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Preface
The purpose of this report is to present the "state-of-the-art" of research on
common property regimes. Hopefully, this report can serve as an introduc~
tion to common property theory for non-specialists, as well as being useful
to scholars who are engaged in research on common property regimes. In
order to aid future research on the subject, the bibliography accompanying
the report is available in electronic form to students and researchers. * With
the staggering amount of new publications in this field, it has been
necessary to limit both the thematic and the geographic coverage. The three
themes which have been selected for c10ser study are coastal fisheries,
rangelands management with an emphasis on East African pastoralism, and
forestry management. It has been necessary to leave out work on irigation,
even though it c1early is a relevant and important theme (cf. Wade 1988;
Coward 1990; Ostrom and Gardner 1993). Regionally, case studies from
Africa and Asia have been preferred over material from the rest of the
world. This delimitation is deferred to pick up important contributions from
the North Atlantic region, inc1uding Northern Norway, as well as Oceania,
because without them, important theoretical contributions would have been
leftout. The bibliography accompanying this report is not exhaustive,
neither was it intended to be so. There has, however, been a conscious
effort to find new, and less well known material in addition to c1assic
material presented elsewhere. The studies selected for inc1usion in the
report reflect their importance in terms of theory and thematic scope, and
'whether they bring new points to the debate. Naturally, a short report of
this kind cannot do justice to the subtlety of the original works, but can
only summarize their mai n points.
*
The bibliography contains 342 entries. A diskette containing the bibliography included
in the report is available from CMI for an additional co st of NOK 50 (including
postage). The diskette contains the bibliography in three different formats: unformatted
text file (ASCII), formatted (WordPerfect 5.1 for DOS) and database file (DataPerfect
2.1). Readers are also advised to consult two excellent bibliographies (Martin 1989,
1992), which provide a number of references to cornon property regimes throughout
the world. They are available directly from Indiana University (USA) on plain paper and
diskette. Online searches can also be done using the Internet (WW: //lib-
gopher .lib. indiana.edu).
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1. The "tragedy of the commons": The
legacy of Hardin
Introduction
Natural resource management has recently generated much multi-
disciplinary research activity. The aric1e which initiated this activity was
Garett Hardin's (1968) essay titled "The Tragedy of the Commons". The
essay's prime aim was to discuss a class of socIal problems which has no
technical solution. One such problem, Hardin argued, is the long term
effects of unrestrained individual maximizing behaviour on a finite resource
base. Hardin proposed that without outside intervention, there was no
solution to this dilemma, and coined it "the tragedy of the commons".
Hardin had drawn on sources in mathematics, biology and economics to
popularize a research theme of great importance: the tension between
individual rationality and collective outcomes.1 Hardin' s deceptively simple
article has had numerous re-readings, but its legacy is (regardless of
whether Hardin was right or wrong) that it provoked research in a theme
that is highly relevant to problems in developing and modern countries
alike (Kehoane and Ostrom 1995).
Despitethe massive critique of Hardin' s thesis, and efforts to revise
(McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes et aL. 1989), rephrase (McCay 1993;
Rose 1986), expand on (Ostrom 1990), or flatly reject his ideas (Berkes
1983), nobody it seems, has been able to dispel the impact the notions
contained in Hardin's paper have had. It is perhaps the wide acceptance of
the view contained in his essay among managers, bureaucrats and state
agencies, which has caused the unending criticism and condemnation of
Hardin's work in almost all the new research on common property regimes.
The first concerted effort to challenge the conventional wisdom about the
demise of common property regimes, was a conference in 1985 on common
property resource management (National Academy Press 1986). The
conference proceedings (ibid.) examined common property regimes in a
The study of rationality has of course, lon g antecedents in the socIal sciences, cf.
Weber's dIstinction between Wertrationalitat and Zweckrationalitat (1987:28 (1922)).
A modern classic in the study of collective action is Olson (1965).
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variety of settings. At the time, the papers represented an unprecedented
wide range of empirical studies, held together by a common analytical
framework (the "Oakerson framework"). Many of the papers presented at
this conference were published in subsequent years in books and edited
volumes by McCay and Acheson (1987), Berkes (1989), Ostrom (1990) and
Bromley (1992). These books have in common that they want to revise
Hardin's originalwork. The problem is that little has emerged from this
critique, either in the form of a new theory or new analytical approaches,
hence there is lack of a coherent theoretical framework. In a review of
Elinor Ostrom's (1990) book Governing the Commons, Field (1992:356)
notes that:
There is a curious lack of congruenee between the material in early and
late chapters, which may help explain why no particular compelling
theory of collective CPR (cornon property resourcesJ institutions
emerges from these pages.
In a review of another major work on common property regimes, Daniel
Bromley's edited volume, Making the Commons Work (1992), Lees
(1993:106, italics in original) observes that:
it is a little surprising to read attacks...on positions which c1aim that
commonproperty inevitably leads to resource mismanagement and
ecological disaster - that is, it is surprising that anyone today would hold
such a position, and that anyone would find it worth the time to refute it.
...On the other hand, the occasional insistence on the intrinsic value of
common property to people and their communities in this collection
sounds somewhat romantic and of ten unnecessarily defensive.
Theeffect of this has been that though there appears to be a considerable
research activity, original contributions which can move the study of
common property regimes beyond a critique of Hardin are lacking (Feeny
et aL. 1990; McKean 1992). Much of the so-called "new" research on
common property management tend to repeat criticism which has long been
absorbed by the research community (Lees 1993). Jf Hardin was "wrong",
how can we construct new models which are informed by the advances
made by social science over the past decades? Before we can answer this
question, there is a ne ed for a review of empirical and theoretical
contributions to the commons debate. Moreover, there is the question of
why common property regimes have commanded scholarly attention across
disciplines.
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Why do we study common property regimes?
The study of common property regimes has attracted numerous scholars
over the last decade. Both political scientists, economists, anthropologists
- and we could no doubt extend the list - have joined forces to study "the
commons". It is difficult to identify a single reason why disciplines which
normally pursue different research agendas, converged to study the
commons. The problem Hardin raised was the divergence betweeri'.
individual rationality and collective outcomes, or to put it differently,
between micromotives and macrobehaviour (McCay and Acheson 1987:2).
Hardin was not the first to bring up this issue, but as he himself
acknowledged, it was first formulated in the early 19th century by William
Forster Lloyd in his pamphIet "On the Checks to Population" (1977
(1833)). Hardin, however, gave Lloyd's ideas a more general form, saying
that there is a fundamental difference in interest between users sharing a
resource which, Hardin argued, could not be solved unless they willingly
restrained their own freedom of action through "mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon" (1968: 1247). Especially Hardin's parable linking rationality
with pastoralism attracted scholarly interest. The argument was simple. Jf
a herdsman adds another animal to his fields, the positive gain, or utility for
him could be denoted + 1. For the other herdsmen sharing the same pasture,
the added grazing pressure represents a negative utility which can be
denoted -lin (n = the number of herdsmen). For the individual herdsman,
Hardin claimed, the rational response is to add as many animals as possible
to his herd. This was a simple and immediately attractive proposition which
seemed applicable to a number of situations of shared resource use, and
suddenly resources which previously had nothing in common - air, fish,
public transport and drinking water - were found to share a singular trait;
they were shared resources, or in short, a "commons". Naturally, this
opened newareas for comparative research, and to some degree explains
why the fie1d has grown so rapidly. The problem of rationality and resource
management could be approached empirically in studies of natural resource
management; it could be investigated by applying game theory or it could
be used to investigate issues in relation to the structure of institutions,
human behaviour and choice.
Apart from the theoretical issues in the research on common property
regimes, the field has wide ranging practical implications and is therefore
relevant to development interventions. Keywords in this respect are
security, equity, community-based resource management, resource
conservation and ecological sustainability (Berkes and Farvar 1989: 11ff.).
Around the world resources critical to people's livelihood are under
pressure (Blakie and Brookfield 1987), and this is not only a threat say, to
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East African pastoralists (Graham 1988; Lane 1990), but equally to Saami
pastoralists in Northern Norway (Berge et aL. 1994; section 3; Bjørklund
1990; Stenseth et aL. 1991:ch. 2). In paricular, it seems that institutions
which govern the use of common pool resources are being eroded by
diverse forces such as population growth, market integration, urbanization
and government interference. In paricular, state policies have eroded, or in
some cases, actively dismantled traditional institutions without replacing
them with functional equivalent institutions within a framework of state
resource management.
An important question, then, is whether local level management can be
reintroduced or reinstituted as an intermediate form? "Management" is not
a very precise term, but could be defined as the "balancing of labour and
material inputs to the natural system in order to enhance its carrying
capacity and achieve a profitable and sustainable lev el of production"
(Watson 1989:55). Management, according to this definition, has the
positive connotation of utilizing a resource in such away that it continues
to benefit its users. At the outset, local management seems to offer an
advantage over state management due to lower transaction costs, and at the
same time, by keeping aresource open to legitimate users, avoids the
alienation that is a consequence of privatization. However, as McGranahan
points out: "Advocates of reinvigorated common property institutions must
show not only that common property was effective in the past, but that it
can be effective in the future" (1991:1285). One of the aims of this report
is to look more closely into how institutions change their form and
function, and how diverse forces such as population growth, market
integration and state. intervention influence traditional. institutionsand alter
their legitimacy and relevance. Moreover, this study is particularly
concerned with "local institutions" as a possible solution to the high
. transaction costs associated with state management and the equity problems
that arise from privatization (Seabright 1993: 125ff.). The term "local
institutions" is imprecise. It will be used here to denote institutions which
have one ormore of the following characteristics: a) govem resource use
ina bounded or restricted area (spatial dimension), b) are devised and
enforced by socIal groups (whether indigenous or not), c) are informal, that
is, unrecognized by central authorities and not part of statutory law. The
term "local institution" as defined here does not, however, imply that an
institution must be traditional in the sense that is has been in place for a
long time, neither does the term disqualify institutions which are the result
of local innovation.
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What is meant by "common property"?
Research on common property, the specific class of property relations
which concems us here, has suffered from a lack of accuracy and analytical
rigour. Bromley (1989a, 1991:ch. 2) has suggested a conceptual scheme
which removes the ambiguity connected to the term "common property
resources". First, it is important to keep the terms "resource" and "regime"
separate from each other. Property, as Bromley (1991:ch. 1) has pointed
out, is a benefit (or income) stream and a property right is a claim to such
a benefit stream. Common property is a paricular type of property rights,
not typìcal of a paricular class of natural resources. Despite being
analytically ambiguous, the term "common property resources" is still
widely used (Berkes 1989; Seabright 1993). Bromley has suggested that
"the term common property resource is abandoned in favour of the more
correct common property regime" (1991 :2, italics in original).
Bromley distinguishes between four different types of property regimes:
state property, private property, common property and non-property regimes
(see also, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). The term "non-property regimes" is
important because this toa, is of ten interpreted differently. The reason
Bromley adopts the term "non-property regimes" is to underline that in a
situation where nobody lays claim to aresource (i.e., the benefit stream) we
can no longer talk about "property" . In much of the literature on the
subject, the preferred term is "open-access", that is, entry is unrestricted and
the resource is open for allpotential users. The problem with the term
"open-access" is that researchers have tended to define it differently. Some
authors use the term "open-access" as synonymous with "common
property" . The confusion of these very different situations is usually
attributed to Hardin's original work (1968). Among the first to point this
out were Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975), who argued that Hardin
failed to comprehend the difference between shared ownership ("common
property") and situations of diffuse or non-existent property rights ("open-
access").
Another attempt to clarify the termnology of common property regimes,
is Ostrom' s (1990) introduction of the term "common pool resources". This
term is linked to another way of ariving at a definition of common
property, namely by introducing the concepts of "excludability" and
"subtractability" (Feeny et aL. 1990:3; see also Oakerson 1992). By
excludability it is meant that the resource is of such a kind that it is
difficult or costly to exc1ude other potential users. A typical example of this
. is migratory fish stocks. Subtractability means that one user' s harvest
subtracts or diminishes other users' gains from the resource. This is typical
of most natural resources, but the classic example is pastures where adding
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more animals negatively affects other herdsmen. Ostrom (1990) has
suggested the term "common pool resources" for the particular c1ass of
property where exclusion is difficult and one user' s gain is the other' sloss
(i.e., the resource is subtractable).
Common pool resources share properties both with the class of resources
known to economists as "public goods" and "private goods". Public goods
are those goods where one user' suse or consumption does not reduce
others possibility to consume.2 Private goods, on the other hand, are goods
where one user' s consumption reduces what can be consumed by others by
the same amounL Unlike pure public goods where exc1usion is either
difficult or impossible (such as street lighting), common pool resources
allow for exclusion, but not to the degree possible in private goods. Runge
(1984a:808) distinguishes between private and common property rights in
this way: "Property institutions characterized by rights of exclusion are
2 The original definition of public goods is attributed to Samuelson (1954). In pure public
goods there is no rivalr among users (x = xi = xi = x3 ...). Private goods, on the other
hand, can be defined as (x = xi + Xl + x3 ...), i.e., there is rivalr among the users.
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of ten called private property; while those characterized by rights of
inclusion are terme d public or common property" .
The advantages of common property regimes can be seen as a trade-off
between ecological uncertainty (for example, erratic rainfall and drought)
and behavioural uncertainty: what is the probability that other users will
maximize their own benefit? (Figure 1). Private. property reduces the
behavioural uncertainty - the owner and user is the same person - but
gives less protection against ecological uncertainty (Wilson and Thompson
1993). For an open-access situation this is reversed; there is no check on
individual action (high behavioural uncertainty), but ecological uncertainty
is low (as long as degradation does not occur) because a herdsmen can
mo ve his animals to any pasture which offers good grazing.
Defining institutions
This study looks in paricular at the role of local institutions in natural
resource management: what are institutions and why are they needed?
Among the first to argue that institutions are important to understand why
common property regimes break down or endure were Ciriacy- W antrup and
Bishop (1975). They developed a conceptual framework for institutional
analysis (ibid.:716), and posited three hierarchicallevels of decision making
systems which they termed the operating level, the institutional level and
the policy leveL. They argued that in non-market economies, in formal
regulations such as customs and taboos are adequate to achieve sustainable
use of resources. After reviewing a selection of European examples,
Ciriacy- W antrup and Bishop conclude that common ownership of resources
can function satisfactorily in a market economy too (ibid.:721). What is
unclear from Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop's aricle is exactly what role
institutions play in the management of common property regimes.
Social scientists working on common property management are quick to
put the label "institution" on any condition regulating resource use, but are
characteristically vague about how to define the term (cf. Acheson
1989a:358; Askvik 1993:150; Vedeld 1992). Before discussing the role
institutions play or should play, we ne ed to clarify what an institution is.
There are, broadly speaking, two ways of viewing institutions among socIal
scIentists. The first is the "bottom up view" which sees institutions first of
all as the outcome, the aggregate of individual action (Ostrom 1986). Here
institutional change results from actors changing preferences or changing
constraints (opportunity set), what we could term a "voluntaristic" view of
institutional change (Askvik 1993: 152). The other approach takes a
normative perspective, arguing that institutions shape peoples action and
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preferences. In this view, changing preferences come about as a result of
institutional change, what we could term the "determnistic" position (ibid.).
In a review of the study of institutions, Askvik (ibid.) points to the fact
that the term institution refers both to a micro and a macro phenomenon.
From the micro perspective institutions are of ten identified simply as
organizations, whereasthe macro perspective reserves the term for entities
such as "the state" or "the economy" (ibid.: 151). Both these strands in the
study of institutions would agree that to qualify as an institution requires
a degree of permanence as well as independence of the personneI attached
to or organized by it. As Askvik points out, an institution may or may not
be 'an organization (and vice versa). North (1990:5) wants to keep the two
distinct from each other, and argues that institutions represent - to use a
sports analogy - the rules of the game, whereas organizations represent a
set of players, a team, working within the framework of these rules towards
specific objectives.
This duality in the study of institutions is expressed by Ridell (1982:56)
who distinguishes between institutions understood as a normative concept
within the social structure, from the more dynamic meaning of institutions
referring to the ability of people to assert their collective will to reach some
goal vis-à-vis each other and the environment. Similarly, Ostrom (1986:3-4)
lists two standard definitions of institutions as either "rules about behaviour,
especially about making decisions" or "equivalent to the term 'political
structure"'. In the same vein as Ostrom, Runge (1984a:807) defines
institutions "as a public system of rules that specify certain forms of action
as permissable, others as forbidden, and provide for certain penalties and
defenses when violations occur". In herbook, Bow Institutions Think, Mary
Douglas (1986:46) defines institutions simply as "a convention". In contrast
to theminimalist definition offered by Douglas, a more comprehensive
definition of institutions is given in North (1991:97):
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economIc and sodal interaction. They consist of both informal constraints
(sanctions, taboos, customs, tradition, and codes of conduet), and formal
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).
In another of North's works on institutions (1990:4) he adds that
"Institutions may be formal and informal, and they may be created or have
evolved through time". This brings us to the second question: why are
institutions needed? One of the simplest answers to this question is
providedby North (1991:97) who argues that: "Throughout history,
institutions have be en devised by human beings to create order and reduce
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uncertainty in exchange". More specifically, North argues that effective
institutions lower transactions costs hence reduce the risk of defection and
enable cooperative solutions (ibid.).
To answer the counter-question of why do institutions not evolve,
North adopts an explicitly evolutionist perspective (1991: 102). In a tribal
economy thereare strong moral constraints to innovative behaviour -and
constant struggles for power. This serves to constrain the development of .
institutions thatotherwise could have facilitated trade. At the next level,
North discusses bazaar economies in North Africa and the Middle East,
which even if they represent a step up the ladder, are still constrained by
a lack of uniform price and weight agreements. A third, and further
refinement was the caravan trade which moved commodities and cash over
long distances, but still was unable to institute formal rules securing the
trade and instead had to rely on negotiating informal and temporary
agreements based on trust and honour (ibid.: 105).
According to North, modern states represent the highest leve! of
institutional complexity. To explain "the interrelationship between the state,
property rights, and productivity" (Eggertsson 1990:319), North adopts the
terms "technical production frontier" and "structural production fron tier" .
Broadly speaking, the highest level of productive specialization in a society
is the technical production fron tier, whereas the most effective way of
organizing production, inc1uding property rights, defines its structural
production frontier. Maximum output is secured by bringing these two
frontiers as dose to each other as possible. North argues that historical
evidence shows that states have been unable to accomplish this, which has
limited the potential economic output. (For a critique of this view, see Field
1981).
Many socIal scientists seem to take institutions for granted, thereby
avoiding the question of why they exist in the first place. North (1990:6)
has proposed that:
The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by
establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human
interaction. ... InstItutional change is a complicated process because the
changes at the margin can be a consequence of changes in rules, in
informal constraints and in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement.
Central to North' s argument is that effective institutions reduce trans action
costs. Only in situations where there are perfect information and zero
transaction costs, are there no need for institutions (North 1990:57).
Institutions are, in North's view, first of all a means to enable economic
transactions. This is,however, only one of many possible approaches to the
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study of institutions. The definitions of the term "institution" discussed
above imply that the primar aim of an institution is economic (North
1991). However, this is not necessarily the case, and in the following we
will review a number of ethnographic studies which reflect the diversity of
local institutions for natural resource management. The questions which
concern us here are not only what institutions are, but what they do and
accomplish, how they are altere d or changed and whether institutions can
be revived or reinstated.
To summarize, there are two different ways of understanding institutions;
either as a micro-Ievel phenomenon which is created by actors for specific
ends, or as a macro entity which strcture human action. For North,
institutions are first of all vehicles which structure economic behaviour, and
efficient institutions enhance economic transactions by lowering transaction
costs. There is less to be leamed from North's work about institutions
whose function is not readily identifiable as "economic". This is
problematic, because we know that small-scale communities lack the
institutional specialization found in modern states (Weiner 1994:591). There
is, for example, a wealth of literature on small-scale communities which
demonstrate that institutions whose function is not primarily economic, may
still have economic implications. Examples of such institutions are religion
(Rappaport 1968; Keiser 1991), magic (Fortes 1937), kinship (Brox 1964;
Hviding and Baines 1994), village solidarity (Taylor 1987), aspects of
social organization such as hierarchy (Park 1992) and age-grade sets
(Tvedten 1990).
Analytical approaches to the study of property regimes and
collective action
There are number of different analytical approaches to the study of property
regimes and collective action. The frequent overlapping of approaches,
however, tends to blur their origins. For the sake of clarity, we will review
four different approaches to the study of property regimes and collective
action. The first approach builds on the seminal work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1945) where problems of collective action are analyzed from
the perspective of games (game theory). The second approach is the
contribution some economists have made in developing a theory of property
rights (the property rights school). The third research strand is - broadly
speaking - a reaction to the tenets of game theory and the property rights
school, and aims to revise Hardin's (1968) hypothesis (the revisionist
approach). The last and most recent theoretical framework inc1udes
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elements such property rights, transaction costs and institutional analysis
(neoinstitutional economics). Each of these approaches are reviewed in
more detail below.
Game theory
The principal use of "games" is to study problems of collective action. A
game can be defined as "a situation in which the actions of one person
perceptibly affect the welfare of another and vice versa" (Heap et aL.
1992:94). When two or more actors share a resource,their choices and
behaviour can be modeled as games and used to predict the outcomes of
decision makng dilemmas. There are two main categories of games;
co operative and non-cooperative games. However, cooperative and non-
cooperative games should not be understood as different "classes" of
games; rather they denote the outcome of the game under the prevailing set
of rules and incentives. In this short review we willlook more closely at
a) the prisoner's dilemma game, b) Nash-equilibria, c) repeated games, d)
the multiperson prisoner' s dilemma game and e) the assurance problem.
The most frequently quoted example from game theory is the prisoner' s
dilemma (Wade 1987). In this game, as well as other games of the same
type ("game of chicken"), paricipants lack information about each others
choices, and only have the choice to cooperate or defect. The combination
of these strategies produces four different payoffs indicated in the matrix
(Figure 2, next page). The players cannot communicate with each other, but
the outcome of one player' s decision affects the result (payoff) of the
other' s decision. The prisoners may confess that they both to ok part in the
crime ("cooperate"), thus both will receive a short sentence (1, 1). Jf, on the
other hand, one of them confesses and the other does not, one is released
while the other gets a long prison term, hence the payoffs (2, -2) and (-2,
2). Jf neither of them confesses ("defect"), both get a short prison sentence
(-1, -1). Jf this game is played on ly once, known as a "single-period"
game, the dominant, but Pareto-inferior,3 strategy is for both players to
defect (-1, -1).
3 Pareto efficiency - named after the Italian econornst Vilfredo Pareto - is a measure of
how efficient resources are allocated. Efficiency in this context means that it is not
possible to reallocate resources in such a way as to make at least one of them better off
and none of them worse off. In the prisoner' s dilerna the Pareto optimal solution is the
cooperative outcome (1, l).
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Figure 2
The prisoner' s dilemma
First person Second person
Cooperate Defect
(1, 1) (-2, 2)
(2, -2) (-1, -1)
Cooperate
Defect
The prisonef' s dilemma game can also be used to illustrate the seminal
contribution made by John Nash (1951) to the development of game theory.
N ash demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium point - later known as
the Nash-equilibrium - which can be defined as "a set of strategies, one for
each player, such that given the strategies being played by others, no player
can improve on her pay-off by adopting an alternative strategy" (Heap et
aL. 1992: 101). Whereas Pareto optimality only depicts the frontier of the
most efficient solutions (which, generally, are unattainable unless players
cooperate), Nash-equilibria are points (payoffs) where competing players
are most likely to end up, and will have no incentive to move from this
point. N ash-equilibria are hence, very important in order to predict where
players will end up (their payoff) in a real-world situation. In the prisoner' s
dilemma game, the non-cooperative pair (-1, -1) is a Nash-equilibrium.
There is another lesson to be leamed from the prisoner' s dilemma game.
The tendency to defect is stronger than the desire to cooperate, and if
possible, people will try to maximize their own benefit by moving costs on
to others. A way to illustrate this is to examine a grazing context. Let us
imagine that the users on the outset. have agreed to a maximum limit of
animals per herdsman ("stinting"). There is in this case a strong incentive
to break this limit (defect), which will benefit the violater and be
detrimental to those who comply with limit (cooperate). In game theory this
strategy is known as "free riding" (Runge 1984b). Those who choose to
cooperate will in the long run lose out, aresult known as the "sucker' s
outcome". Thus, to prevent free riding there is a need for incentives (e.g.,
penalties): where these are lacking the free-rider strategy will be dominant
as predicted in the prisoner' s dilemma. Another reason for free-rider
behaviour is that the users do not pay for the intrinsic productivity of the
resource ("resource rent"), for example, the grass grows without graziers'
investments. This means that there are no immediate costs involved with
increasing the number of animals.4
4 Whereas Hardin (1968) does not mention game theory in his essay, his "tragedy of the
cornons" parable is prernsed on the same "non-zero-sum" argument which underpins
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Figure 3
Defection and cooperation in a MPD-game
Payoff to
agent (n + 1)
o
m
n
Number of other agents
choosing to cooperate
Adopted from Runge 1992:24
Jf the prisoner' s dilemma is played not once, but many times, known as
iterated or repeated games, there is no dominant strategy (North 1990: 13).
One of the first who argued in favour of the possibility of cooperation in
repeated games, was Robert Axelrod in his thesis The Evolution of
Cooperation (1984; see also, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1393). He showed
that in an experimental set-up, "egoists" could cooperate if they adopted the
so-called "tit-for-tat strategy" - cooperate the first time and thereafter to do
whatever your opponent did the previous time - was always the winning
strategy (Badcock 1988). In other words, a tit-for-tat strategy is neither
exploitative, nor can it be exploited. Apar from the opening move, if the
opponent defects so will you; if he cooperates so will you. B y adopting a
tit-for-tat strategy, cooperation may emerge spontaneously without state or
other external intervention (North 1990:13).
The prisoner' s dilemma is a simple game, but it highlights the problem
of individual rationality and collective outcomes. A more complex version
of this game, is the multiperson prisoner's dilemma (MPD). In his analysis
of a MPD-game, Runge (1985:369; 1986:626ff.) found that the outcome
was dependent on the structure of incentives and the number of persons
the prisoner's, dilerna game.
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following the rules. Jf enough players complied with the rules, this "critical
mass" of players would also make it advantageous for the rest to comply,
hence less coercion would be needed. This is represented by the point k in
the figure reproducedabove (Figure 3). C and D are two linear payoff
curves, and D (defection) lies above C (cooperation) because defection is
a strictly dominant strategy. In this example k = n/2, which means that
when half of the agents choose to cooperate, they will start to reap positive
payoffs (see, Runge 1992, for a fuller explanation).
The lesson from Runge's example is that there exists a threshold where
voluntary cooperation is preferred over defection. Regardless of the
resource in question, the information about choices made by other players
is central to actors' own strategies, and of course affects the outcome. This
problem - what will be B' s response to A' s action - is often termed the
assuranee problem (see Brox 1986; Runge 1981). To explain the nature of
the assurance problem, we need to make a short detour to the seminal work
of Amartya Sen (1967) who c1arified the difference between the assurance
problem and the isolation paradox. In his analysis of a multi-person non-
cooperative game, Sen theorised the following conditions: (a) the players
always prefer to do A instead of B, and can only choose either of them; (b)
given the choice of everybody do ing A and everybody doing B, each player
prefers B instead of A. Given these conditions, Sen argued, it follows that:
(1) the outcome will be Pareto inferior, (2) there is strict dominance of
individual strategies, and (3) there isa need for enforcement (to get people
to choose B over A).5 The rigorous dominance of strategies which are
Pareto inferior in this game, Sen termed the "isolation paradox" .
To analyze the assurance problem, Sen modified rule (a) in the example
above: if everybody chooses B, the individual player will also choose B. Jf
the player has complete assurance that the other will choose B, he will also
choose B and no enforcement is necessary. Sen named this the "assurance
problem" (ibid.:115). In the assurance problem there is no strictly dominant
strategy, and one of the equilibrium points may be Pareto-optimal. Whether
the outcome is Pareto-optimal or not (ibid.: 122):
depends on what each individual expects about others action. To get out
of the problem all that is necessar is that each individual is assured that
others are doing the "right" thing, and then it is in one's own interest also
to do the "right" thing. No enforcement is necessary.
5 In the special case of this example of only two players (N = 2), this multi-person game
becorIes a case of the prisoner' s dilerna (Sen 1967: 113).
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Whereas the "isolation paradox" is an example of a non-cooperative game,
the "assurance problem" on the other hand is a (potentially) cooperative
game. Following Sen' s original exposition of the assurance problem, Runge
(1981:600ff.) analyzes this as a two-person co operative game without a
dominant strategy for either player. Instead of the zero information
commonly implied in the framing of the assurance problem, Runge
proposes that in a real world situation, an 'actor will know the strategies of .
the others with some degree of certainty. In game theoretical models such
as the prisoner' s dilemma, the options in the game are known to the
. paricipants, but they do not know anything about the actual choices made
by other players. This drives the outcome of the game towards defection for
both parties ("the isolation paradox"). Translated to a grazing context this
means that both users will add more animals to their herds until it is no
longer rational for each of them to do so (i.e., until they drive the rent from
grazing fields to zero). This Pareto-inferior solution can be avoided, Runge
claims, because in a typical grazing con text, herdsmen can to some degree
trust, or be assured, that fellow herdsmen will cooperate. It is in other
words a "problem of cooperation, in game-theoretic terms...known as the
'assurance problem'" (ibid.:600). A better way to model a grazing context
is, according to Runge, an interdependent model where there is "no
domìnant strateg y for either individual" (ibid.:601). Runge proposes a
coordination model where actors choose among a limited set of
interdependent choices, which leads to cooperation as the dominant
outcome. 6 In a grazing con text, Runge claims overgrazing is not caused by
free-rider strategy, but rather by interdependent actors who are unable to
coordinate and enforce their actions (1986:631). To return briefly to the
importance of institutions, the works of Sen (1967) and Runge (1986:630)
show that if institutions can provide each player with the assurance that all
the others will choose the option which is in everybody' s best interest, the
outcome will be cooperative behaviour (see also, Larson and Bromley
1990:238-41).
Whereas game theory is acknowledged as an important tool for analyzing
strategic behaviour and decision makng dilemmas, some will question
whether game theoretical applications are advanced enough to portray real-
world situations (Bardhan 1993:91; Brox 1986; North 1990:15). Responding
to such criticism, newer and more sophisticated dynamic ("evolutionary")
models are currently being developed (van Damme 1993; Sumaila n.d.). In
a static game such as the single period prisoner' s dilemma, the rules and
6 For a critique of Runge's analysis of the assurance problem, see Palmquist and Pasour
(1982).
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incentives are fixed, and there is a strict dominance of individual strategy
("defection") which means that the payoff is unchanged ("static
equilibrium"). In dynamc (evolutionar) models by contrast, there are no
fixedrules, and the payoff is changed as the game proceeds. Players
repeatedly try out different strategies, review the results and try alternative
strategies, muchas real-world strategiesseemto be worked .out. Regardless
of their leve! of sophistication, game theoretical models have strongly
influenced the way we perceive common property dilemmas, and the way
we analyze problems of individual rationality and collective outcomes.
The property rights school
Property rights are - in the economic sense - more than just controlover
assets. The social character of property rights was developed by economists
such as Demsetz (1967), A1chian and Demsetz (1973) and Furubotn and
Pejovich (1972). Furubotn and Pejovich (ibid.: 1139, italics in original) have
pointed out that:
property rights do not refer to relations between man and things, but,
rather, to the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from
the existence of things and pertain to their use. Property rights
assignments specify the norms of behaviour with respect to things that
each and every person must observe in his interactions with other persons,
or bear the costs for nonobservance.
This approach to the study of property rights developed into what came to
be known as the "property rights school", and it is often referred to as the
"property rights paradigm" or "the naÏve theory of property rights"
(Eggertsson 1990:250). To explain the formation of this concept, the
property rights school employed the concept of "externalties", a concept
attributed to the work of Arhur Pigou (1920). A common definition of
externalties is a situation described by Angelsen (1992: 11) where: .
a consumer' s welfare or a producer' s production is affected by variables
whose values are chosen by others, without particular attention to the
effects on. the other actors' welfare or production.
In laymen's terms externalties are situations where A's actions inflict harm
(or benefit) on B. Adding another animal to a herd benefits the owner, but
for other users of the same pasture, this represents a negative externality.
The solution to such problems is, Demsetz (1967) argues, to internalize
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Figure 4
Cost and benefits from establishing private property rights
Costs
and
benefits Marginal costs
Marginal benefits
Q E Definition and
enforcement activities
Adopted from Eggertson 1990:253
externalties. This means that the costs of negative externalties should be
borne by those who cause them. One way to do this is to privatize
resources, another to introduce taxes or fines. Introducing private property
rights will cause some extemalties to disappear but may also create others.
Demsetz (1967:350) argues that: "Property rights develop to internalize
externalties when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost
of internalization". In other words that the evolution of private property
rights takes place "when the benefits of claiming rights exceed the costs of
negotiating and enforcing those rights" (Stevenson 1991:67; see also
Anderson and Hill 1990). To give an example: Jf a group of herdsmen
decide to close a paricular pasture by puttingup a fence, they will have to
ca1culate whether the time spent and money used to build a fence and
control trespassers, is worth the gain over the present arrangement with
losses due to illegal grazing (Anderson and Hill 1975).
This argument can be presented in graphic form (Figure 4), and the
figure shows the inverse relationship between the costs of exc1usion
(marginal costs) and the profits (marginal benefits). The point of
intersection between the curves, QE' is the equilibrium point showing the
leve! of exclusion activity. Introducing cheap barbed wire (Anderson and
Hill 1975), will shift the marginal cost function down, which in turn, will
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increase the exc1usion activity. Similarly, if the value of the resource
increases, the marginal benefit curve will move outwards, thus exclusion
activity increases (Eggertsson 1990:253-54). The problem with this "naÏve"
approach to the formation of property rights, is that it neither takes in to
consideration free-rider behaviour nor political interestgroups (ibid.).7 To
summarize, theproperty rights approachimplicitly or explicitly endorsesan
evolutionary transition from communal property to private property rights.
Its principal deficiency is, as Furubotn and Pejovich (1972: 1140) see it, that
the property rights approach lacks a theory of the state, thus the focus on
property rights becomes incomplete.
The "revisionist" approach
During the last decade, there has be en a rapid increase of new research
which has as its stated aim to refute Hardin's "tragedy of the commons"
hypothesis. This research strand is also a reaction to the property rights
school, which c1aims that private property is better at protecting resources
than other property regimes. Rebutting Hardin and the property rights
paradigm have become a school of its own, which we could call the
"revisionists" (McCay 1993). Thotigh the "revisionists" by no means
constitute a uniform group, they represent - on the grounds of their
common research agenda - an alternative approach to research on common
property regimes. As the term "revise" implies, this is an effort to amend
Hardin's thesis, not to replace it with an alternative theory. As Acheson
(1989a:375) puts it: "Because of the work of anthropologists, the theory of
common-property resources needs to be extended and modified in several
ways". The thrst of the revisionist critique has been empirical, that is, to
bring forward new evidence that rebuts Hardin's thesis (Berkes 1989;
Bromley 1992; McCay and Acheson 1987).
One of the revisionists, James M. Acheson, dismisses the assumption
that private property provides a better protection of resources than does
common. property regimes. Acheson claims that almost "all the basic
axioms on which the (HardinJ model is based are flawed" (1989a:375).
According to Acheson, the list offlawed axiomatic assumptions include; (1)
that common property means the absence of property rights (i.e., open-
access); (2) that everywhere there is a level of technical capacity to over-
7 Another application of the "naÏve theory of property rights", is North and Thomas'
(1977) attempt to explain the first econornc revolution - the transition from hunting to
agriculture. North and Thomas perceive this shift as the first tangible exampleof creating
property rights through closing the open cornons (ibid.:235).
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exploit resources; (3) that there is a general inability to craft effective local
institutions for resource management; and finally (4) that only private
property or government intervention represents a viable solution to resource
management. The contribution of anthropologists to the study of common
property regimes has essentially been to revise common property theory on
the grounds that it does not account for the persistence of a number of
c ommun al arrangements, and that it conflates common property and
situations of open-access (McCay and Acheson 1987). In other words,
overuse of resources is not caused by the breakdown of "common
property" , but includes situations where there are no property rights, hence
no effective management of resources ("open-access").
As already mentioned, a wish to revise Hardin's thesis is more evident
among this group than the intent to put forward an alternative theory or
research program. It is indicative, perhaps, that instead of new theory, there
has been an effort among researchers to present their results within a
common framework, known as the "Oakerson framework" (Oakerson
1992). First presented to a workshop on common property management in
1985 (Oakerson 1986), the Oakerson framework remains in wide use -
despite occasional criticism (Cousins 1993). Oakerson c on siders the
interaction between four factors: physical and technological attributes,
decision makng arrangements, patterns of interaction, and outcomes (Figure
5). The physical and technological attributes represent characteristics of the
. resource itself such as jointness, indivisibility and exclusion. Perfect
"jointness" means that the resource is a "pure public good", in other words
one person's use does not detract from the use of others (Samuelson 1954).
Indivisibility refers to whether the resource is divisible or not, and
exclusion to whether potential users can exclude other claimants from using
the resource.
The second aspect, decision making, refers to "who decides what in
relation to whom" (ibid. :456), whereas patterns of interaction refers to the
range of possible strategies available to actors. Actors may heed by the
rules or ehoose ntOm freenride~ Gutcomes--refersto-distribution, equit-y, -and
other measures of institutional efficiency. The strength of Oakerson' s
framework is as an heuristic tool which "can be used to analyze common
property problems whatever their particular resource or facility" (1986:14).
Further, it allows for a case-by-case analysis and that it organizes features
which are shared among different common property regimes. Its weakness
is that to only to a limited degree does it contribute to theory; in paricular
it does not explain why property regimes remain unchanged over time, or
why one property regime is replaced by another. To do that, it seems, a
more comprehensive theory of institutional change is needed.
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The institutional approach: Neoinstitutional economics
In this study we are particularly interested in the role of institutions and
how they are related to property rights, economic behaviour and collective
action. The institutional approach to comparative economic analysis has its
roots in the economic historian Karl Polanyi's classic work, The Great
Transformation (1944). Though the work of Polanyi has faded from main-
stream interest, it has been taken up again by North (1977) and Halperin
(1984). Halperin claims that even though institutions were important to
Polanyi' s theories, he never attempted to define the term: "In all of his
writing, Polanyi made clear that institutions were the key units of economic
analysis, but he never provided an unambiguous, succinct definition of the
term" (ibid.:250). There is a definite link between Polanyi's work and the
questions of which concem us here: how do we explain the transition from
non-market to market exchange, a shift which seems to be premised on a
move from communal to private property regimes?
The most recent, and perhaps most ambitious, attempt to work out a
theory of institutional change is found within neoinstitutional economics.
Put simply, neoinstitutional economics use the traditional neoclassical
method 'of rational individual actors to study institutions, and is concerned
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with how and why property rights and institutions change. More
specifically, neoinstitutional economics is concerned with a) how
institutions affect individual choice, and b) how institutions change. Since
it reflects the objective of this study, it deserves a broader presentation than
the other approaches which. have been described. The following outline of
neoinstitutional economics builds on the work of Douglass North (1985,
1990, 1991) and Thràinn Eggertsson (1990). The innovative part of the. .
approach advocated by North and Eggertsson merges property rights theory
with a consideration of transaction costs within a framework of institutions.
The foundations of neoinstitutional economics are the ordering or
routinization of action (institutions), the costs of exchange (trans action
costs), and human motivation and behaviour (rational choice). We have
alreadydiscussed how North perceived institutions as essentially malleable
and a result of human agency, as well as the links his work has to that of
Karl Polanyi. Polanyi argued that there were three different "transactional
modes": reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange. In his re-reading
of Polanyi, North (1977) tries to salvage the neoclassical assumption of
maximising behaviour, at the same time as he criticizes Polyani for being
unable to explain why one transactional mode was replaced by another. To
understand this, North contends, we need to introduce transaction-costs
analysis in combination with a theory of the state (ibid.:715).
Despite the fact that the term transaction costs is widely used, it is
difficult to agree on a clear-cut definition of the term. North defines it
simply as the "costs of defining and enforcing property rights" (1977:710).
The term was originally developed by Ronald Coase in his ground-breaking
work on "the firm" . In his article, "The N ature of the Firm", Coase
(1937:394) asked the deceptively simple question: given the benefits of
large firms, why are there any market transactions outside firms at all:
"Why is not all production caried out by one big firm?" The answer is,
Coase argued, the additional costs of organising extra transactions which
serve to limit the potential size and efficiency of firms (ibid.:396). Coase
developed what came to be known as the "Coase theorem" in more detail
later (1960) in order to discuss the scenario (implied in neoc1assical
economics) of a situation of zero transaction costs. Jf trans action costs were
not inc1uded into the equation, Coase argued, the most efficient solution
giving rise to the maximum income would predominate and that this would
be independent of the initial distribution ofproperty rights (North 1990:93).
In a review of the property rights approach, Libecap (1986:228) argues that
when transaction costs are high, the initial distribution of property rights
becomes very important. Likewise, North argues that low or non-existent
transaction costs are rare, and this explains why inefficient institutional
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arrangements persist (1990:93). In the same vein as North, Bromley
(1989b:181) argues that transaction costs are never zero, not the least when
one considers that "transacting with future generations is infinitely costly".
The third important par of neoinstitutional economics is what motivates
people's actions within institutions. In neoclassical economics, the
behavioral assumptions rest on "rational .choice .theory". This .analytical
perspective takes as an a priori condition that actors maximize self-interest
in a consistent manner. Though North obviously finds this toa constricting,
he is not clear on where his approach differs from rational choice theory,
except that it assumes that people do not always act in self-interest and may
also be motivated by an element of altruism. To North, the purose of
institutions is to channel individual action by penalizing choices which have
negative outcomes for the collective. North (ibid.) has stressed the role
informal rules and constraints play in order to regulate behaviour, but even
if North modifies the extreme "homo economicus" concept, he retains the.
basic features of rational choice theory.
Induced institutional innovation ?
Where do institutions "belong" in economic analysis? Are they exogenous
or endogenous? This important point is discussed by Richard Grabowski
(1988), who points to some problems in the way institutional change is
treated in neoinstitutional economics. Grabowski notes that whereas
neoclassical economics conventionally has assumed that institutions are
exogenous, neoinstitutional economics as presented by Douglass North
(especially in his earlier works), makes institutional change endogenous by
viewing change from the point of actors' choices ("rational choice theory").
According to North and other neoinstitutionalists, institutional innovation
. is a result of actors' changing preferences (or changing constraints) within
a cost-benefit framework. For institutional innovation to occur, either the
costs of changing it must be reducedor alternatively, the benefits increased
(ibid.:386). Grabowski provides a critique of this argument, by pointing out
the inconsistencies this position suffers from. The norms and traditions
which shape actors preferences and hence, their perceptions of costs and
benefits, must, a priori, be a par of their constitution as actors. This means
that this part of their cultural make-up as actors, cannot be made
endogenous. To escape this epistemological problem, such factors have to
be made external to the mode!. This leads to further problems, because the
neoinstitutional approach can now only explain change in what is termed
"secondary institutions" (such as acts and choices) but not in the primary
processes that motivate action (ibid.:388).
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Secondly, for the theory of induced institutional change to hold, actors
must be assured that they will benefit from such change. Introducing
lessons from game theory, Grabowski (ibid.:388) argues that this would be
consistent with the "assurance game", but not a "prisoner' s dilemma" type
of situation where outside enforcement is necessary. Thus, induced.
. . institutional innovation may hold in the first case,- but not in the latter. The
reason why an assurance game situation of ten seems to be prevalent - and
hence North's model of institutionalchange valid - is because people tend
to share a common ideology which serves to constrain the diversity of
moral and ethical judgments. This minimizes enforcement costs, and
enhances institutional stability. Rapid socIal change, however, tends to
promote ideological diversity, which means that enforcement costs rise
steeply and explains why institutional collapse seems to be a feature of
such periods. In the latter case, argues Grabowski (ibid.:390), neo-
institutional economics is unable to explain such change because of "the
increased importance of enforcement costs and our inability to understand
them" . Grabowski ' s critique of induced institutional innovation, suggests
that neoinstitutional economics is not a panacea which has sol ved all
epistemological problems related to institutional change and innovation.
There is also the question whether "rational choice theory" can account for
other forms of rationality, including variations which are culturally
constituted (Peters 1993:1072ff.).
Rationality and intentionality
Economic rationality is important to most, if not all, discussions on
common property regimes. We have previously discussed the problem of
individual versus collective rationality, exemplified by Hardin' s allegory
"the tragedy of the commons". Another problem of rationality concems
how to account for economic rationality which cannot be explained by
formal economic theory. To some extent, this problem reiterates the old
substantivist (i.e., institutionalist) versus formalist (i.e., neoclassical)
positions, which disagreed on whether formal economic models could be
used to explain "primitive" economies (Dowling 1979). However, the
concept of economic rationality (Rutz 1977) is in theory more general and
less restricting than commonly believed. In short, economic rationality may
be defined as consistent behaviour or choice in order to fulfil or achieve
certain aims. In principle, the aims can be anything, but in practice and in
. applied economic models in general they tend to be limited to material
goals. Typically, household analysis assumes utility maximizing behaviour,
where utility comes from two sources - leisure and consumption. Thus, the
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formalization and quantification used in economic analysis of ten limits the
types of economic rationality studied. One example which has been
commonly used to illustrate the difference between the simple supply-
demand model for an atomistic market (Figure 6a), and the more wider
concept ofeconomic rationality (and possibly also other conceptual models
ofbehaviour) is the economist A. V. Chayanov's (1986) work on Russian
farmers. Using neoclassical economics and extensive data on household
consumption and production pattems, Chayanov concluded that Russian
farmers reduced their effort when their returns on effort increased, in other
words, if prices increased, they sold less (Figure 6b). To explain this
"perverse market reaction", one need to take into account "that they
operate( dl with their own system of economic rationality, based on
satisfaction of family needs (that is, marginal utility) and the drdgery of
labor" (Netting 1993:299). The Russian farmers described by Chayanov,
retained a subsistence oriented rationale typical of peasant economies, even
if they as farmers were par of a fully market-integrated agricultural sector.
This reaction is difficult to explain by the simple (and commonly applied)
economic model of a profit-maximizing production unit. Extending the
analysis, as Chayanov himself did, to also con sider the consumption aspect
of the household, could explain the economic behaviour found by
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Chayanov. (Similar examples of a peasant economic behaviour have also
been noted among fishermen, cf. Firh 1966; Faris 1977).
The divergence between individual and collective rationality is a central
problem in social theory. An extensive treatment of the problem is Mancur
Olson's book, The Logic ofCollective Action (1965). He argues that the
larger the group in question, the smaller the chance that institutional
measures can secure an optimal amount of collective good (ibid.:35). In fact
"rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common
or group interests" (ibid.:2, italics in original). As discussed earlier, this is
the paradoxical outcome of the prisoner' s dilemma game.
Another question which is linked to the problem of economic rationality,
is the role of intentionality. 8 Does re source management need to be the
result of an intentional strategy for regulating production and consumption,
or is it enough that aspects of the ecology, social organization or "culture"
serve such ends, whether conscIous or not? A classic study which illustrates
the problem of intentionality, is Roy Rappaports (1968) study from the
New Guinea highlands. Rappaport applied ecosystem theory and
cybernetics to the study of ecology, ritual and religion. He contended that
among the Maring, an isolated hill tribe, a ritual cycle of feast giving, pig
slaughtering, warare and agricultural production together formed a self-
regulating system (ibid.:4). In his original study, Rappaport argued that the
resulting homeostasis was an unintentional outcome of the system itself
(ibid.:321), and distinguished between economic rationality and what he
termed "ecological rationality" (ibid.:307). Rappaport s study has been
controversial and its conclusions debated. Rappaport himself saw his work
as a reaction to the crude functionalist bias in anthropology by integrating
ecology and culture in a cybernetic system (ibid. :vii; see also Rappaport
1979:43-95). His critics, however, argued that Rappaport s study was
typical of a functionalist approach, because he did not account for the
origins of institutions. Instead, institutions were treated as given, and
fulfilling specific functions (Gross 1983:165).
Many contemporary studies of resource management, implicitly or
explicitly, seem to return to a functionalistic perspective.9 They assume
that local institutions are a result of the conscious effort of individuals and
groups to manage their resources. This may seem unproblematic, but in
8 Intentional economic rationality can be defined as "a system of consciously elaborated
and applied socIal rules for the optimum attainment of a set of objectives" (Godelier
1988:41).
9 See, Acheson (1975, 1988); Berkes (1985a); Hviding and Jul-Larsen (1993); McCay and
Acheson (1987).
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fact, is not. For instance, how should we interpret the custom of using cows
to pay bride wealth requirements? Its intended outcome is to secure wives,
argues Dombrowski (1993), but its unintentional outcome is serving to
reduce herds, thereby avoiding overstocking. Dombrowski (ibid.:27) claims
that particularly in small-herd dynamics in East Africa, cowsused as bride
price payments account for ten to twenty per cent of herd fluctuations.
Simulating the role of cows as bride price in a time series of 50 years,
Dombrowski feels confident that the custom of exchanging cows as bride
wealth, reduces herd fluctuations and the threat of herd failure to close to
zero, as well as ensures rapid restocking of herds through the exchange of
young and fertile animals (ibid.:46).
Another way to study the problem of rationality is through laboratory
experiments (Gardner et aL. 1990:350). In a simulation study devised by
Erling Moxnes (1993), paricipants were asked to play the par of an owner
of a small fishing fleet. According to Moxnes, when over-harve sting was
noticed by the players, they reduced their effort too liule to prevent further
overfishing. In this experimental set-up, the total quantity of fish was fixed,
and the challenge was to control the fishing effort in such away that profits
were maximized without violating lon g term sustainability. Moxnes' main
interest is in the cognitive aspect of decision making. Based on this
experiment, he argues that the reason for the high level of failure
(overcapitalization), was that the players were psychologically inclined to
be overambitious and preferred short term benefits over sustainability in the
long term. On more generalleve1, Moxnes' experiment reflects the fact that
success in fisheries is not only related "to the ability to catch fish, but to
the ability to handle andinvest the money generated" (Acheson 1981:292).
The problem which is raised in Moxnes' study, is the relationship
between time and peoples' strategies. We have previously discussed "time"
as a variable in connection with game theory, and how players' strategies
reflect the time frame of the game (single period games, finitely repeated
games or infinitely repeated games). The time factor is of crucial
importance to people's strategies, and people have to consider whether they
will gain or lose from choosing future yield over present benefit. To make
a decision about this, they need to calculate the present value of a future
yield. The scientific study of this problem is known as "discounting"
(Angelsen 1991; Angelsen et aL. 1994:56; Ostrom 1990:34). Discounting is
necessary in analyses of real economic behaviour because people put less
weight on future costs and benefits than present ones. The discount rate can
be defined as the extra benefit people would require to postpone a benefit
for one year (alternatively: how much they require to bear a co st now
instead of delaying it by one year). Because of the uneven distribution of
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costs and benefits over time, the discount rate may be the single most
important factor in resource users decision making.
A low discount rate means that future yield is preferable to present
income or benefit. Alternatively, a high discount rate favours present
benefit over future yield. Whereas people in general will not be able to
undertake a strictly scientific estimate of the discount rate, they wiU
consider their present needs against what they perceiveas futurebenefits. - , '
Nevertheless, the concept of discounting is useful in order to understand
.. why it may be profitable to either preserve or emptya resource. In the case
where the natural growth of a resource is lower than the discount rate, it
can be economically rational to empty the re source now.lO How-ever, not
all studies of economic rationality would agree that discounting is a key to
understand economic behaviour. Economic rationality is also linked to
probability (Quinn 1978). For example, what is the probability that a future
benefit can be reaped at all? It seems that the risk of other prospective
users extracting aresource will have the same effect on decision making as
a higher discount rate, and will favour short term, myopic decisions ("use
it or lose it"). This is of ten referred to as "risk discounting" .
Traditional, customary or indigenous? The problem of
. authenticity
In the discussion of institutions the terms "traditional", "customary" and
"indigenous" are frequently used to specify the type of institution, or
management system in question, but rarely is there an attempt to qualify
their meaning or substantiate their con tent. 11 "Traditional" used in
connection with "management", for example, is generally taken to mean not
only a situation characterized by sustainable use and equal access to
resources, but an equitably sharing of benefit as well. "Traditional" also has
the connotation of being "old" and implicitly, legitimate and well adapted
to available resources and to the situation of the users in question. For the
same reasons, the terms "customary" and "indigenous" are seldom defined,
and often used interchangeably. "Indigenous", as in "indigenous
institutions", is frequently, and without any kind of substantiation, taken to
imply that the institution is old, local in origin and promotes equity.
There are dangers in volve d in the indiscriminate use of terms such as
10 For a theoretical discussion of the interests of present generations against future ones,
see Brorney (1989b).
11 For an example of the indiscrirnnate use of the term "traditional", see Niarnr (1991).
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traditional, customary and indigenous, because they may give a stamp of
authenticity to a management system which is either quite recent, or has
undergone considerable change. Anthropologists, amongst others, have
become increasingly aware of the fact that what is glossed as "traditional",
"customary" or "indigenous" may hide a series of complex shifts and
amalgamations in the organization of rightsand duties (Fortmann 1990).Jn
addition to the problem of misinterpretation on the part, of the researchers,
fixing labels of this kind can be employed in order to strengthen claims to
ownership, or to lay claim to existing practices. An example of this can be
found in Johannes' (1982:260) discussion of traditional conservation
methods in Oceania, where:
Written records of traditional fishing boundaries of ten do not exist, and
it is not surprising under the circumstances to find that vilagers wil
invent "traditional" fishing rights if there are advantages to be gained by
do ing so.
That a system of ownership or management is "traditional", can in other
words be used to validate claims to resources.
Another term which is frequently used, but seldom questioned and
scrutinized, is the word "communal" (Shackleton 1993). Researchers tend
to forget that "communal property" may be glossing over what is in fact a
series of shifts in tenure, rights and legislation. To illustrate the
complexities of such a case, Pauline Peters has analyzed the history behind
the formation of the "communallands" of Botswana (1984, 1987). Peters
claims that "the communal tenures so disfavored by the colonialists were
in a very real sense created by them" (1987:181). The emergence of
communallands was made possible by transforming the complex property
. rights to land of the Tswana kingdom into "tribal" land by colonial
authorities. Over time triballand came to imply "communalland" in the
sense that it was claimed neither by the state nor by individualleaseholders.
In the early post-colonial period the term "tribal" was officially substituted
by "communal" in government parlance. In the meantime, however, a lot
of changes had taken place. In the period since the introduction of
boreholes, from the 1930s and onwards, the grazing lands had in fact
slowly changed to enclosures whereby borehole owners and their
dependants c1aimed ownership to the area surrounding boreholes. Originally
the drilling of boreholes was regulated through "tribal commttees"
(ibid.: 184) which later became "borehole syndicates". This did not only
imply a change of name, but continued the process of creating exclusive
ownership to boreholes and the surrounding pastures. Over time the control
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over enc10sures around boreholes became tighter, and members of
syndicates prevented would-be users from entering. Dominated by rich and
powerful cattle owners, borehole syndicates were appropriating what
officially, were still regarded as "communallands". Peters' point is that if
we accept"commons" or "communal property" labels and take them at face
value, we are unintentionally denying theirhistoric specific context and the
contested meanings associated with them (1984:40ff.). Moreover, we would
be ,unable to grasp what nianagement and ownership really were like, and
how they relate to the present day situation. We should also bear in mind
that in Botswana, and probably in other African colonial states as well,
there was a "colonial ideological antipathy to communal property systems"
(1987: 180). The story related in great detail by Peters has some
consequences for the common mistake of equating communal ownership
with equity. As we will see next, some studies explicitly link common
property regimes with stratification.
Along similar lines as Peters, Angela Cheater (1990) analyzes the origins
of "communal" land tenure in Zimbabwe (see also Cousins 1992). Her main
point is that the "communal" lands never were communaL. She traces the
reformulations of the past ("mythogenesis") which transformed private
property rights into the present-day authorized version of Zimbabwe's
communallands. Cheater c1aims that first among the many who helped
establish the myth of communal lands in Zimbabwe, were the
anthropologists who failed to investigate the historical foundations of
property rights (ibid.:203). The idea of a pre-colonial time when
communalism reigned was an integral part of the reformulation of
Zimbabwe's history which neglected "three and a half decades of the
legalised sale of 'communal' arable (land) and grazing rights" (ibid.: 194).
As Cheater notes, it is important to keep in mind that history is malleable,
and tends to be altered and reformulated. The methodological problem
Cheater raises, is linked with our willingness to present what we believe is
the "native's point of view", and the danger this poses for misinterpreting
the past. Moreover, Cheater's study underlines the importance of inc1uding
the state in the study of the property rights, and it is to this discussion we
will now turn.
The state, hierarchy and common property
Durrenberger and Pálsson (1987a) have argued that common property
regimes only make sense in conjunction with stratification, arguing that in
"truly egalitarian societies...common property has no meaning" (ibid.:371).
The authors take this argument even further, claiming that the regulation of
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common property is "a phenomenon of stratified societies organized as
states" and that the "forms of production in which a tragedy of the
commons can develop are societies organized as states" (ibid.:372). The
view that stratification is an inherent feature of common property regimes
receives strong support from Thomas Park (1992:94) who argues that
str~tification and hierarchy are central to successful common property
regimes. Park dismisses the assumptions of equal access and equal rights,
of ten implicit. in the call for common property management. In Park' s
subtle analysis of flo od recession agriculture in the Senegal Basin valley,
he shows that this form of agriculture lays the foundation of hierarchy and
that common property is a rational way to deal with the chaotic character
of river flooding. Each year when the river receded, there was a
reallocation of agricultural land, and the available agricultural plots (a
common pool resource) were distributed among groups of rights holders.
The groups were hierarchically organized on the basis of genealogical
position (core lineage members against peripheral members) and also
included outsiders who could lease land in sharecropping contracts. For
Park (ibid. :96) this implies that the flood recession type of agriculture:
is based neither on equal rights or duties nor on simple diversions
between those with rights and those without them. It is a model of
common property where hierarchy and inequality are fundamental.
Park conc1udes that (ibid.):
One of the basic c1aims of this paper is that common property in the flood
recession case is intrinsically hierarchical and does not involve individuals
having equal rights.
Jf Park is correct, this means that the idealist or populist view of common
property as a means to achieve equity (in the sense of equal access to
resources), is premised on a too restricted interpretation of case material,
and is countered by scrutinising historical studies.
Another example of the importance of stratification and hierarchy in the
successful management of common property regimes, is Gilles et aL.' s
(1992) study from the High Atlas mountains in Morocco. They describe the
Oukaimedene agdal, which is a high mountain pasture controlled by an
indigenous range management system with fixed opening and closing
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dates. 12 Used by two tribally organized Berber groups, pars of the agdal
are irrgated and consist of hay meadows which due to their remoteness,
have not become privatized. The reason that the two tribal groups (Ourika
and Rhraya) cooperate in managing the agdal is that they stand a better
chance of protecting it against rival groups. Though in principle. all
households . share collective usufrctrightsto the Oukaimedene agdal, there
is in fact a hierarchical rights structure where some have senior, or full
rights, and can use the pasture for a longer time, as well as being allowed
to graze their animals at any location. In addition, they have the privilege
of charging fees from other users. Those who enjoy such senior rights do
so because they c1aimdescent from a local saint. Furthermore, the ethnic
divisions within the tribal groups trans late into differential access to springs
and hay meadows. Rights are not extended to all, and those who are denied
access have the right to dispute it by bringing their case before a local
council (jmaa). Moreover, there are informal arangements where outsiders
may use the agdal against offering reciprocal grazing in another location.
In addition to formal regulations such as levying fines, the agdal is
believed to be the land of a saint, and hence protected by spirits who will
harm those who break rules concerning its use (ibid.:241). The finely
meshed system of rights and privileges should not, say Gilles et aL., be
interpreted primarilyas a conservation measure. The reason for the success
of the Oukaimedene agdal was not only that entry was restricted, but that
the intern al social stratification was used to establish a hierarchy of
different user rights. In addition to social stratification, the Oukaimedene
agdal was also protected by its remoteness, meaning that not alllegitimate
users were able to enjoy their rights and privileges.
History and the origins of common property regimes
One of the problems we have in assessing how common property regimes
and institutions came about, is the restricted time frame we adopt in
analyzing them. To show some of the insights which can be gained if we
adopt a historical (diachronic) perspective, we will turn next to Ame
Kalland's studies of Japanese fishing villages (1984, 1990, 1991)13 and
secondly, to Robert Netting's (1972, 1981) studies of the commons in a
12 The Moroccan agdal is related to the hima system which is found throughout the Middle
East and where land was protected by customary law for specified periods or seasons
(Shoup 1992).
13 For an ,account of the present day Japanesecoastal fisheries, see Ruddle (1989).
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Swiss village. Kalland describes the system of sea tenure in Fukuoka
Domain in the northern par of Kyushu during the Tokugawa period (1603-
1867). Ownership of both land and coastal waters was regarded as a part
of the feudal estate, and the privilege of fishing was granted to registered
coastal villages(ura) at the discretion of the feudal rulers. Fishing rights
were c1early delimited, and specified which types of equipment were
allowed. Villages enjoying fishing privilegeshad to pay tithes as well- as
perform various types of corvée labour. The stretch of sea immediately
outside a village was normallygranted as its exclusive fishing territory. In
addition, adjacent areas further out at sea, were of ten shared or "common"
fishing territories(iriai), used jointly with neighbouring villages according
to rules specifying who could fish where and with which types of gear. It
is important to note that not everybody in a fishing vill age enjoyed rights
to fishing. Such rights tended to be appropriated by village leaders and
other influential people. In addition to formally recognized fishing grounds,
there were sanctuaries where fishing wasprohibited (1984:31). Because the
strict territorial divisions reflected imperial command rather a logical
distribution of fish stocks, villages granted each other informal rights of
"guest fishing" according to specific inter-village agreements (Kalland
1991). By the end of the Tokugawa period, more efficient fishing methods
emerged, and the pressure increased to privatize fishing grounds and
beaches needed for drag netting (i.e., seining).
Netting (1981, 1993:34ff.) traces the history of Törbel, an isolated Swiss
mountain village. He shows that as early as in 1224, the local peasants
were granted collective user-rights to areas which at the time belonged to
the church. In return for this privilege they agreed to pay a fixed annual
rent in grain and cash as well as to supply fighting men when required. The
community acting as a corporate group subleased these rights to individual
villagers. Jf a non-citizen i.e., a man not belonging to the village, bought
land there, he did not automatically acquire the right to use the communal
pastures and forest. Moreover, those who sold their property in the village
lost their rights in the communallands and the privileges that went with
them. In other words, the community (Gemeinde) enforced strict rules of
exclusion through restricting community membership. Additionally,
community members themselves devised a number of clear-cut rules
regarding duties and privileges concerning the use of communal pastures
(Alpen) and village forest (1981:61ff.). Communal ownership to pastures
and forest coexisted in Törbel with tight private ownership to agricultural
land.
The co-existence of private and communal property regimes (though not
limited to these two cases) is very interesting. First of all it reminds us not
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to confuse the issue by asking whether there are either private or communal
arrangements. The reason that the communal arangements persisted in
Törbel, in addition to vill age endogamy (men and women maried within
the vill age ) which discouraged outsiders from settling in the village, was
the very low population growth. . Villagers never purposely tried to limit
population growth (Netting 1981:226), butfemale fertil it y was low due.to
high age upon first marriage and birth-spaèing.After about 1850, migration. .
rather than low fertility kept the population in check.
There are strking similarties in these two cases as well as important
differences. In the case described by Kall and, property rights were vested
with the feudal lords, and fishing villages were granted usufruct rights
against payment of taxes. Whereas fishing villages brokered informal deals
of guest fishing in each others' fishing terrtories (Kalland 1991), the size
and extent of fishing territories as well as the right to their use were
granted at the discretion of the feudal rulers. Any opposition was severely
punished, and in one instance described by Kalland (1984), two village
leaders were executed because they kept quarelling over who had the right
to use a stretch of the beach used for landing fish. In the case described by
Netting, villagers themselves took the initiative to lease land, upon which
they later devised strict rights, duties and privileges. Communal and private
property arangements co-existed, but unlike Kalland' s Fukuoka example,
duties and privileges were instituted through local consensus, not by any
outside authority.
What are the lessons to be leamed from these cases? Netting's case study
shows . that institutions for the management of common property regimes
were instituted as early as the 13th century and were continually improved
and elaborated. Secondly, it demonstrates that strict rules of exclusion can
be, devised and enforced by social groups. Netting's study has in this
respect become the favourite example of those who wish to revise Hardin's
thesis (Ostrom 1990). A fundamental question in the research on common
property regimes is what promotesprivatization. In Fukuoka, communal
arangements were gradually privatized, especially in the more capital
intensive fisheries. During the Meiji era (1868-1912), which followed the
Tokugawa period, the process of privatization was for the most part aresult
of the various governments ' wish to increase the total catch (Kalland
1990: 195). In order to accomplish this, they abolished the traditional "sea-
tenure system..(which had)..inhibited food production, both by closing the
sea for all but fishing villages and by restrictive licensing policies"
(ibid.:194). In Törbel, by contrast, the commonsremained virtually
unchanged until World War Il, and did not become privatized.
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Two competing hypotheses have been advanced to account for the
stability of common property regimes such as those found in Törbel.14 The
first hypothesis maintains that common property regimes persist because the
inherent productivity of the resources is too low to create an economic
surplus which is-needed for a transition towards privateproperty (Bromley
1992:5; Runge 1992). The second hypothesis is basedon the assumption
that common property regimes reduce uncertainty and give greater overall
benefits to its users than private property regimes (Eggertsson 1993:46).
The two hypotheses represent different theoretical vantage points. Thefirst
assumes that private property regimes are more efficient than common
property regimes (Demsetz 1967), hence looks for obstac1es to privatization.
The sec ond hypothesis on the other hand, takes into account both labour
costs and uncertainty (Runge 1986:625), and maintains that common
property regimes safeguard users against calamities, as well as increasing
a household' s labour pool by instituting services such as communal water
guards or forest stewards (Netting 1981:42-69). Consequently, in order to
understand the economics of the formation of property rights, it is necessary
to consider both biological productivity and the costs and benefits which
accrue from joint use (or harve st) of aresource. This brings us back to the
origins of the commons debate, and it is to this we will turn in the next
chapter.
14 For another study of a long enduring common property regime, see Eggertsson (1992).
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2. Common property theory: Lessons from
fisheries economics
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we reviewed some of the theoretical contributions
to the study of common property regimes. To understand the origin of the
field of study itself, however, we need to tur our attention to where it all
began, namely fisheries economics. The insights provided by fisheries
economics - in paricular what is now known as "common property theory"
- have provided the theoretical foundations of the interrelationship between
harve st and returns in the utilization of renewable natural resources.
Compared to other types of renewable natural resources, the marine
commons is the prototyp al example of the problems associated with
common property regimes. Migratory fish stocks do not observe inter-
national boundaries, and this makes the exclusion of potential users
difficult, but as newer studies have demonstrated, not impossible. The
problem of exclusion becomes more manageable where fishing takes place
in enclosed stretches of the sea, such as fjords, bays or lagoons. The work
of anthropologists and biologists has led to new insights into the
commercial fisheries operations in the North Atlantic (Acheson 1988;
Andersen and Wade11972; Andersen 1979; Jentoft 1991) and the Near East
(Berkes 1986, 1992). Newer and promising studies focus on artisanal
fisheries in Oceania (Hviding and Baines 1992, 1994; Johannes 1978, 1982;
Ruddle and Akimichi 1984), West Africa (Jul-Larsen 1994; Lawson and
Robinson 1983; Tvedten 1990; Tvedten and Hersoug 1992) and South-East
Asia (Kalland 1984, 1991). In paricular, these studies contribute to the
growing research on customary marine tenure (Ruddle et aL. 1992) as well
as research on informal management systems such as territoriality (Acheson
1975, 1987) andguest fishing (Kalland 1991; Levieil and Orlove 1990). In
the course of this chapter we will look more closely at the role of fishery
cooperatives (Berkes 1986), and how artisanal fisheries ariculate with
market and non-market exchange (Tvedten 1990).
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Common property theory
The economic theory of common property regimes originated in the field
of fisheries. The classic work is the Danish economist Jens Warng's
(1911) aricle "On Rent of Fishing Grounds" ("Om 'Grundrente' af
Fiskegrunde") which discusses the problems of regulating fishing effort.
Warmng proposed that given two fishing grounds of different quality, the.
fishing effort could be controlled by introducing what he termed a
"resource rent" (grunnrente ). i The state could regulate fisheries by adding
aresource tax to the most productive of the two fishing grounds, thereby
equalizing the fishing effort (see also, Andersen 1983). Despite Warming's
pioneering effort, economists did not take up this lead. This changed in
1954, when Howard Scott Gordon's paper laid the foundation of what was
later terme d "common property theory". To analyze the interrelation
between harvest and returns, Gordon (1954) added an effort curve to the
Schaefer curve which depicts the natural growth function of a single fish
species (Schaefer 1954). There are a number of extensive treatments of
Gordon's model (Brox 1990; Grima and Berkes 1989; Hersoug 1992;
Stenseth 1991; Townsend and Wilson 1987), therefore a short recapitulation
of its basic features will suffice (Figure7).
The two axes denote fishing effort, and returns (or yield) respectively.
The point where there is maximum returns on effort, is known as
"maximum economic yield" (Erne ), and at this point the "economic rent"
or "re source rent" is maximized. ~ The resource rent can be defined as "a
surplus value over and above the opportunity costs for all factors of
production" (Grima and Berkes 1989:45). As more fishermen join to
harvest the resource (or more time is spent at sea), the total catch increases
to the point of "maximum sustainable yield" (Ernsy)' This is depicted by the
high point of the Schaefer curve, and is a biological measure of the largest
possible catch size without depleting fish stocks. Note, however, that all
points along the Schaefer curve represent a sustainable yield (Charles
1994). Beyond the maximum sustainable yield, the returns diminish to the
point of intersection between the total co st curve and the Schaefer curve,
In present day terrnology, what Warrng discussed is known as "differential rent".
2
It is important to be aware that fishing effort which maxirnzes econornc rent (Emey)
may, under certain circumstances, drive fish stoeks to extinction (Clark 1973, see also
Charles 1994). In the special case where the discount rate is zero, the Emey is equal to
the maximum "net present value" (NPV). Jf the biological growth rate of a speeies -
Clark used whales as an example - is smaUer than current interest rates on capital
(money in the bank) it can be econorncaUy rational (that is, maxirnze the NPV) to hunt
whales to extinction and bank the net revenue.
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Figure 7
The Gordon model
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the "break even point" (E¡). At this point there is no economic rent to the
participants ("rent dissipation"); in other words, they do not make any
profit. Jf effort continues to rise beyond the break-even or equilibrium
point, new entrants willlose money if they are not aided by subsidies. The
problemwith subsidizing fisheries is also predicted by the model - it will
shift the total cost curve downwards and add to overfishing of the resource
(Es).3 The problem with fisheries (and common property regimes in
general), Gordon argued, is that fishermen do not pay for the reproduction
of fish, hence no "rent" is being incurred by those who harvest the
resource. This means that it is tempting to maximize fishing effort through
more intensive fishing and by investing in more efficient gear
("overcapitalization"). Gordon's model is premised on the following points:
There are no limits to the number of new entrants ("open-access"), and
fishing effort is only constrained by the threat of diminishing returns. The
resource itself is neither protected by formal nor informal rules, in other
words it is open for all potential users (open-access, res nullius).
3 It is important to note that Gordon's mode! represents different long-term bio-economIc
equilibria.
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A year after Gordon's aricle appeared, Anthony Scott (1955) set out to
revise two features of Gordon's mode!. First, Scott claimed, Gordon's
model failed to distinguish between efficiency in the short and long run. In
the short run "there is Httle difference between the efficiency of common
and of private property" (ibid.: 117). Secondly, Scott argued that Gordon
had not taken into account the diminishingretums linked to the fishery
operation itself and not only to decreasing fish stocks. The only reason
fisheries in Gordon' s model approached the equilibrium point, Eb, was that
the density of the fish population itself decreased, hence there was no
incentive to stop fishing before the total co st equalled the profits from
landing fish. This approach is deficient, says Scott: "In the short run,
fishermen do not expand their catch indefinitely because they doexperience
increasing costs in attempting to increase their landings" (ibid.: 120, italics
in original).
The work of Gordon has been severely criticised, especially by
anthropologists who see. Gordon' s model refuted by a number of examples
of successfullocal management of fisheries (McCay and Acheson 1987).
Moreover, the theory has been criticized on the grounds that it does not
take into account that there are culturally defined checks and balances
which reduce harvesting effort. Others, such as Brox (1990) sees this
critique as misconstrued, arguing that Gordon's model is analytical, a
theory, not a model of the world. More importantly, Brox points to the
trivial fact that in those cases where Gordon' s model is proven wrong, "the
assumptions of the model are not satisfied' (ibid.:229, italics in original).
Despite frequent criticism, Gordon's model remains widely used in
deciding fishing effort and planning government regulation of fisheries.
Gordon' s theory is based on the notion that actors will increase their effort
as long as it is profitable to do so. To hinder overfishing and over-
capìtalization it is necessar to limit effort, either by limiting the number
of fishing vessels through a licensing system (restricted entry), restricting
harvest (quotas), outlaw certain types of gear (gear restrictions), 4 or as
Warmng suggested as early as in 1911, by imposing aresource tax on
harve sting (taxation) (see also, Pontecorvo and Vartdal 1967). All these
options for state regulation of the fishery have been tried, of ten with mixed
results .
Whereas restriction on types of gear and fish quo tas are generally
favoured by commercial fishermen, there is a tradition going back to the
work of Gordon, which favours the introduction of private property rights
4 An example is the Danish seine which was outlawed in the Lofoten cod-fisheries (Jentoft
and Krstoffersen 1990).
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in fish stocks and the enc10sure of the marine commons (Pontecorvo 1988).
In the light of the recent collapse of a series of important regional fisheries
(cf. McGoodwin 1991; CERES 1993, on the unexpected collapse of the
cod-fisheries in Newfoundland),5 privatization has become more popular,
and is advocated by some as the ultimate solution to the problems of over-
fishing. Keen (1983), amongst others, has argued that limited entry has,
overall, not be en successful, and that the solution to the problem of,
overfishing is privatization of fish stocks. This view has in some circ1es
become a favoured strategy for solving the problems of overfishing. The
key concept is the term "individual tradeable quotas" (ITQ) (Eggertsson
1990:268). Management by ITQ means that every vessel owner is given an
individual quota (either in tonnes or as a percentage of the total allowable
catch). In principle this quota is tradeable, meaning that the owner of the
vessel can either sell the rights to the quota or ehoose to fish it himself
(Toftum 1993:101). Tradeable quotas ne ed not be linked to vessels, but can
likewise be assigned to single registered fishermen, groups of fishermen or
companies. As a management regime, ITQ marks a shift from a system
based on rights and entitlements towards a system based on private
ownership (ibid.:102). Researchers who oppose the move towards ITQ,
wam that "c1osing the commons, will open the tragedy" (Maurstad 1992,
in Brox 1993). Others see ITQ as an efficient management system, which
will contribute to conservation because the owner can fish his quota when
.. he deems it most profitable, or if he wishes, can opt to sell it.
Fishery cooperatives
Whereas fishery cooperatives are of ten suggested as a solution to the
problems of organizing fishermen (Jentoft 1986:353), cooperatives are
rarely successful (Bailey and Jentoft 1990:342). Discussing the merits of
fishery cooperatives in the Caribbean, Sandersen and Jentoft (1993) fin d
that they only organize a minority of the loeal fishermen and do not
succeed as economic enterprises. An exception to the rule is Bonnie
McCay' s (1980) description of a fishermen' s cooperative in the New York
Bight region, USA. McCay describes the cooperative's rigorous regulation
of membership: only retirement and death make room for new members.
5 Another, and quite recent critique of quota regulations is concerned with the accuracy
with which fish stoeks can be predieted. More specifically, the question is whether the
fishery biology represented in Gordon's model by the Schaefer curve, can be used to
prediet the size of fish stoeks. An alternative interpretation of wildlife fluctuations has
been advanced by "chaos theory" (W orster 1990).
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There is a strict enforcement of quota regulations, which despite smaller
fluctuations in response to expected prices, cannot surpass a self-imposed
weekly maximum quota ("dock limit"). This example, claims McCay
(ibid.:36), demonstrates that "highly individualistic, competitive commercial
fishermen of the North Atlantic are capable of co operating in order to
create, enforce, and maintain viable systems of fisheries management".
In a detail ed study of fishery cooperatives in Turkey, Fikret Berkes
(1986, 1992) analyzes traits of the individual cooperatives and the informal
rules which govem them. The areas whichBerkes studied were (the number
of registered fishermen in brackets): Çamlik lagoon (103), Tasucu (150),
Alanya (100), Bodrum (305) and Bay of Izmir (1850). Among the first
three, all or the majority of the registered fishermen were organized in one
cooperative which was identical to the user group. Among the two latter,
cooperatives were either lacking (Bodrum), or there were a number of
smaller cooperatives (Bay of Izmi). On ly the three smallest areas with less
than 150 registered fishermen, showed a relative stability in absolute catch,
in catch/effort ratio and the number of fishermen and vessels. They were
therefore deemed to be "successful" compared to the two largest where
overfishing and overcapitalization were evident (ibid.: 167). The Alanya case
represents an interesting example of informal regulations. The Alanya
fishermen had devised a lottery system where each vessel drew a number
which corresponded to a fishing spot. The spot marked the boats starting
position when the fishing season began. From September to May the boats
made daily shifts eastward from their assigned starting spot, which gave all
vessels an equal chance at the best fishing sites.
Without going in to the technicalities of the different locations, the
important question is why local management seemed to be successful in the
first three cases, but not in the latter, Bodrum and Bay of Izmir. In these
two areas, the overall catch remained unchanged, but the catch per unit of
effort declined (1992:167). In Bodrum, there were six different user groups,
but no active cooperatives. In the Bay of Izmir, there was a total of six
cooperatives, but these had been unsuccessful in finding cooperative
solutions and enlist the support of all fishermen. It simply was "beyond
their power" (1986:226) to agree on how to manage the fishery, and the
presence of cooperatives alone was not sufficient to ensure sustainable
management. The success of the smaller ones - Çamlik lagoon, Tasucu and
Alanya - Berkes (ibid.:227) attributed to:
the existence of traditions and institutional arrangements such as
cooperatives ( which) no doubt reduces the cost of organizing local
management systems and facilitates the formation and survival of user-
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group organizations. One pattern that emerges from the three success
cases is the use of extra-Iocal authority, such as the cooperative charter
and the local mayor or gendarme.
The centralpoint here is "cost," but Berkes daes not add to this the concept
of "transaction costs" which couldhave given new insight into the'
successes and failures he describes. Transaction costs are, as defined
previously, the "costs of defining and enforcing property rights" (North
1917:710). By utilizing government institutions to control the fishery, the
costs of policing are moved from the members of the cooperative on to the
state. Lowering the transaction costs of the management regime, is surely
important to its success. Berkes study corroborates the work of Olson
(1965) who argued that the larger the group, the less likely it is that
individuals and the collective will have similar interests. Besides, as Berkes
himself notes, the management system devised by Alanya fishermen
confirms that cooperation may evolve spontaneously, without external
intervention (Axelrod 1984).
Berkes notes that much of the literature on maritime anthropology tends
to argue that traditions, as well as fishermen's detailed local knowledge are
important in explaining successful fisheries. However, the three successful
cooperatives do not support either of these hypothesis. In Alanya and
Tasucu less than 50 per cent of the cooperative members could be termed
traditional fishermen (1986:226). In the Çamlik lagoon, says Berkes, there
are hardly any "traditional" fishermen - almost all of them took up fishing
after 1974. "These examples", claims Berkes (ibid.:226):
do not negate the importanee of traditional knowledge and institutions, but
show that their existence is not an essential precondition for a successful
fishery.
Another important point is that the Alanya cooperative only organizes about
half of the fishermen. The cooperative functions first of all to legitimize
decisions about the fishing system which have been reached in an informal
forum, in this case the local coffee house which serves as a hang-out for
fishermen (ibid.:226).
Regulations in 'fisheries are inherently problematic, and reflect not on ly
the problem of organizing fishermen but that of shifting government
policies as well. This is the point McCay (1978) makes in her description
of the problems in the cod fisheries around Fogo Island, off the coast of
Newfoundland. Traditionally, fishermen survived occasional ebbs in the cod
fishery by their engagement in long-term credit arangements involving
local merchants and wholesalers. Whereas credit arangements fostered long
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term viability, they limited fishermen's bargaining power vis-à-vis local
traders. Fogo islanders, as well as the rest of the fishermen in outports of
Newfoundland, therefore remained a rural proletariat (Brox 1972). After
some poor cod seasons in the mid-1960s, people "diversified" by going on
government welfare, shifted topaid jobs onshore or turned to lobster and
salmon fisheries. By the end of the1960s, the government introduced
subsidized longliners to boost Iocal fisheries. The local responses during
this period vared from signing up for work on longliners, emigrating to the
mainland or leaving the fisheries. After a short boom in the fisheries in the
years 1969-71, catches and profit dec1ined rapidly during the period 1972-
1975. Overcapitalization finally led to resource depletion, resembling
Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" (ibid.:416). As McCay shows, intensifi-
cation was not promoted by fishermen themselves, but was the result of a
government sponsored program aimed at increasing the profitability of
fishing by introducing larger and more efficient boats. (Similar points are
advanced by Durrenberger (1994:81) in order to explain overfishing among
shrimpers in the Mississippi, USA.)
Economic rationality and markets
As Gordon (1954) rightly identified, the enduring problem in the
commercial fishery sector is overcapitalization (or overcapacity), and
successful fishermen must in addition to catching fish, also be good at
managing capital (Acheson 1989:292). Harvesting fish with modem gear
is capital intensive, and heavy investments are in turn an incentive to
increase fishing effort, leading, ultimately, to overfishing. In the literature
of fishery, there is a tendency to juxtapose the capital intensive fishery
sector with what is terme d "artisanal fishery" or the "arisanal sector" .
Artisanal fisheries may be defined as small-scale fisheries, using simple
gear and primarily exploiting inshore or coastal fishery resources. Most
of ten, only a smaller par of the catch is marketed and the rest bartered or
consumed locally (Tvedten and Hersoug 1992: 11). The interesting question
is under which circumstances will arisanal fisheries become commercial
enterprises, in other words, to what degree are artisanal fisheries preadapted
to capital intensive, commercial production methods?
One way to approach the transition from a non-market to a market
economy, Dahl (1988) argues, is by employing the Marxian distinction
between "use-value" (non-market exchange) and "exchange-value" (market
exchange). With the absence of markets (and exchange-value) there is less
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incentive to exchange goods for alternative commodities.6 However, as is
often the case, a market and a non-market sector co-exist, hence the
distinction between "goods" and "commodities" become less well defined
thanDahl implies. For instance some of the catch may be used in an
exchange of gifts in the domestic sphere, but the rest sold in the market.
An exampleof this can be found in Inge Tvedten's(1990) study of
fishermen in the Bijagòs archipelago, off the coast of Guinea-Bissau. The
Bijagò are artisanal fishermen who use traps, lines, gill nets and more
lately, beach-seine and drift nets. The fishery is based on canoes, but only
about one fifth of the canoes are outfitted with an outboardmotor. Though
the Bijagò Islands have increasingly been drawn into the national economy,
there has on ly been a negligible commercIalization of the fishery. The
reason is, according to Tvedten, to be found in the age-grade institution,
where men who aspire to a higher age-grade, must invest goods and money
as ceremonial contributions (grandessa). This means that surplus produce
is reinvested in the age-grade institution, rather than in the fishery itself. In
fact, ceremonial contributions mayaccount for 50 to 75 per cent of
household expenditures (ibid.: 128).7
The case discussed by Tvedten is an interesting example of the problem
of how to c1assify institutions which inadvertently pre serve resources. From
Tvedten' s description it seems that there were no institutional measures
among the Bijagò fishermen aimed at regulating fishing effort. However,
by reserving a large proportion of the catch for ceremonial exchange, less
surplus was available to modernize the fishery. In response to the stagnant
fishery, many younger fishermen retreated to subsistence production or left
the fishery. The limited capitalization of the Bijagò fishery represents an
analytical problem. Should it be interpreted as an example of successful
local management - whether intentional or not - or should it be treated as
a problem for the development of the arisanal fishery sector? The Bijagò
case seems to fit with Lees' (1993: 109) observation that "disincentives,
while protecting the pool of common property resources, also curb
individual entrepreneurship, investment, experimentation, and innovation" . 8
6 The terms goods and commodities have their origins in two distinet traditions within
economics. The latter belongs to the cornodity-theory paradigm of the 19th century
formulated by Smith, Ricardo and Marx among others. The first belongs to the theory-
of-goods paradigm whose 19th century origins was developed by modern theorists such
as Samuelson and Friedman. Central concepts in the theory-of-goods approach is utility
(a consumer's subjective preferences) and scarcity (Gregory 1994:912ff.).
7 For a different interpretation of the stagnant economy among the Bijagòs, see Bækgaard
and Overballe (1992:187ff.).
8 Fora discussion of institutional innovation,see Moberg and Dyer (1994).
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We may take this argument a step further. Some attribute sustainable
resource management to pre-modernity and to the absence of a market.
Breakdown of traditional institutions is supposed to happen when the
"hidden hand" of market forces transforms the traditional sector. In the case
described by Tvedten it is obvious that the Bijagò fishermen were par. of
a modern, and fully integrated market sector, but that. their consumption
pattern hindered an adequate investment of surplus in the fishery. In this
sense, the situation described by Tvedten resembled the system of "dual-
economy" found in Newfoundland (Brox 1972). Brox argued that
Newfoundland fishermen were par of a fully monetized and market
integrated fishery sector, but due to the low price of fish, used fish for
domestic consumption instead of selling it, thereby avoiding con vers ion
losses. The fishery therefore remained a "backward sector" , divided into a
small commercial sector and a disproportionately large subsistence sector
(see also, McCay 1978:406ff.).
Some of the arguments put forward by Tvedten become of paricular
interest when compared to the development of the migrant canoe fisheries
in West Africa which are characterized by a dramatic technological
development and market integration (Chauveau 1991). An interesting case
study of this development is that of the Béninois Popo fishermen in Pointe-
Noire, Congo (Jul-Larsen 1994). This study reveals how the development
of a highly commercialised drift-net fishery must be seen in association
with the emergence of new internal institutions connected to their status as
migrants. The new commercIal fishery evolved without any intern al
regulations as to resource access. However, it shows that the same internal
institutions which facilitated the development towards increased market
integration also are effectively utilized by the community leadership to
reduce the recruitment of new drift-net fishermen to Pointe-Noire (Jul-
Larsen 1994). Besides demonstrating the variation which at present exists
in West African canoe fisheries, the cases of the Bijagò and the Popo also
demonstrate how intemal institutions in the fishing communities in various
ways serve to regulate fishing effort. This view is supported by Lawson and
Robinson (1983), who in a review of artisanal fisheries in West Africa,
argued that in spite of the huge catch potential in artisanal fisheries,
overfishing is not a problem. The authors attribute this to the persistence
of traditional institutions, such as the "Chief Fisherman" found in many
West African countries (ibid.:287). The function of the "Chief Fisherman"
was primarily ceremonial, but did in some cases contribute to the
organization of the seine net fishing.
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Customary marine tenure
The study of "customar marine tenure" grew out of the dissatisfaction with
economic models for understanding fishery management. Whereas
researchers tend to agree that there are systems of local resource
management, there is no consensus on what their prime function was. Were
they devised to protect the resource, or, were they primarily away' to
distribute catch among legitimate users?
Based on material from four Micronesian atolIs, Dahl (1988) proposes
. that the characteristics of functioning marine tenure systems are "resource
scarcity; the ability to define resource boundaries; group/territorial
identification; the type of.. technology used to exploit the resource; and
economic structure of society" (ibid.:40). The scarcity concept builds on the
assumption that people will only seek to manage resources which are
considered to be scarce. One way to create re source boundaries is to assign
a section of the sea to a paricular user group ("terrtoriality"), or
alternatively to limit harve st and consumption of some marine organisms
to a stratum of the population, for example people of high rank. The
question remains, however, whether this is done in order to protect the
resource or is a response to the hierarchical social organization.
In. a study from New Guinea, Carrier (1987:144) argues in favour of the
latter. He describes how the Ponam islanders limited entry through
elaborate rights vested with lineages, but this was not done to contribute to
conservation. "We cannot assume", claims Carier, "that limited entry in
Melanesian fishing societies playsa role in the conservation of marine
resources" (ibid.:164). The prime aim ofthese elaborate rights was resource
allocation - who gets the fish - not conservation. Carier contends that the
Ponam' s notions about species ecology differ significantly from Western
ecölogical science. What is needed, says Carrier, "is careful examination of
the ways people understand their environments and the ways that ownership
works in specific cultural and ecological settings" (ibid.: 164).
In contrast to Carrier's analysis, Hviding and Jul-Larsen (1993) describe
how elaborate rights and restrictions are conserving fish stocks as well as
other marine resources. In their review of arisanal fisheries in the tropics,
the authors argue that the reason for this not being immediately obvious to
Western trained scientists, is that such knowledge is either cast in the local
idiom and not in the language of a Western ecology discourse; or that
regulation mechanisms are the indirect results of local relations of power
between individuals and groups. Hviding and Jul-Larsen believe that in
many instances developing countries could increase the effectiveness of
fisheriés management by making better use of such regulating institutions
by integrating them into federal legislation and the practices of fishery
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administration. Hviding and Jul-Larsen argue that local mechanisms of
resource regulation, in spite of their shortcomings, often prove far more
effective than any management regime implemented and controlled by the
state. Hviding and Jul-Larsen do not, however, discuss the feasibility of this
approach in a situation where the state and local managers compete for
control and ownershipof marne resources. Moreover, they take a very
restricted view of the problems facing tropical fisheries. According to
Hviding and Jul-Larsen (ibid.:2ff.) there are two ways of perceiving
fisheries: the wrong one which equates common property with open-access,
and the right one which is concerned with eliciting and understanding local
modes of resource management which are often deeply embedded in local
culture and cosmology. To buttress this view, much of the argument hinges
on Hviding's case studies from the Morovo lagoon (Solomon Islands).
With the importance of the Morovo case to Hviding and Jul-Larsen's
argument, it can be useful to look at it more closely. In arecent
collaborative aricle RuddIe, Hviding and Johannes (Ruddle et aL. 1992)
give a detailed picture of customar marine tenure in the Morovo lagoon.
Local residents perceive the lagoon and the coastal mangrove forest as an
"integrated corporate estate" (puava). They distinguish between people
living (or who used to live) in the inland forest, "bush people", and those
who reside on the coast. The coastal dwellers hold more elaborate and
defined rights to the sea and reefs than bush people. Rights are held by
corporate descent groups (butubutu) which have specific rights to parts of
the lagoon as well as the adjoining coastallandscape. The descent groups
within a single butubutu who reside permanently in the corporate estate are
recognized as the tre "guardians" of the estate, and have a greater say
(nginira) in their management than those who only have rights of use
(hinoho) (Hviding and Baines 1994:20). The bush people are allowed to
. fish in the lagoon for their own subsistence needs, but these rights can be
reduced or suspended according to the availability of fish. When a
commercial fishery project was established in Morovo, the descent groups
controlling the lagoon responded by tightening their control of fishing reefs
by excluding bush groups that had traditionally been allowed to fish for
their own subsistence needs (Ruddle et aL. 1992:257). The potential for
increased eamings which the project represented, promoted a process of
exclusion by alienating a former user group. On the whole, the authors
acknowledge that Morovo may be a unique example of customary marine
tenure, and concede that claims about the general prevalence of similar well
adapted and robust management systems are "roman ti c and uncritical"
(ibid.:263). In fact, Morovo may well be an exception to the rule in the
Solomon Islands (see, Meltzoff and LiPuma 1986a).
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The example of the Morovo lagoon shows a very fine subdivision of
fishing rights. Johannes (1981) has argued that in Melanesia, fishing rights
are often so finely dispersed that when the fishery becomes commercialized
it is unable to adapt, resulting in a conflict among fishermen. Rebutting this
view, Cordell argues that Melanesian sea tenurecannot be judged by how
well it adapts toa "Western cultural overlay" (1984:309). Instead of
imposing a Western type of management, ill-fitted to local conditions, he
adyocates a development of fisheries which builds on the "unwritten laws
of the sea embedded in the cooperative social foundation of customary sea
tenure" (ibid.:322). This may be taken to imply that customary marine
tenure always provides for sustainable management. This is, however, a
point where researchers disagree.
A native ecology: Fact or fiction?
Whether indigenous people have an innate ecological sense or are in a
peculiar way pre-adapted to an ecologically sustainable harvesting system
is debatable. Despite their advocacy for customary marine tenure, Ruddle
et aL. (1992) concede that exaggerated claims to an indigenous
environmental ethic have backlashed, causing some researchers to focus on
the unsustainable and unsound practices in Oceania. One of the better
known critiques of the claims to widespread customary marine tenure
throughout Oceania is Polunin's (1984) discussion of case material from
Indonesia and New Guinea. Reviewing a number of old and contemporary
sources, Polunin remains unconvinced that well defined rights in the sea
were a result of conscious resource management. Polunin argues that they
were more likely a result of infighting between villages and a convenient
way to create well-defined boundaries. Another possible explanation is that
resources were not valuable enough (compared to the costs of enforcement)
to warrant the development of property rights (ibid.:272). For regions such
as the western coasts of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Polunin finds
no historical evidence that there ever were traditions for managing marine
resources. Polunin concedes, however, that they may have existed earlier
but broke down for unknown reasons (see also, Baines 1989).
Johannes (1978, 1982) has brought to the fore cases from Oceania where
local management is radically transformed or has broken down. He also
questions the assumption that local resource management everywhere is
guided by an environmental ethic (1982:260). Examples such as
. "dynamiting of reef fish, although illegal, is widespread in Western Samoa"
and "Solomon islanders harvested porpoises primarily for their teeth, letting
much of the meat rot" throws doubts on claims of a uniform and innate
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ecological sense (Johannes 1978:355). Johannes believes that "environ-
mentally destructive practices coexisted, as in most societies, with efforts
to conserve natural resources" (ibid.:355). Whereas Baines (1991) quotes
examples of the reassertion of communal property rights in the Solomon
Islands, Johannes (1978:358-359) takes a more negative view of the
reintroduction of traditional fishing rights in Oceania:
In addition to the resistance of some colonial govemments to the
institution or reinstatement of such laws, the islanders themselves are
. sometimes unsympathetic to such a move. Now accustomed to unlimIted
entry on the fishing grounds and motivated in their pattems of resource
use by a money economy, many fishermen fear the short-term incon-
venience and economIc dislocation attending the reintroduction of reef and
lagoon tenure.
Outside Oceania, an area where native ecology and environmental ethics
have be en c10sely studied, is in the circumpolar region. Arecent addition
to this research topic is Freeman and Carbyn's (1988) edited volume on
"traditional knowledge" (see also, Brokensha and Werner 1980). The main
purpose of the volume is to discuss "traditional management systems..rand)
..in paricular, the role of traditional communal property institutions in their
management" (Berkes, in Freeman and Carbyn 1988:7). The essays aim at
discussing the "philosophical underpinnings" of traditional management
among various Arctic peoples (Cree, Inuit, Saami etc.). Overall, the editors
c1aim, there is a native ecological knowledge and an environmental ethic
limiting exploitation, and that this offers an alternative to Western science
(ibid.:6). It could be invoked against these studies that they entail a very
sympathetic reading of native ecological knowledge and practice.9 The
authors argue that native peoples in the Arctic have an innate ecological
sense, which we as Westerners should acknowledge and emulate. For this
reason we could have expected more emphasis on examples such as
wasting of walrus and narwhale meat (ibid.:35) which seems to contradict
such c1aims. In fact, some have c1aimed "that Northern Native peoples have
no tradition of restraint of harvesting effort" (ibid.: 19, italics in original),
whereas others would argue that hunting practices (such as "trap lines") do
contribute to preserve breeding stock (Berkes 1981, in Acheson 1989a).
To explain instances which seem to contradict the Freeman and Carbyn's
argument we are left with two contending hypotheses: either native peoples'
9
See also Ellen (1993) and Silitoe (1993), who question the claim to an indigenous
environmental ethic among forest dwellers and shifting cultivators in Indonesia and
Papua New Guinea respectively.
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traditional ecological sense has been eroded, or this sense was never as
strong as the authors c1aim, but was a result of the absence of a market,
rather than cognitive and moral imperatives. The first hypothesis (that there
was an environmental . ethic), is implicitly or explicitly found in many
works onnatural resource management but rarely questioned (McCay and
Acheson 1987: 12ff.). The examples just cited, indicate that the willingness
on the part of the researchers to embrace c1aims to an indigenous
environmental ethic may, at times, make it difficult to arve at a
disinterested and objective opinion of their merits.
Informal and formal regulations in fisheries
Fisheries' management is of ten characterized both by informal or formal
regulations (Jentoft 1985:327). Informal regulations may be defined as
rules, restrictions and privileges based on privateagreements among
fishermen, and hence unrecognized by law. Formal regulations are laws,
legislation and regulations defined by the state and enforced either
alongside informal regulations ("co-management") or without considering
informal regulations. As such, co-management combines formal and
informal rules and, ideally, the state and local users have an equal say in
the management of the resource. Co-management is of ten suggested as a
way to resolve conflicts over management between state and local
communities.1O Some authors advance co-management as an alternative
theory of resource management, but as Sandersen (n.d.) notes, it is more
adequately understood as a pragmatic principle in the design of
management regimes. The advocacy for co-management as a management
tool, should not be used to conceal the fact that in many cases the state is
reluctant to share controlover natural resources, hence unwilling to adopt
co-management regimes (Pinkerton 1992). Conflicts over who has the right
to manage resources is not restricted to the state versus local communities
by may also pit nation states against each other (Meltzoff and LiPuma
1986b). Other possible lines of conflict are between different groups
exploiting overlapping territories (Acheson 1987), between legitimate
("traditional") users and new user groups (Miller and van Maanen 1979)
and between users of old and new technology (Goodlad 1972; Jentoft and
Kristoffersen 1989). To solve such conflicts, there is a tendency among
fishermen to seek informal, local level solutions, which may range from
10 See, Acheson (1989b); Jentoft (1989); Jentoft and Krstoffersen (1989); Pinkerton (1989);
Sagdahl (1992); Sandersen (1993); Sandersen and Jentoft (1993); Vásquez Léon (1994).
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unwritten rules and customs to more encompassing systems of local
resource management. In order to identify such informal regulations, one
needs to complement the study of the fishery as an economic system
(Gordon's "common property theory") with an approach that focuses on the
culture of fishing, viewing it as a socio-cultural system. 
11 Whereas the
economic approach focuseson the relationship between fish ("prey") and
fishermen ("predator"), the socio-cultural approach focuses on the relations
of fishermen vis-à-vis each other. An example of the latter approach to
understand fishermen's strategies is Andersen's (1972, 1979b:324ff.) studies
of the tactics of Newfoundland trawler skippers. The skippers tended to
conceal the size of their catch, their current position, or occasionally,
deliberately misinformed nearby vessels by directing them to a bad fishing
site. The motivation for this non-cooperative behaviour12 among skippers,
and the tendency to deceive competitors, is a wish to keep information
about good fishing sites secret. Thus, skippers tend to conceal information
about good fishing spots in order to secure the long term catch for each
vessel. Secrecy can in this case be viewed as a management system in
itself, which serves to limit exploitation. The net effect of this is, however,
that the total catch is lower than if fishermen had cooperated (see also,
Sandler and Sterbenz 1990 on the link between harvestand uncertainty).
Another example of elaborate informal regulations in fisheries, is Levieil
and Orlove's (1990) study of fishing territories in Lake Titicaca, which
straddles the border between Peru and Bolivia. Levieil and Orlove studied
more than 150 villages along the shoreline and found that there were
clearly delimited territories whose integrity was strictly preserved.Overall,
individual territories included the stretch of sea immediately outside villages
and extended outwards beyond the economically important beds of totora
reeds. Outsiders caught fishing or illegally cutting totora were verbally
abused and risked having their fishing gear taken away from them. Rumour
also had it that some were beaten to death (ibid.:370). However, the
effectiveness of the exclusion of outsiders was related to the ease of
surveilling territories.. The informal regulation of strictly defined territories
had so far not been influenced by the fact that the government opposed
them. The limited presence of the government' s Coast Guard meant that
they played only a nominal role in controlling fisheries in the lake. Despite
11 See, Acheson (1981); Andersen (1979a); Andersen and Wadel (1972); Hersoug et aL.
(1993); Smith (1977).12 For this reason game theory (non-cooperative games) seems to be better at explaining
fishermen's behaviour, than actors' behaviour in other cornon property contexts
(Sumaila 1994).
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the strict territoriality, there was a tradition for granting outsiders the
privilege of guest fishing in the lake. This could in volve the extension of
temporary use rights, or systems of temporar lease whereby leaseholders
paid part of their catch in retum for enjoying this privilege. More durable
rights of guest fishing were granted to dose kin, or topersonswithwhom
they shared important fictive kinship ties such as coparenthood
(compadrazgo).
The M aine lobster fishery
One of the most carefully analyzed examples of elaborate informal
regulations in commercial fisheries is James Acheson's studies of Maine
lobstermen, in the northeastern corner of USA (1975, 1987, 1988). The
lobster fishery off the coast of Maine is an inshore trap fishery. The
informal regulations of the lobster fisheries are connected to stretches of sea
where different user groups have exdusive rights to fishing. The social
foundation of this terrtorial division of the coastline is "harbour gangs". A
harbour gang is a loosely knit group of fishermen belonging to the same
village or area,. and access to fishing depends on being recruited into a
harbour gang. Criteria of membership are first of all to be a native of the
area, but persistent outsiders may become members if they can handle the
.. initial harassment. Boat crews belonging to a harbour gang defend their
fishing territories against intruders using verbal abuse and insults, but if the
trespassing continues, resort to destroying traps or cutting the rope used to
secure them. Repeated trespassing of territorial boundaries may provoke
"cut wars" between opposing harbour gangs (Acheson 1988:74). Sanctions
not.only restrain outsiders: fishermen who are given to over-fishing
("hogs") are sanctioned by other members of the harbour gang.
Disagreements between harbour gangs are frequent since fishing territories
tend to overlap, and with the exception of inshore areas, they are sometimes
poorly defined (Acheson 1979:262ff.). Acheson identifies two types of
territories: "nudeated" and "perimeter-defended" areas (1988:79). In the
nudeated areas there is an inverse relationship between the severity of the
sanctions and the distance from the harbour: intruders dose to the harbour
are severely sanctioned, whereas at the outer fringes there is a greater
acceptance of mixed fishing between adjacent territories. In the second
category, perimeter-defended areas, the willingness to sanction trespassing
is very strong regardless of where it occurs. The perimeter-defended
response is common to harbour gangs on the islands off the coast, whereas
nudeated defence of territories is more common to mainland harbour gangs.
The reason is, according to Acheson, that on islands recruitment to harbour
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No. of lobsters caught
No. of lobsters caughtltrap hauled
Mean kg. of lobsters caughtltrap hauled
Mean weight of lobsters (in kg.)
Source: Acheson 1989:206
Figure 8
Nucleated vs. perimeter-defended areas
Nuc1eated Perimeter
3169 6180
0.31 0.51
0.36 0.55
0.53 0.64
gangs is very strict, hence .itmakes senseto keep outsiders prying for
lobsters out. On the mainland, however, recruitment to harbour gangs is
easier, hence they are more lenient in defending their territories. Naturally,
there is "no sense in incurring the cost of defending strict boundaries ìf
anyone can join the harbor gang" (ibid.:80). There is a positive correlation
between the degree of terrtoriality and catch size. The perimeter-defended
areas have larger overall catches and catches per unit of effort than
nucleated-defended territories (Figure 8). However, harve sting effort does
not reflect the unit price of lobster (Acheson 1985: 113). Instead, harvesting
effort is correlated with the availability of lobster. Fishermen intensify their
fishing effort during the months when lobster is abundant, even if this
coincides with the period of low prices. Acheson's analysis bears out the
rationality of this response by show ing that fishermen ear four times more
during a day' s fishing when the price is at the annual low, compared to
when it is at its annual peak (ibid.: 114). The income among fishermen also
reflects personal skill, 
13 and successful lobstermen ("highliners") have
considerably higher income than unsuccessful ones ("dubs") (Acheson
1988:52ff; see also, Smith 1974:376).
13 The question of fishing skill has stirred up a heated debate among those who argue that
skill is a statistically significant factor in determning fishing success (Barth 1981;
Thorlindsson 1988; Bjamason and Thorlindsson 1993) and those who claim that the
importanee of skill is a "folk moder' which is not supported by analyses of catch
statistics (Pálsson 1993; Pálsson and Durrenberger 1982, 1990).
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Limits to informal regulations
The case of the Maine lobster is perhaps the most frequently quoted
example of successfullocal management, and the role played by in formal
regulations in managing the fishery. Many of those who quote Acheson as
an example ofsuccessful informal regulations in fisheries(Ruddle "et aL.
1992:268), fail to acknowledge that after about 1970 there was a graduaI
shift in the management of the lobster fishery, something Acheson describes
in detail in his monograph The Lobster Gangs of Maine (1988). By the end
of the 1970s there was a gradual transformation of the lobster. fisheries,
with early signs of overfishing. The Maine lobster fishery was from the
star only nominally controlledbythe.stateandthe fishermen resented state
intervention. The state of Maine passed its first law on the protection of
berried lobsters in 1872, and in 1874 a legal minimum size was specified,
as well as fixed c10sing periods when fishing was outlawed (Acheson
1998:5). This meagre set of formal regulations remained in place until the
1970s. Throughout the 1970s, a number of new restrictions were proposed
to limit harvesting, but none of them received enough support to be passed
as bills. For many years, however, fishermen had enforced a minimum size
of lobster. Whereas entry to the fishery was restricted informally through
recruitment to a harbour gang, the formal regulation of registered fishermen
only required getting a state licence, which until 1987, everybody could
purchase for a nominal fee (ibid.:89). That there were no limits to the
number of traps per fisherman, compounded the problem. Fishermen
invested in more expensive vessels and more efficient gear, and had to
increase their fishing effort to pay the bills. By increasing their effort -
more trapsand more time at sea - at the same time as the ranks of
fishermen swelled, the net returns became so low that many fishermen were
forced out of the industry. 14 There was widespread dissatisfaction with the
way the fishery decayed (1988: 136), but it seems that fishermen were
unable to do anything about it, since offenders were not breaking any rules,
merely exploiting the freedom to fish as much and hard as possible (cf.
Miller and van Maanen 1979).
Overcoming their previous suspicion of government regulations, by 1986
more than 90 per cent of the fishermen favoured a maximum limit to the
number of fishi:ng licences and the number of traps (ibid.: 137). In the
proposal for new legislation which should regulate the lobster fisheries, the
state and the lobstermenagreed on raising the minimum legal size of
lobsters, as well as to continue to protect proven breeding stock by marking
14 For an account of the declining lobster fisheries off the coast of Namibia, see Moorsom
(1984: 17-20).
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their tail. Marking berred lobsters and returning them to the sea, was
traditionally a par of the in formal protection of the breeding stock, and this
was now adopted as par of the formal legislation. The management of
lobster fishing was approaching what is termed "co-management" (Acheson
1989b ).
The material presented in great detail by Acheson isa case where a small
number of formal regulations coexisted with informal regulations of
recruitment to harbour gangs and a territorial division of fishing areas.
Those who see in this case material only the success of a local management
system are neglecting the limitations of informal regulations which became
evident during uthe1980s. The problems of overcapitalization. .and
overcapacity forced fishermen to change their initial hostility towards
government intervention and to accept the necessity of formal regulations.
To explain this change, the concept of "trans action costs" (North 1977:710),
gives added insights into the process: the costs of keeping the traditional
(pre-1970) system became larger than the potential benefits from a new co-
management regime (Acheson 1989b). Unable to agree on how to control
the fishery through informal means themselves, fishermen turned to the
state for help, and in the process, transferred the costs of policing and
punishing breaches of regulations onto the state.
Summng up the Maine lobstering experience and its relevance for
"common property theory", Acheson (1988: 142ff.) concludes that it
confirms the role property rights play for the conservation of resources, but
does not support those who think communal property is the same as "open-
access". Whereas local institutions for a lon g time were able to prevent a
tragedy of the commons situation, in the end. the Maine lobster fishery
collapsed, not because entry was not restricted - it was - but because
individual fishermen were free to increase their fishing effort. In this sense,
it followed the implied logic of Gordon's (1954) "common property
theory". Is, then, the Maine lobster industry a case in support of local
management of resources? The answer depends on which period we choose
to analyze. Without doubt, the in formal framework based on territorial it y
did work properly until the 1970s. However, in the period which followed,
the in formal arangements lacked the enforcement capability needed to
restrain the escalating capitalization and overfishing.
The foundations of "territoriality" among fishermen
Territoriality is commonly found both in commercial and artisanal fisheries,
but its effectiveness as a management tool varies. Territoriality as an
informal management system needs to backed by sanctions and penalties.
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When this is the case, terrtoriality establishes some degree of property
rights to a resource, by reserving it, either permanently or seasonally, for
a single group of users. As an informal management tool, territoriality is
of ten used as evidence that local management is better than formal
regulations.15 However, both the concept of territoriality and its role in
limiting fishing effort have be en debated. The argument which is implicit
in Acheson's (1988:ch. 4) description of the Maine lobster fisheries is that
the in formal management regime, the particular type of sea tenure known
as "terrtoriality" , was a result of the nature of the fishery itself (cf. Dyson-
Hudson and Smith 1978; Ingold 1986:ch. 6, for a theoretical discussion of
territoriality). Territoriality emerged because it was a solution at the break-
evenpoint between the costs of exclusion and the economic benefits from
restricted entry. This view is supported by Platteau (1992) who argues that
the reason communal arangements tend to survive a commercialization of
fisheries, is that the costs involved in establishing private property rights
are prohibitively large. (This argument is typical of the way of reasoning
in the theoretical approach known as the "property rights paradigm"
reviewed earlier.) As a result, the fishery in general, and the artisanal sector
in paricular, are dominated by alternative institutions and characterized by
informal, local arangements.
This point is taken up by Durrenberger and Pálsson (1987b) who argue
that the survival of common property regimes (in fisheries) is not linked to
the costs and benefits of exclusion per se, but a management regime
favoured under a domestic (or household) mode of production. They posit
a link between tenure systems and the economic organization of the fishery,
arguing that the "management practices we have reviewed...are best
conceived as consequences of the form of household production, as against
capitalist production" (ibid.:519). In other words, Durrenberger and Pálsson
revers e Acheson's (ibid.) argument about the foundations of territoriality
(see above). Durrenberger and Pálsson claim that in those cases where the
fishery is communally organized, this is a result of inherent limitations in
the economic organization of the fishery (i.e., the domestic mode of
production), and not because fishermen are inclined to favour communal
arrangements per se. It follows from the same argument that Durrenberger
and Pálsson explain the demise of communal arrangements as a result of
a shift from a "household" to a "capitalistic (mode of) production"
(ibid. :519).
15 For a discussion of fishermen's responses to formal regulations anda review of
"enforcement. and avoidance theories", see Vásquez Léon (1994).
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The second of Durrenberger and Pálsson' s c1aims concerns the concept
of property rights itself. They argue that there is a difference of "form"
between fishing rights such as those found in Japan, which were sanctioned
by the feudal rulers (see above on Japanese fisheries) and the Maine
lobstermen whose property rights were informal, hence not recognized by
the state. To treat these two examples as beingsimilar is, .. c1aim
Durrenberger and Pálsson, "simply to confuse the issue of what property is.
It is not the same phenomenon if the state protects a c1aim to ownership
and if one has to protect ithimself' (ibid.:517). It seems that Durrenberger
and Pálsson lose track of their own argument here. To recapitulate, the
meaning of "property" is the right to lay claim to the benefit streamfrom
aresource (Bromley 1991). Property rights might be defined according to
national or federal law, or in some cases, ownership to a resource is
acknowledged to belong to the community (or usergroups) by way of their
long-standing residence in the area, or because of the importance of the
resource to local people. In legal terms this distinction in property rights is
known as de jure and de facto (Schlager and Ostrom 1992:254). The latin
term de jure means "rightful, by right", whereas de facto means "existing
in fact, whether by right or not". In a number of cases of conflict between
the state and local communities over resources this distinction will be
exploited by the paries to validate their claims to ownership. It is apparent
that the Maine lobstermen acknowledged that legally, fish as well as
lobster, were state property (de jure), but what mattered was how local
groups (without state interference) defended their rights and privileges vis-
à-vis each other. In this sense the "harbour gangs" appropriated the benefit
stream of the resource, and in this sense this is their "property" (de facto).
Property relations do not, as c1aimed by Durrenberger and Pálsson
(ibid.:517), have to enter "the state-defined system of differential access to
resources in law" to be regarded as property. However, Durrenberger and
Pálsson are right in arguing that there is a tendency among researchers to
accept that "any form of restriction of access represents ownership"
(ibid.:517). Moreover; their observation that the concept of ownership has
tended to be extended "beyond its useful range of meaning" receives some
support from Berkes (1985b). In his study of the Great Lakes fishery in
Canada, Berkes found that commercial fishermen agreed to zones to be
used exclusively by specific types of gear, as well as operated under harvest
quo tas allocated to varous groups of fishermen. Berkes was reluctant
however, to label this "property rights", and instead suggested the term
"limited property rights".
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Communal control of resources?
Whereas it is an established fact that informal and formal regulations of ten
co-exist in fisheries, there .arefew studies on the origins and history of
informal regulations. Moreover, studies of informal regulations, tend .to
advocate more local contro!. An interesting study because it confronts this
advocacy for more local control with resources, is Lawrence Taylor' s ' .
(1987) study. of a fishing community in the Gaelic-speaking western par
of Ireland. Taylor questions whether "communityrights" are a romantic
notion whichappeals to -social scientists, or a universal type of rights
common to all functioning systems of common property management.16
The villagers had de facto rights to the salmon fisheries in the Donegal Bay
estuary but the de jure rights were shared between the Irish government and
a Gaelic non-profit organization, the Gael-Linn, which bought the fishing
rights in the late 1950s. The fishing in the estuar and upstream in the river
was illegal, but widespread due to the lack of government contro!.17
Fishing in the river was organized by a local system where boats took
turns at fishing upstream with a purse seine. The fishermen uniformly
explained this as being very old cooperative system, hence legitimate and
immutable. Most likely, claims Taylor, the rotational system is more recent
in origin, and the fishermen' s version of the past is at odds with reports and
historical records which tell of endemic strife, c1ashes and lawsuits among
fishermen (ibid.:298). The interesting part is that the collective memory of
fishermen now locates the originsof the management system firmly in a
distant past, hence makes it immutable. Attempts to change the system, and
especially to buy back the rights of fishing, a suggestion made by a well-
meaning local priest, was vehemently opposed. People believed that if the
salmon fishery was to become their de jure property, it would turn them
against each other. In the ensuing fight among villagers, a local man
disc10sed to Taylor, "the river would run red with blood" (ibid.:291). Why
did the villagers not want to take formal control of the fishery? To answer
this question one needs to consider the history of resource management in
Gaelic villages.
Until the early 19th century the Gaelic villages had functioned as local
territorial units (clachan), which held collective rights in the surrounding
resources. Whereas the property relations have changed, the clachan now
16 For a critique of the "local cornunity" concept, see Barth (1992).
17 For a very interesting study of the organization of ilegal fishing and avoidance strategies
among Mexican shrimpers, see Vásquez Léon (1994).
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survives as a communal ideal, where people have reciprocal obligations to
help each other (ibid.:294). Moreover, since villagers had historically been
denied rights to the salmon fishery, they had seen it as their privilege to
poach. This traditionally united villagers against the feudal owners of the
river during the 19th century, and in modern times, the bailiffsand agents
representing the Gael-Linn and the government in Dublin (ibid.:295). As
long as the enforcement of regulations lay outside the community, fishing
(or poaching) did not challenge communal ideals. Jf, on the other hand, the
rights to the fishery were bought back, as suggested by the local priest,
villagers would end up policing each other - a horrifying thought in a dose
knit community. As a vill ager put it; "if I saw that man down pooching
(sicJ and he's my cousin...I couldn't tell him to stop. We're all too dose
here" (ibid.:303). Trying to rein state the corporate' nature of resource
ownership by buying back the legal entitlement to the fishery would, argues
Taylor, militate against the egalitarian ethos of the village, and only by not
owning "the resource in common are villagers able to cooperate"
(ibid.:304). On a more generallevel, Taylor offers this example as a
waring against introducing a system based on contractual agreements (cf.
Tönnies' GesellschaftJ in a setting which predominantly is defined by status
and egalitaranism typical of the community (GemeinschaftJ.
To extend the argument made by Taylor on the link between community
organization and distribution of rights, we end up finally with a Norwegian
example. In a comparative study of inheritance and residence patterns in
two North Norwegian villages, Brox (1964) has discussed how property
rightswere shaped by traits of the local ecology. The two villages
examined by Brox were alike in most ways, but in one of them there was
a limited number of profitable salmon fishing sites. Salmon was caught
using fixed nets (kilenot) placed dose to the shore. To ensure that the rights
. to salmon fishing remained un-paritioned - a necessity for it to remain
economically profitable - inheritance rules favoured the youngest son
("ultimogeniture") and denied rights of inheritance to older brothers as well
as sis ters. Whereas older brothers were granted a part of the landed estate,
girls neither inherited land nor shares in the salmon fishery (ibid.:40). The
older brothers in the family could, if they wished, still continue co-
residence with their younger brother and to function as a single household
after partitioning the estate. However, since they knew that they could not
expect to make a living from their meagre inheritance, they usually
preferred to mary early and to establish their own household. Girls who
were denied all rights of inheritance, opted to mary out of the village.
Census material shows that in the case of women, there was c10se to 100
per cent vill age exogamy. The reason for this mariage strategy was, daims
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Brox, that it solved the moral dilemma that girls were denied their par of
the parent' s estate. When they took up residence elsewhere, there was no
reason to outright deny them their right of inheritance, since they would
have been unable to take advantage of it anyway. The unintentional costs
of excluding women from inheritance, was a demographic stagnation whic~
would ultimately have led to the demise of the vill age itself. Not a single
girl born in the village stayed to raise a family there, and during the period
from 1900 to 1950 the population rose from 70 to just 76! In the other
village studied by Brox, there was no salmon fishing, so parible inheritance
was the norm, and the girls also maried and settled in the hamlet. There,
during the same period, the population more than doubled. Whereas most
studies focus on the adaptive potential of indigenous re source management,
we have in the case presented by Brox seen an example where exclusion
of women from rights in the valuable salmon fishery led to vill age out-
mariage ("exogamy"), and in the long run, to demographic stagnation. It
is here also possible to draw the lines back the Netting's (1981) Swiss
example, where frequent celibacy and high age upon mariage led to a very
low population growth. Inheritance rules entitled all siblings to an equal
share of their parents' landed estate (partible inheritance), hence many
children would promote fragmentation of agriculturalland. Netting argues
that people did not consciously try to limit population growth (ibid.:226),
but the tradition for late mariages and celibacy reduced the number of
children and, hence, slowed the process of fragmentation.
Both Netting and Brox's studies are particularly instructive because they
incorporate fields such as local ecology, social organization and property
rights, which are of ten mistakenly treated as analytically independent. It is
also possible to draw lines between Brox's study and Taylor's (1987)
perceptive observation of the tensions which are inherent in an egalitarian
ethos. As Brox points out, the denial of inheritance rights to girls was not
openly acknowledged since it was at odds with community ideals. Instead,
this moral dilemma was concealed and under-communicated through the
practice of girls to mary elsewhere, meaning that they could neither
consummate their share of landed property nor fishing rights.
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3. The pastoral dilemma: Ecological crisis
or rational herdsmen?
Introduction
Garett Hardin's essay in the journal Science (1968) has been as important
to the study of pastoralism as was Gordon's (1954) seminal work on the
economics of fisheries. Though Hardin barely mentions pastoralism, it is
the idea that private herds on common lands willlead to overstocking that
most people remember. There was a clear resonance between the ideas
contained in Hardin ' spaper and what at the time was the general view of
African pastoralism. Another reason for this biased interpretation of Hardin,
is perhaps that it provided a simple explanation of why pastoralists of ten
find themselves in a situation of acute stress. Regrettably, the negative
stereotype of pastoralism implied by "the tragedy of the commons" parable,
was supported by range ecologists and economists who argued that
pastoralism was ecologically wasteful and maladaptive (Picardi and Seifert
1976). Few, it seems, bothered to take notice of a growing number of more
sophisticated and complex analyses of pastoral adaptations (Gilles and
Jamtgaard 1981).
Numerous studies of pastoralists adopt an economic view of pastoralism,
analyzing it as a "pastoral system of production". The study of pastoralism
is therefore (apart from fisheries) the field where the ideas of Hardin and
Gordon have been most influential (Gilles 1982:219). Authors such as
Sommerville and Kerr (1988) and Simpson and Sullivan (1984) propagate
the idea that rangelands should be privatized, and buttress this view with
data showing that livestock production is higher in group ranches than
among free-ranging animals. Simpson and Sullivan (ibid.) argue that cattle
production in Sub-Saharan Africa is constrained by common property
arrangements, and that without privatization, breed improvement
programmes will never succeed. They believe that the high symbolic value
attached to animals and the practice of using cows as a store of wealth,
means that cattle production never will reach its productive potential
(ibid.:67). The authors blame overgrazing on common property
management, and portray seasonal movements from one ecological zone to
the next as dysfunctional (ibid.:66). Moreover, Sommerville and Kerr argue
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that pastoralism is ecologically maladaptive, and that there is a "common
. property problem facing pastoral Africa" (ibid.: 145), hence, assume a priori
that common ownership is the root of the problem. To bolster this
interpretation, Somerville and Kerr apply Gordon' s model, with some
modifications, to pastoralism (Figure 9). The stocking rate curve is now a
function of the total plant production and Sri is the maximum sustainable
stocking rate. One way to limit the number of animals is to charge taxes,
which will mo ve the co st curve from T o to T l' This will shift the stocking
rate from the point Sre to Sre which in this example is equal to the
maximum economic yield. Other options suggested by Sommerville and
Kerr are the introduction of quo tas (i.e., a maximum number of animals
which can use aresource) or to privatize land in the form of a fenced ranch
or cattle posts (i.e., an enclosed communal pasture). Despite the wealth of
new and detailed information on pastoral adaptations at their disposal,
Sommerville and Kerr advanced a model of pastoralism which reproduced
the essentials of Gordon's (1954) original work, almost twenty-five years
earlier.
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Some muddles in the modeis: Implications of the new range
ecology
For many years anthropologists working among pastoral peoples had argued
that the negative stereotype of pastoral range management was wrong
(Gilles and Jamtgaard 1981; Livingstone 1986; Niamir 1991; Picardi and
Seifert 1976). As long as the hard science "evidence" was lacking,
however, few paid attention to anthropologists' criticism of the prevailing
view of pastoral adaptations. A major change in the perception of
pastoralism in Africa's drylands, was provokedby the publication of James
Ellis and David Swifts (1988) aricle: "Stability of African Pastoral
Ecosystems" which analyzed the links between ecology and livestock
fluctuations among the Ngisonyoka pastoralists in the Turkana district of
Kenya. In their paper, Ellis and Swift verified that indigenous range
management techniques were ecologically sound and better adapted to local
conditions than had be en acknowledged. Re-interpreting range ecology data,
Ellis and Swift offered a new way of understanding the ecology of Africa' s
drylands (see also, Behnke 1992; Behnke and Scoones 1992; Scoones
1994).1 They distinguished between two different categories: "equilibrium"
and "non-equilibrium" ecosystems (ibid.:453ff.). In non-equilibrium
ecosystems, low and erratic rainfall is the dominant ecologic varable. This
means that destocking of herds will not necessarly result in arejuvenation
of soil and plant cover. In non-equilibrium areas they suggested that
livestock numbers should be allowed to fluctuate in line with indigenous
management practices. Following the seminal work of Ellis and Swift,
Behnke (1994:10, italics added) has argued that in non-equilibrium areas:
the harshness and unpredictability of the environment reinforce rather than
diminish the need for pastoralists to maintain institutions which regulate
access to natural resources and the intensity of their use.
In equilibrium areas, by contrast, rainfall is higher and more regular, hence
a stable livestock population is more desirable, but it must be kept below
the estimated carying capacity (Vedeld 1992:31). The new interpretation
of ecological data provided by Ellis and Swift (ibid.) made it easier to
argue in favour of a local management mode!. It has also led to a timely
reevaluation of indigenous managements systems, which earlier had been
discredited as wasteful and maladaptive.
Earlier, range ecologists such as Pratt and Gwynne (1977) had criticized pastoralists for
contributing to desertification, by keeping 50 to 100 per cent more animals than that
needed for subsistence requirements (see also, Fratkn and Roth 1990).
62
However, a continuing problem is that state policies often run counter to
indigenous management practices, a problem which is especially
problematic during times of drought. Scoones (1992) discusses the problem
of obtrusive state policies in relation to coping strategies among pastoralists
in Southern Zimbabwe. Scoones c1aims that in non-equilibrium areas,
"opportunistic" herding, that is, separating the herd in small units which are
moved frequently, is normally enough to ward off large herd losses during, .
times of drought. The incentive to sell animals is low during a drought
because the market quickly becomes saturated, pushing the prices down.
. For this reason, pastoralists prefer to keep their animals rather than to
purchase new ones after the drought when prices rise steeply. Scoones
found that during extreme and prolonged drought, territorial boundaries
between neighbouring groups, which normally are impermeable, break
down because local level institutions are unable to de al with the massive
movement of animals. Despite this, Scoones argues, in all but extreme
droughts, local measures such as cattle loaning and opportunistic herding
are adequate to prevent large herd losses. Instead of supporting traditional
coping strategies, the policy of the Zimbabwean government has been to
contain pastoralists and their livestock within their terrtorial boundaries and
request them to destock herds at a time of low prices. This has contributed
to undermine pastoralists' ability to cope with severe drought and to survive
once the drought is over (ibid.:312).2
The demise of traditional institutions
Whereas it might be important to reconstitute common property regimes,
it daes not necessarily follow that the best way to do this is through
revoking traditional institutions. Is, for example, the advocacy for local
solutions premised on an outmoded belief in what could be termed "The
Golden Age of traditional authority"? (Fortmann 1986:73). Lawry
(1990:407) is concerned about the weakening of local institutions in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and is not convinced that local institutions are capable of
managing resources, because modernization:
has reduced incentives for individuals to participate in 10calIzed collective
arrangements, has undercut the economic viability of common property
institutions, and has reduced the politicallegitimacy of local management
2
In a study of the impacts of drought up on Ariaal pastoralists in Kenya, Fratkin and Roth
(1990) argue that post-drought studies show that the. gap between rich and poor
households increases.
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authorities. ... Local institutions, weakened by far-reaching economic
changes, are unlikely to engen der support at the locallevel for imposition
of intensive controIs, especially where there is liUle precedent for direct
regulation.
Despite such cautionar remarks, there is as Helland (1993: 15) points out,
a "recent trend in pastoral development (which) celebrates the virtues of
~ traditional management systems; environmental problems in the rangelands
are believed to be related to the decline and/or collapse of these traditional
systems"..If this analysis is correct, it would seem that revoking traditional
institutions would be the right strategy in order to recreate the former
system of local resource management. The question is to what degree this
is possible.
In a review of a pastoral development project in Mali, Trond Vedeld
(1993, see also Shanmugnaratman et aL. 1992) discusses the problem of
institution building. Vedeld argues that project staff deemed it unrealistic .
to revoke traditional institutions, and instead, it was decided to organize
pastoralists through the formation of pastoral assocIations which where
granted formal rights to land and water. According to Vedeld, none of the
pastoral associations which were formed functioned well. In the exceptional
cases where pastoral associations did function, membership in the
association corresponded to social groups circumscribed by traditional
access to water and pastures. Despite the problems encountered, Vedeld
argues that the Mali program should have tried to incorporate more
elements of traditional institutions into the new institutional framework.
According to Vedeld, a particularly distressing problem was that at the
same time as new institutions were created, state policies dismantled
customary institutions which had similar or overlapping functions.
An illustration of the problems involved with revoking traditional
institutions in a modern setting is Louise Fortmann ' s (1986) examination
of the role of local institutions in modern development planning in
Botswana. The institution in question was the kgotla which originally was
a tribal public assembly in the old Tswana kingdom (see also, Gulbrandsen
1984; Wynne 1993). At the time of Fortmann's research, the kgotla was
changing rapidly and had to share decision-making authority with
government institutions. Moreover, it was caught up in factional politics,
meaning that in some villages meetings were not called. Fortmann argues
that traditional institutions are important in order to confer legitimacy to
new projects or interventions, but they should not be given the full
responsibility for implementing them, a tas k they rarelyare equipped for.
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In another case of institutional change, Jean Ensminger (1990) analyzes
the transition from local management to state governance of resources
among the pastoral Orma of northeastern Kenya. From 1960 and onwards
the Orma were gradually sedentarized, and at the same time they were
alienated from vast tracts of land which were used to create game reserves
. and irrigation schemes. Sedentarization and population growth meant that
the Orma stared to exclude nomadic pastoralists from using areas around
their villages. After the Sahelian droughts from 1968 to 1974,
sedentarization rose and consequently the restrictions on grazing were
tightened. At this point, elders who until then had mediated disputes,
relinquished their control to the state. In order to explain this change
Ensminger makes a number of interesting points. First, the council of elders
had serious problems with ariving at consensual decisions in the new
environment, and they of ten had to literally buy compliance from those
who were unwilling to support the majority vie w (ibid.:670). Secondly,
economic diversification meant that young men took up new trades and left
pastoralism. This in turn meant that elder men lost the pri vilege of
con trolling younger men. Independent young men were able to circumvent
mariage proscriptions(clan exogamy), thereby eroding the power of elders
who formerly had been in the position to control aranged mariages. In the
end, the council of elders felt that more could be achieved by yielding
control to the state. The state was not dependent upon consensus decisions
and majority votes could be backed by force.
Central to Ensminger' s analysis is the fact that Orma elders willingly
gave up their control of resource management. The devolution of local
power was a result of socio-economic change which placed heavy burdens
on traditional institutions and made state management the only realistic
alternative. For our purpose, this is the most interesting part of Ensminger' s
analysis, and testifies to the fact that attempts to "empower" or "enable"
traditional institutions sometimes can be motivated by wishful thinking
rather than careful analysis. The theoretical underpinnings of Ensminger's
analysis is neoinstitutional economics, and she makes use of a trans action
cost perspective to show the dramatic rise in costs of enforcing decisions,
thus it is not the rules which have changed but the environment for their
enforcement.
In a later aric1e on the Orma (Ensminger and Rutten 1991), the analysis
is strongly influenced by neoinstitutional economics and critical of the work
of "tragedy theorists" and neo-Marxists. According to Ensminger and
Rutten (ibid.), the strength of neoinstitutional economics is that it analyzes
institutional change as a politicalprocess in which people quarel, struggle
and disagree. Property rights will therefore necessarily reflect changes in
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the relative strength of groups and individuals. In the case of the Orma, the
gradual shift from communal to private property rights was made possible
by having the state subsidize enforcement (see also, Ensminger 1992).3
Returning to this report' s concern with local institutions as a possible
solution to the high transaction costs associated with state management and
the equity problems that arise from privatization, the case presented by
Ensminger shows that locallevel management of resources are abandoned
due to rising transaction costs. This runs counter to our initial hypothesis
that local level management is preferable to state management because of
lower transaction costs. Low transaction costs used to be a feature of local
enforcement, but with increased pressure on local resources as well as
general socio.;economic change, this is no longer the case. Ensminger
(1990) explains the devolution of local control as the result of a collapse
of a local institution where decision makng was based on hierarchy
(through the authority of the elders) but lacked the legitimacy for penalizing
offenders which made coercIon impossible.
The consequences of the devolution of traditional authority for resource
management has also been raised by Nek Buzdar (1984) in his study of
changing range management techniques among Baluch nomads in Pakistan.
Traditionally, the Baluch chieftains were dependent on support from their
tribe to remain in office. With growing state presence, however, the
chieftains source of legitimacy shifted from the tribe to that of a state
representative. The chieftains were now free to neglect triballaw and in
paricular were free to disregard rules that governed pasture use and animal
husbandry. At the time of Buzdar's fieldwork, indigenous institutions for
range management had be en weakened, but a few Baluch still practised a
system which involved closing important rangelands during the summer
months, thus allowing the pastures to regenerate. Comparing rangelands
under traditional management by the tribe with rangelands without effective
control, Buzdar found that the average closing period in the traditional areas
was three months but onlyten days in the non-traditional ones. Responding
to increased food insecurity, overstocking was evident both in rangelands
under traditional management and those left without such contro!. However,
the mean overstocking (per forage acre) was about six animals in non-
traditional areas and only one animal in the traditional ones. This,
conc1udes Buzdar, is evidence that "institutional changes may have
contributed to the general decline in rangeland productivity" (ibid.: 15). It
also shows that the gradual demi se of a traditional political institution (i.e.,
3 For a critique of Ensrnnger' suse of neoinstitutional econorncs, see Rigby (1994).
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the chieftainship) weakened indigenous range management techniques and
contributed to overstocking of animals.
CIosing the commons: Enclosures and group ranches
The practice of fencing pars of rangelands in order to create zones for
exc1usive use ("enc1osures"), represents a significant shift from the
traditional open-range pastoralism found in Africa. Roy Behnke (1985)
argues that spontaneous range enclosures in Darur in Southern Sudan,
represent a process towards private controlover rangelands (ibid.:2).
Behnke discusses the formation of range enclosures in two adjacent zones,
termed A and B respectively. Zone A was primarly used to produce animal
fodder, while zone B was inhabited by farmers and transient nomads who
spent pars of the wet season in zone B. Under open-range conditions,
farmers in zoneB allowed traditional grazing by pastoralists during the wet
season. U sed by both sedentary farmers and nomads, zone B was heavily
grazed, a situation which was aggravated by periodic droughts. To reduce
the grazing pressure farers fenced part of the rangelands thereby
excluding the nomads from their seasonal use of the zone (ibid.: 18). Range
enclosures were also found in zone A, spurred by the high value of animal
fodder, and hence, the high value of land. The fencing of plots in zone A,
was to some degree consistent with former practices, which allowed fencing
of land which was paricularly valuable. In zone B, by contras t, enc10sures
were initiated by a development project and backed by local authorities and
policed by armed patrols. Serving to exclude nomads travelling through the
zone, the enclosures were supported by the sedentary farmers who profited
from the development (ibid.:21). Unlike most scholars working with
pastoralists in Africa' s arid lands, Behnke views enc10sures as a positive
development which aids conservation by protecting pockets of rangelands
in hea vil y grazed areas.
Behnke' s argument concerning privatization of c ommun al land in
Darfur,4 is supported by Lawry (1990:412) who argues that resource
scarcity will not necessarily favour common property regimes "but lead
individual users to attempt to enclose the commons for private use". In this
respect, both Lawry and Behnke agree that when resources become scarce,
the subsequent increase in value will promote enforcement through
regulations. In other words, as hypothesized by property rights theory,
4 Behnke has made similar arguments about range enclosures in central Somalia (1988),
but here points to how a lack of feneing material slows the formation of enclosures.
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Figure 10
Stages in the transformation of pastoralism
Subsistence pastoralism
Livestock becomes
a commodity
Open-range ranching
Land becomes
-- -- - - -- - - - -- ---- -- - -- - - - -- - -- --- - - -- - -- --- - - ---
a commodity
Fenced ranching
"property rights are instituted when the costs associated with a lack of
property are smaller than the gains to be had from establishing property
rights" (Acheson 1989b:374).
Intensification of land use and commercialization of pastoralism tends to
take place in a two-stage process (Figure 10). First livestock is raised for
the purpose of selling, and secondly, land is made a commodity by fencing
it. More often than not, commercialization of pastoralism is the result of
state policies rather than a result of local initiative. In a study of the
formation of Maasai group ranches, John Galaty (1992) discusses the
governments piecemeal privatization of Maasai rangelands. Traditionally,
says Galaty, the Maasai community held resources in common, i.e., they
were managed by the local homestead. Territorial groups (olosho) could
c10se pastures for specific periods of time but these enclosures never
developed into exclusive zones. During times of drought herds could be
moved freely between various rangelands controlled by the local territorial
group. Livestock development projects which began in the 1960s, had by
the 1970s changed this pattern by demarcating land and vesting private land
tide with Group Ranches (ibid.:27). Initially, the Maasai favoured the
formation of group ranches, because it was believed to secure land rights
for the Maasai community. For its part, the government hoped that by
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creating group ranches the long term effect would be the introduction of
market mechanisms and for land to be bought by the bidders most adept at
utilizing them effectively. In the 1980s, the next step towards privatization
involved abolishing group ranches, by distributing land among their
members. In response to the privatization of land many Maasai chose to sell
it, rather than as planned, to adopt sustainable husbandry practices. Due. to
the low agricultural poten ti al of much of the land as well as immediate cash, .
needs, the Maasai sold land, primarily to Kikuyu's who instead of using it
for farmingused it as collateral to obtain bank credits. In the future,
. hypothesizes Gal at y , land as a pure commodity may be used for exchange
rather than use. Moreover, the investment in livestock gradually changed
into specialized meat production ("ranching"). However, we simply do not
know, says Galaty, whether this was caused by the privatization of land, or
if the Maasai suddenly realized the profits to be made from such
transactions. In conclusion, Galaty laments the "scandalous process by
which Maasai rangeland is subjected to privatization, individualization and
loss" (ibid.:38). Galaty's concem is reflected by Gilles (1982:216) who
argues that: "Over the past 35 years there have been scores of programmes
designed to modernise pastorallivestock productions systems. Virtually all
of these have failed". As Gilles points out, in order to solve the problems,
there is a ne ed to strengthen features of traditional pastoral systems such as
mobility, restricted use of critical resources and indigenous information
systems.
Overstoeking and herd growth: The "cattIe complex"
The first concerns about overstocking of animals in African pastoralism are
of ten attributed to Herskovits (1926), who. coined the term "cattle
complex". In recent years the conventional wisdom of overstocking and
impending crisis among African pastoralists have been refuted (Ellis and
Swift 1988). Yet the controversy persists between those who see
pastoralism as a successful adaptation to a marginal environment and those
who think overstocking and overgrazing will lead to a disaster (Helland
1990: 169).
Let us start with the problem of herd growth which many argue is not
only unavoidable, but intrinsic to pastoral husbandry (Helland 1990, 1993).
The problem with much of the work on African pastoralism is - if Ellis
and Swift (1988) are right - that the conventional range ecology has failed
to understand the dynamics behind livestock fluctuations in the arid and
semi arid lands. Thus, short term overstocking is. a conscious and rational
response to a high degree of uncertainty in the non-equilibrium zones (cf.
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Western and Finch 1980, on the Maasai). One of the first attempts to
analyze the dynamics of herd fluctuations among sub-Saharan pastoralists
was Haaland' s (1977) study of Toposa pastoralists in Southem Sudan.
Haaland argued that for pure pastoralists, a growing human population
means an increasing number of livestock. After a while, overstocking and
reduction of profit per animal will contribute to increased consumption of
livestock, and which over time leads to sedentarization of marginal
households. In turn, a smaller number of animals and more available
rangel and will cause livestock numbers to rise again. In sum, this functions
as a homeostatic system and causes the herd size to fluctuate around the
carrying capacity.5 The other _scenario examined by Haaland is the case
where agro-pastoralists, who combine animal husbandry and agriculture,
face similar conditions. Haaland argues that in the event of overstocking,
agro-pastoralists will not increase their consumption but subsist on
agricultural products, hence herds will continue to grow. Eventually the
large herds will cause severe overgrazing, leading to catastrophic loss of
animals, a pattern known as "boom and bust cycles". This perspective is
taken up again by Helland (1990, 1993) who focuses on the propensity for
rapid animal growth, but in the same vein as Haaland, argues that
epidemics and droughts will intervene to decimate herds long before an
active management of the herds is needed, thereby averting a "tragedy of
the commons" situation.
That growth in pastoral herds is mainly constrained by environmental
factors is supported by J. Terrence McCabe's (1990) study among another
East African pastoral group, the Ngisonyoka Turkana in Northwestern
Kenya. As a purely pastoral group living exc1usively from herding, the
Turkana share rights of access to pastures with other groups living within
their territorial boundaries. A large part of their potential herding areas are,
however, not used due to fear of raiding from neighbouring groups and also
of cattle disease (ibid.:90). McCabe's main point is that the herd size
5 The origin of this argument is to be found in Fredrik Barth's (1980a (1964)) study of
Basseri nomads in Iran, where Barth claimed, overstoeking of animals was restrained by
proeesses of sedentarization among non-viable pastoral households. A refutation. of
Barth's hypothesis has been launched by Tim Ingold (1988:212ff.) who argues that
Barth's argument is tautological because it does not differentiate between pastoralists'
depletion of their animal herds because of their need for food and the periodic
overgrazing of pastures due to overstoeking. Ingold concludes that if Barth's argument
about sendentarization as a homeostatic mechanism was correct, this would imply that
"the growth of animal numbers were generated by the growth of human numbers. This,
manifestly, cannot be the case" (ibid.:217). (Interested readers should refer to Ingolds
original text for a more detailed version of his complex argument).
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fluctuates around a mean value, mainly due to "environmental constraints"
such as disease, drought and raiding. To corroborate this view, McCabe
uses data from another East African location, the N gorongoro Conservation
Area (ibid. :97). These data show that livestock numbers have remained
stable for large periods of time, while the human population increased
during the same time-span (McCabe et aL. 1992:357). .
In an excellent aricle, Roy Behnke (1994) dismisses the relevance of the
herd growth discussion. This debate is, claims Behnke (1994: 14, italics
added):
irrelevant as a practical guide to rangeland policy, since pastoralists
almost universally con sider private herd accumulation to be desirable, do
not recognise any moral imperative to limit personal livestock wealth, and
have not created institutions which force this limitation upon group
members.
Even if herd owners strive to increase their herds, says Behnke, they "do
not appear to do so for the reasons (or primarily for the reasons) Hardin
gives, under the conditions he posits, or with the results he predicts"
(ibid.:16). Instead, Behnke (ibid.:20-21) argues:
the intensity of resource use is not controlled byenlightened self restraint
(the 'stinting' advocated by Runge, 1981 ), extemal coercion (the state
intervention recommended by Hardin, 1968) or the maximisation of
economic rent (private property as extolled by Gordon, 1954). It is
regulated instead by a process whereby actors internalise both rental
benefits and transaction costs, in an attempt to hold resources as openly
as their productive interests wil permit and as exc1usively as is tactically
feasible.
There is, hence, little evidence that institutions whose principal function is
to constrain herd growth is common among East African pastoralists.
Instead, overstocking was regulated by ecological constraints and the
shedding of non-viable units through sedentarization. This, however, only
applies to pure pastoralists, and not to those who combine pastoralism and
agriculture (Haaland 1977). It is also important to keep apar restrictions on
access ("limited éntry") which are quite common, from institutional checks
on livestock numbers, which it seems, are rare (Helland 1993:3). This
means that whereas some pastoral groups do limit access to pastures, they
do not prevent legitimate users from increasing their herds, hence the
"tragedy of the commons" argument may still be valid (ibid.).
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Do institutions conserve?
The debate of institutions among pastoralists in Sub-Saharan Africa does
not so much concern whether there are institutions or not, but what their
prime functions are. The main question is the degree to which traditional
institutions are explicitly concerned with resource management, and to what
extent institutions contribute to conservation. Helland (1993:173) argues -
that "we rarely find institutions in pastoral societies which explicitly
regulate the use of communal pastures at sustainable leveIs" . Other
researchers working with East African pastoralists agree that conservation
was not the primary goal of traditional institutions (Little and Brokensha
1987), but argue that more research is needed to establish the extent to
which institutions contributed to conservation. Little and Brokensha
(ibid.: 196-197) argue that:
While there have been several excellent field studies of pastoral systems
of East Africa, few have systematicallyexamined the organisation of
grazing and the tenure systems that affect it. Critical details of rules
determining access to grazing and water, as well as of institutions for
regulation, are laeking.
An example of a critical reflection on the role institutions play is Helland' s
(1993) analysis of the form and function of institutions among the Borana
in Southern Sudan. East African pastoralists, says Helland, tend to place
more emphasis on managing water than pastures (1978:80; 1980:40).
Among the Borana regulations are first of all linked to access to water
wells, not to pastures (Helland 1982).6 However, Helland stresses that one
should not think of "the wells and the organisation of water usage as a
natural resources management system" (1993:18). Helland argues that if
there is something such as resource management at all, it is an
epiphenomenon caused by actors pursuing other goals (ibid.). Helland
argues that among the Borana, one does not find institutions whose prime
function is resource management, and that the alleged "local institutions"
for resource management are bureaucratic arifacts. This particularly
concems the concept of madda which Helland describes as a weakly
defined unit with a water source as its center but which Ethiopian
development policies elevated into a fully fledged resource management
system. The madda had, maintains Helland, neither the authority to restrict
6 Managing water in the way described here does not, however, seem to be cornon to
all Borana. Hogg (1990:25) reports that the Isiolo Borana of Northern Kenya lacks
clearly defined rights in water.
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access to wells nor pastures associated with the well. The reason is that
such restrictions goes against the aada - "the Borana way" - which is the
pervasive ethos regulating all aspects of Borana social life. The only
institution which may have played a role in managing resources among the
Borana is the c1an-based political system (gosa). In recent times there has
been a gradual weakening of the aada and a trend towards restricting the
free access to the commons. In paricular this has encouraged the formation
of range enelosures as well as the establishment of small agricultural plots
in selected rangelands.
There seems, however, to be regional variations to the pattern described
by Helland, even within the same tribal group. Baxter (1970) discusses the
system of water and pasture management among the Borana living in
Kenya. Here water wells are controlled by elder men, usually the same men
who took the initiative to dig them. Once in place, wells can be used by all
members belonging to the homestead (worra), which among the Borana is
the elemental social unit. Though the Borana do not man age pastures in an
explicit sense, they organize herding and husbandry in such a way as to
prevent catastrophic herd losses. The most common strategies are extensive
herding, and the distribution of pars of their livestock among networks of
relatives and friends.
Moving to another East African pastoral group, Daniel Stiles (1992)
describes land-use management among the Gabbra which are found both in
the Marsabit region of Northern Kenya, as well as in Southern Ethiopia. In
a similar fashion as their Borana neighbours, the Gabbra practise a strict
regulation of water resources. Wells and boreholes are owned by the c1an
or group who dug it. The use of a well is managed by a tribal elder who
is recognized as the "father of the well" (Abba EUa). A consequence of the
many new wells has been that the water table has dropped, something
people are aware of but lack means to prevent (ibid.:46). The Gabbra live
solely from their animals and do not practice agriculture. With the
importance of livestock to the Gabbra they need to have access to networks
which extend beyond relatives in the main camp and the scattered satellite
camps. In addition to brother-in-laws who pool their livestock and labour
resources, they may join members belonging to the same "phratry" (a
phratry is a group of elans related by common descent or historical
alliance) to form a c1uster of households who collectively manage their
herds. As is common to many pastoral groups in Africa, the Gabbra attach
special importance to the bond between a boy and his matemal unele. The
boy will initially herd his unc1e's livestock, whereas the unc1e in due time
will help his nephew to star his own herd. When it is needed they will also
lend each other animals. Close inter-elan links are maintained by
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exchanging wives, an institution which creates kinship links that can be
utilized when needed. Finally, the Gabbra practice a generalized system of
long-term lending (dabaree) of each others animals. In addition to a
complex web of animalloans, the Gabbra' s herd management system is
intertwined with religious sanctions, pertaining paricularly to camels, that
animal which is most important to their survival (ibid.:50). Among the
Gabbra we find a complex system of institutional measures which reduce
the risk and enhance the viability of livestock herding.
Though institutions which regulate grazing are rare in East Africa, Peter
Little's (1983, 1985) studies show that institutions explicitly concerned with
pasturemanagement have, untilrecently, been in place among the Il
Chamus in Northern Kenya. Little's (1983, 1985; Little and Brokensha
1987) studies show that during the dry season the Il Chamus practised a
system of restricted grazing (olokeri). Men between 18 and 30 years
belonged to a paricular age-grade (il murran) which was in charge of
policing the areas restricted to grazing. The olokeri system was controlled
by a council of elders (lamaal) which imposed fines on those who breached
regulations. Since 1958, however, the olokeri system has on ly been
enforced for two or three years (LittIe 1985: 139). At present, grazing
decisions are taken by individuals, and the olokeri system is no longer
contributing to range regulation. The factors which have affected the Il
Chamus' traditional decision-making are changes in wealth distribution,
new market linkages and increased demographic pressure (Little and
Brokensha 1987: 195).
In a survey among the Il Chamus inquiring into why the olokeri system
disappeared, 24 per cent answered that rainfall declined, 19 per cent said
they did not know and 12 per cent that there had be en a general decline in
traditions and the role of groups such as the il murran age-grade and the
eldèrs (LittIe 1985:140). Little's own hypotheses for the demi se of the
olokeri institution is that population growth increased the pressure in the
central pasture areas, and that the authority of government sub-chiefs
increased at the expense of the council of elders (ibid.:141). As Little notes:
"When local political structures are changed, tenure and resource
management institutions are often affected" (ibid.:142). Additionally, men
belonging to the il murran age-grade leave to take up wage employment.
Two other developments in Baringo added to the problems: the presence of
absentee herd owners using the area for specialized livestock production
("ranching") and the pressure from neighbouring pastoral groups. In self-
defence, the Il Chamus now favour "government sponsored group ranches
as a way of protecting their territorial integrity" (ibid.: 146). The drive
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towards privatization did not solve any problems, but led instead to a
situation where the Il Chamus lost control of local resources.7
Historical changes in pastoral adaptations
As a rule, analyses of pastoral adaptations tend to focus on immediate and
present day concerns, in paricular overstocking, desertification and'
. destitution. Analyses of African pastoralists from an historical perspective
. are rare. We have already referred to contemporar studies of the Il
Chamus in Northern Kenya (Little 1983, 1985; Little and Brokensha 1987),
and here we will return to the same group again, but this time in a
historical study by David Anderson (1988) covering the period 1840-1980.
Though Little (1985) alludes to the complex history of the Il Chamus, the
overall presentation stresses their contemporary pastoral adaptation. For the
reader, it is easy to infer from this that the Il Chamus have always been
pastoralists: Anderson's study shows that this is incorrect. From 1840 until
the present the Il Chamus passed through a series of adaptational changes:
from irrgated agriculture during drought periods, to a pastoral adaptation
during periods of sufficient rainfall. Throughout this period they hosted
temporarily sedentarized Maasai neighbours as agricultural tenants. When
ecological conditions permitted, tenants left to take up pastoralism again,
.. which in turn would be followed by the Il Chamus too. After a severe
famine in 1882, which was later followed by a flood that destroyed much
of their irigation works, the Il Chamusgradually gave up irrigated
agriculture. This process gained momentum after ca. 1900, when the
colonial administrators shielded the Il Chamus from their hostile cattle
raiding neighbours such as the Pokot, Tugen and Maasai. In 1917, another
flash flood destroyed what was left of the Il Chamus canal networks, and
dealt a final blow to their irrgated agriculture. From 1920 to 1980 the Il
Chamus were gradually turned into full-time pastoralists, but still reverted
to cultivation if conditions neèessitated. The droughts and occasional food
shortages during the 1920s and 1930s, made the colonial authorities anxious
to develop an alternative food production among the Il Chamus, hoping that
this would serve to decrease the size of their herds. This led to the
introduction of a large government sponsored irrigation schemewhich was
7 In another article from Baringo, Little (1983), discusses the links between grain
consumption and herd sizes. The conventional wisdom is that increased grain produetion
wil encourage destoeking of herds. Rebutting this view, Little argues that increased
grain production can be exchanged into livestock, which in turn means that there no
longer is a need to sell livestock to purehase grain.
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initiated in the early 1950s. Instead of employing the Il Chamus, which by
now were regarded as pastoralists, the project employed other groups
without any knowledge of irrigated agriculture. The few Il Chamus
employed under the scheme continued their high off-scheme involvement
with pastoralism (ibid.:258).
Jf we compare the studies by Little (1983, 1985) with that by Anderson
(ibid.), it is apparent that our understanding of pastoral adaptations may be
unduly influenced by the time frame of our analyses.8 In this particular
case, Anderson has shown that the there is considerable fluidity in the Il
Chamus pastoral adaptation: they are not "pure" pastoralists, though they
may appear to be so at this paricular point in time. For example, the
council of elders (lamaal) which Little terms a "pastoral institution" was
equally concerned with the distribution of water. Moreover, the Il Chamus'
resource management strategies are not wholly "indigenous" in the sense
that they reflect only the Il Chamus' relation to the environment. Instead,
the Il Chamus has been influenced by their relations to surrounding groups,
and in paricular have responded to shifting colonial policies since the turn
of the century.
In contrast to the political independence which man y attribute to
pastoralism, East African pastoralists since colonial times have been subject
to external con tro!. This in many cases has also influenced their resource
management strategies (Anderson 1988). As pointed out in the beginning
of this chapter, present-day pastoralists continue to suffer from misguided
development policies, and ill-advised development interventions -
destocking, privatization, and sedentarization - which have reduced their
ability to cope with periodic droughts and disasters. Moreover, the failure
to grasp indigenous range management techniques has helped to
disseminate Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" parable. This problem is
not unique to pastoralism but is also a feature of forest management: who
is to blame for the rapid deforestation in South Asia, the state' s forest
policies or rural villagers ? This will be the topic of the next chapter.
8 The importanee of adopting a longer time frame in our studies is also stressed by Hogg
(1990). He argues that to understand the tightening of rules and increased competition
for pastures among the Isiolo Borana in Kenya, one has to consider the large influx of
Somalian pastoralists since the late 1960s.
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4. The disappearing forests: Failed policies
'or local mismanagement?
Introduction
With the increasing demand for firewood, building materials and
cultivatable land in Third World countries, it is not surrising that forests
are dwindling. Whereas many have been alarmed by rapid depletion of
tropical rainforests (Colchester and Lohman 1993), there has been less
popular and scholarly interest in the fate of forests in South Asia and
Africa. This is unfortunate, because these forests are both important local
resources as well as being commodities in gre at demand. Maintaining
forest-cover has several positive ecological effects and serves to stabilize
slopes, reduces soil-loss and subsequent siltation of rivers and water
reservoirs, as well as form habitats important for preserving biodiversity.
Despite the importance of forest, there has been little research into how
property rights regimes and tenure influence the incentives for protecting
forest (Fortmann and Bruce 1998:1ff.). Due to the paucity of material on
fore stry from South Asia, this chapter is expanded by a short case study of
forestry from Pakstan.
The case studies reviewed in this chapter showagreat variation in the
way forest is perceived and managed by different user groups:
agriculturalists remove forest to create arable land, whereas pastoralists
want to preserve forest due to its importance as browse to their animals
(Barrow 1988). These practices are often incompatible and may lead to
conflict. Conflict may also follow in the wake of commercial felling of
forest where new cash eamings from sale of timber and timber products
increase socIal tensions and weaken kin solidarity. More specifically, there
seems to be a connection between the dismantling of forest commons and
the growth of internecine violence.
Another focal point in the study of forest management is the problem of
property regimes, and the tension between statutory law and what we might
term customar law or customary use rights. Nationalization of forests of ten
leads to unsustainable forestr practices and occasionally to wholesale
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destruction of forests, either through dismantling of local institutional
control by instituting management practices whichare incompatible with
traditional tenure or by giving free reign to commercial interests. In a few
cases, however, the remoteness and lack of physical infrastructure have
reduced the impact of nationalization on forest.
Forest as a common pool resource
W e have previously discussed how pastoralism could be fitted into
Gordon's (1954) analyticalmodel and the connection between effort and
returns in an open-access (non-property) regime (chapter Ill). Gordon's
common property theory may also be modified to include forest. Jf we
imagine a virgin stand of timber (for example a watershed), the growth of
trees, and hence the maximum sustainable yield which can be harve sted at
a given time is determined by the growth rate of the trees. What sets forest
apart from fish and livestock, is the very low growth rate of most tree
species. A pine tree, for example, may take as much as 150 years to reach
. maturity. This has two importantimplications: first, the slow growth rate
means that trees for a very long time are susceptible to illegal logging,
diseases or natural disasters. For these reasons, it makes sense to maximize
the net present value - using a discount rate which is higher than the
natural regrowth - which will pro mote rapid logging (see also Clark 1973).
The long period needed for a tree to reach maturity means that if a tree
is planted ( or left standing) the benefits are in reality left to future
generations. However, the likelihood that the natural growth factor is lower
than the discount rate means that a tree is prone to be cut now rather than
left for the benefit of future generations. Bromley (1989b: 181) discusses
this "intertemporal problem" and argues that it represents an example of
"asymmetrical externalities" where there is little future generations can do
"to ameliorate the detrimental effects of our actions today" (ibid.: 182).
Secondly, argues Bromley, since "the future is not able to have its interests
represented in this matter...this is an instance of a missing market"
(ibid.:183). Apart from the biological properties of fores t which contribute
to its vulnerability as a renewable resource, forest management is suffering
from unclear management objectives, a high urban demand for timber and
bureaucratic inaptitude. Management is often vested with a low-salaried
bureaucratic staff which is inc1ined to accept bribes. Moreover, poor, rural
communities are manipulated by political patrons and intermediaries, to sell
timber below its market value (Box 1.)
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Box 1
Forest contractors as intermediaries in Pakstan' s fore stry
Pakistan as a whole has less than four per cent forest cover, consequently forest
(jungal) is a prized cornodity. Areas with natural forest presently make up less than
one per cent of the total fores t cover and are therefore theatened. Most of Pakistan' s
pine and cedar forest are found in the Nort West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Allan
1986, 1987). Due to the colonial legacy of Pakistan there are complex legal issues
involved in the regulation of forest (Khattak 1976a, 1976b). The most conflict-ridden
management is found in forests which are owned by local cornunities but managed
by the state (guzara) (Azhar 1989, 1993). The local owners are entitled to royalties
from the sales of timber. The royalties, which range from 60 to 80 per cent of the
revenue from the sales of timber, are returned to the local owners.
Currently the timber prices in Pakstan are twice the world average. This means that
forest has become a valuable cornodity. There are, naturally, a number of vested
interests involved in controllng the wealth that stems from forests. Most of the
unaccounted for loss of forest in Pakstan is an incremental loss, that is, single trees
are cut in a slow process of deforestation. Incremental loss of this kInd is usually
attributed to subsistence users, who need trees for firewood and as bu ilding material.
The most serious forest loss is, however, due to deliberate overcutting by fores t
contractors. This could, however, not have been possible without the cooperation of
employees in the Forest Deparment (FD). The payment of bribes (baksheesh,
sifareesh) is common in Pakstan, and is naturally also occurrng in a setting where a
valuable commodity is involved. This fact is acknowledged both in the higher
echelons of the FD as well as among fores t contractors. Forest contractors are not,
however, a uniform group, they can be local entrepreneurs or wealthy patrons who
have the fInancial dout to undertake large fellng operations, involving mechanized
equipment and hired labour. Whereas popular opinion tend to blame forest contractors
for all that is wrong in Pakstan' s forest management, some of this is unwaranted. It
is loopholes in the forest legislation, in association with weakesses in the
organization of forest haresting which have allowed the contractors to prosper.
Moreover, the presenee of forest contractors has long historical antecedents. They
have been an integral par of forest harvesting since colonial times, and were also at
that time, accused of cutting more trees than they had legally purchased (Tucker
1982:119).
Until 1973 contractors could bid for standing trees and once they got the tender, took
charge of both fellng and marketing operations. Unsurprisingly, this led to
widespread over-haresting. To amend this system it was decided in 1977, to
strengthen the FD with the creation of the Forest Development Cooperation (FDC).
One of the reasons for the creation of the FDC, was to separate forest management
from forest haresting. By creating the FDC, the government hoped to curb the forest
contractors. For a while this was successfuL. The contractors were now only
responsible for cutting the trees and bringing them to the road. The contractors
therefore no longer had avested interest in overcutting. However, by exploiting
loopholes in this arrangement the forest contractors were during the 1980s able to
regain their old position. (Continued)
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The main reason for the reemerging problems was that in 1982, the "net-sale system"
began to replace the so-called "fixed price system". The problem with the fixed price
system wasthat the rates had not kept pace with the rise in the market price of
timber. Under the net-sale system, timber was moved to official timber markets and
sold to the highest bidder. With this change, the profits to be reaped from forests
increased dramatieall y.
The way for forest contractors to circumvent the FDC was as simple as it was
elever. Instead of dealing directly with the FDC, forest contractors would approach
local owners of comparments which would soon be up for haresting. The contractor
could easily find out ths by consulting the forest "working plan", an official
document which lists when comparments are to be logged and how much is to be
extracted. With this knowledge, the contractor approached the local owners offering to
buy their forest royalties. For the owners this had the obvious advantage of getting
paid on the spot, instead of having to wait until the comparment was to be logged.
The contractors generally offered to pay a fixed price, slightly higher than FDC' s
rates. For example, they offered to pay 60 rupees per cubic feet for cedar, against the
FDC's "fixed rate" of 51 rupees. To ensure that vilagers agreed to this proposition,
the contractor would in advanee enlist the support of influential elders, the "white
beards" (spin giris) and members of local consensual assemblies (jirga) by offering
them par of the profit. When the comparment comes up for tender, the contractor
enters the bidding competition. Since the contractor has already purchased the
royalties, he is able to undercut the tenders of all other bidders. The FDC on its side,
has to award the tender to the lowest bidder. To hide his identity to the FDC, a
contractor wil bid on the forest by using the nare of one of his relatives or his
attorney. The FDC can therefore only with gre at difficulty find out who is behind a
ten der bid.
The contractor who has purchased the royalties according to an agreed fixed price,
usually around 60 rupees per cubic foot for cedar, wil be refunded by the FDC after
the FDC has sold the timber according to the "net-sale system", that is the current
market price fetched at the timber market. For cedar the net-sale price is currently
about four times higher than the fixed price offered to locals. When the revenues from
the sale are divided, 40 per cent is government revenue and 60 per cent is refunded to
the locals as royalties. Since the contractor has already purchased the royalties, his
share of the profit (60 per cent) wil be transferred to him through his attorney. The
net profit to the contractor is therefore the difference between the costs of purehasing
the royalties based on the fixed price system, the costs of logging the comparment
and the sum transferred. back to him after the timber has been sold according to the
net-sale system. In both cases the FDC wil get its share of the revenue (40 per cent),
but the cornunity members reap only a fraction of what they would have eamed,
had they decided not to sell their royalties, and opted for the net-sale system directly.
However, vilagers tend to distrust government officials, hence are suspicious of the
net-sale system and instead favour the fixed priced system which is tried and tested.
This, then, is one reason why deforestation in Pakstan is rampant, and shows no
signs of abating. Rather than being a "tragedy of the commons", the current
deforestation in Pakistan could more aptly be described as a "tragedy of the
commoners" (McCay 1987:196).
Source: Knudsen, forthcornng
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Commoditization of fores t and dismantling of village
commons
It is commonplace to decry state usurpation of forest management, less
common, however, to assess the degree to which local resource
management actually contributed to conservation of forest. Based on their
comparison of different Pakstani case studies, Dove and Rao (1990, 1992)
argue in favour of re-establishing local institutions for resourCè'.
management. This conclusion builds, in par, on Dove and Rao' s analysis
of Fredrik Barh' s (1980b (1959)) classic study of political systems in Swat,
Northern Pakistan. Dove and Rao argue that the periodic reallotment of
land (wesh), and movement of descent group segments, "equalized their
impact on the environment" (1992:242). This is, however, unconvincing,
especially when the authors' concede that in the Swat case, periodic
reallotment in fact hindered planting of trees which could not be harvested
within the normal allotment period of five to ten years. Apart from Dove
and Rao's general misinterpretation of Barh's Swat ethnography, their
neglect ofthis crucial point can perhaps be attributed to their eagemess to
support a local management mode!.
Whereas local management practices reduced pressure on forest in
Pa1Qstan, forest was also preserved due to inaccessibility and lack of market
demand. Roads in paricular made harvesting of trees easier and opened for
.. commercial exploitation of forest. For a number of rural communities in
Northern Pakistan forest is currently the only local commodity which can
be sold to alleviate poverty. However, recent studies suggest that the profits
from commerciallogging have been implicated in the spre ad of organized
feuding. Lincoln Keiser (1986, 1991) has analyzed the spread of feuding in
Dir 'Kohistan (N orth West Frontier Province). Keiser argues that the new
roáds which were built opened new tracts of forest for commerciallogging
which, in turn, led to steeply increased local earnings. Moreover, the new
roads put the Kohistani communities within the reach of a proselytizing
Islamic sect, the Tablighi Jummaat, which expounded new notions of male
honour. The Tablighi Jummaat preached that preserving one's honour
(ghrairat, izzat) was a Muslim virtue, and that attempts to sullen it had to
be revenged. Income from logging was therefore invested in automatic
weapons, necessar to defend men's honour. Those who were unable to, or
unwilling to, defend themselves were dishonoured. The result was
institutionalized vengeance (dushmani), shifting alliances and blood
revenge. The rapid commoditization of forest represented a change from a
situation where forest was primarily used for local subsistence needs, to a
situatión where fores t represented huge cash earings. The commoditization
of a vill age commons contributed to the creation of severe social disruption.
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A similar type of development has been described by James Greenberg
(1981, 1989), who has analyzed a Mexican case where the change from
subsistence production of corn to cash cropping of coffee led to the
privatization of land which was formerly a village commons. Greenberg
(1981:195) relates how:
Ideally, all the vilagers should have equal access to communal lands.
..(but the)..planting of coffee on communal lands not only reduced the
vilagers' access to fertil e lands (as the best lands were given over to
coffee production) on which to plant corn, but forced further cnicial
reductions in the length of fallow periods as the remaining lands were
used more intensively. Because coffee trees may yield for thirty years or
more, land planted in coffee became "de facto" private property.
After coffee gained popularity as a cash crop, the privatization of
communal land shifted ownership into the hands of the rich, and alienated
the community members from their rightful access to land. Kin-solidarity
was replaced by distrust, and in a short time homicide spread among the
Chatino communities in Oaxaca. Homicide rates reached monstrous
proportions, and in the district Greenberg studied Tanged from sixteen to
twenty-nine times the national average (1989:xi). Greenberg explains the
spre ad of blood revenge first of all as the result of capitalist change and
intrusion, involving privatization of what was formerly a vill age commons.
The case material provided by Keiser and Greenberg provide us with
some disturbing empirical findings. First, they point to a causal link
between the dismantling of a vill age commons and the rise of communal
violence. Secondly, the commoditization of fores t and land respectively,
alienated small-holders and introduced huge sums of money into what could
.be termed "closed corporate communities" (Wolf 1957). This in turn,
stared a process which replaced the communal ethos with enmity and
revenge killings. The studies by Keiser and Greenberg show that communal
ideals may, under certain circumstances, break down with the dissolution
of communal resources and show the problems faced by local communities
in adapting to a situation where a vill age commons is transformed into a
valued commodity. The severity of the social response to such changes,
reflects Taylor' s claim (1987) that community control with valuable
resources can give rise to violence (see chapter Il).
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When is "communal land" communal?
An example of the tacit change of property rights is Michael Cernea' s
(1985, 1988, 1989) description of the problems faced by a forest
development project in Azad Kashmir (bordering India and Pakstan). The
project s main goal was to interest farers in planting trees, and initially
to assistin afforesting 3000 acres of communalland (shamilaat) as well- as
planting certain smaller tracts of private and government land. Whereas"
forest. was normally planted only on government lands, the sociological
analysis which was undertaken in preparation for the project concluded that
more than 60 per cent of the total cultivated far land was communal
property. Based on this assumption, the project proceeded in 1978 to plant
trees on 100 acres of communalland, and in the following year was offered
additional 750 acres of communalland (1988: 143). The sudden abundance
of communal land surprised project leaders, and was much higher than
suggested by the pre-feasibility survey. To investigate the matter it was
agreed to look more closely into the complexities of forest rights. It was
found that villagers recognized three different types of property regimes:
state or Crown land (khalsa), communalland (shamilaat) and private lands
registered in the Revenue register (malkiat). Looking more closely at the
c ommun al land category, the project staff found that there was a
discrepancy between its legal (de jure) and actual (de facto) status.
.. Shamilaat land was not as expected communalland any more, but had over
the years become appropriated by large landowners. There was in other
words, a historical process which had changed de facto ownership of
shamilaat lands. The first step in this process had been the informal
partitioning of the shamilaat lands by a few families owning adjacent fields
(ibid.: 145). The next step was a progressive appropriation of the shamilaat
lands by linking them to ownership of private plots. This made shamilaats
inheritable as well as opening them to alienation through sale. Officially,
however, they kept their status as communalland. Since this meant that
they were not registered in the revenue records, they were exempted from
taxation. When tax on land was removed in Pakistan in 1974, the
appropriators moved swiftly to have the former shamilaat lands registered
as their private property.
The shamilaat plots which were offered to the forest project for planting
were in fact private property, and the owners naturally were eager to have
their plots planted with trees at the project sexpense. The villagers who
took advantage of the project s lack of understanding of local tenure were
unwilling to repay any of the cost for planting forest on their lands. This
group of wealthy villagers did, however, continue to be supportive of the
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project, especially since they were not afraid that their rights to land could
be threatened by the project. The smaller farers, however, were more
reluctant to paricipate, since they were afraid that they may lose possession
of any land they might offer for afforestation. They were also afraid that
they would be denied the right to collect fodder and cut grass for their
cattle.
Cernea' sexample shows that in the case of afforestation projects, and
development interventions in general, there is a need for a thorough
understanding of the system of local tenure. As such, this example support
the findings of Peters (1987) and Cheater (1990) concerning the problems
of adequately grasping the process of changing property rights (see chapter
I). There is, it seems, often a discrepancy between the cultural constitution
of property rights, that is, the normative level, and the changes in peoples'
practice which have taken place.
State versus local management of forest
With their common history, India and Pakistan share many of the same
problems in managing their forests. In India, forest was originally regulated
by the Indian Forest Act of 1878, which divided forest into three different
categories; reserved, protected and unc1assified (Commander 1986:328).
This secured the major part of India' s forest for state regulation (reserved),
and gave only limited use rights to local inhabitants. The reserved forests
suffer both from intense logging made possible by weak and corrpt
bureaucrats in the state forest deparment and widespread illegal logging by
tribal (adivasi) communities. To remedy this problem, a forest bill was
proposed in 1980 which entailed enhancing state powers and thus further
,marginalize the rights of tribal communities (ibid.:331ff.). So far, the
government has been unable to manage state forests and lacks the capacity
to control felling by forest dwellers. This institutional deficiency could,
argues Commander, be overcome if the state delegated management and
control to the villages themselves. Despite the few examples of successfully
managed vill age forests, Commander paints a bleak picture of forest
management in India.
In a similar vein as Commander, Jodha (1987, 1991, 1992) has pointed
to the general demise of common pool resources in India (see also Arold
and Stewar 1991; Wade 1992). Surveying 82 villages in seven different
states, Jodha concludes that since 1950, vill age commons have on average
declined 30 per cent, and in some places the decline is as high as 50 per
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cent. 
1 Still, villages included in the surve y derive from 14 to 23 per cent
of their income from common pool resources (Jodha 1991 :6). This dec1ine,
J odha argues, has eroded informal management practices and led to overuse
of the remaining forest and pastures. Traditional management practices
inc1uded the provision of watchmen who guarded forest resources, as welt
as grazing taxes and penalties for violation of regulations (ibid.:7). New
institutions such as vill age councils (panchayats) have not been able to
safeguard resources in the way the traditional system did. The new councils
are ineffective because they can only act on majority decisions. The
wealthy landlords who constitute the majority of the councils, have large
private land holdings and therefore lack theincentive to manage village
commons (ibid.: 10). In the few villages where traditional institutions were
still functioning, Jodha found that these tended to have fewer occupational
changes, less commercialization, less factionalism, lower socio-economic
differentiation, and being remote, were more impervious to state regulation.
India' s forest management is not, however, just a tale of unending
decline, patron age and rural apathy (Mönch and Bandyopadhyay 1986).
One of the most publicized events in the history of Indian forest
management was the grass roots protest against logging in Gharwal (Duar
Pradesh). In 1976, the Indian government decided reclassify about 10.000
hectares of community forests, and turn them into state (reserved) forests
(Sanwal 1989). To challenge this decision, villagers staged a successful
rally which later developed into a grass roots movement known by its
Sanskrit name Chipko ("hug the trees"). Studies of the Chipko movement
have tended to glorify it, and not fully understood the movement s roots in
local history (Guha 1989). Instead of being essentially an environmental
movement it is, argues Guha, an example of peasant resistance in defence
of forest rights. The history of peasant resistance can be traced back to
1885, when one of the first local rallies against the forest management of
the local raja took place. (For historical analyses of the struggle over forest
management in British India and the Western Himalayas, see Tucker 1982,
1984, 1988).
The environment al raison d être of the Chipko movement, is based on the
teachings of Hindu philosophy. It has been suggested that in India
The gradual dec1ine in cornon pool resources described by Jodha for India, seems to
be cornon for Sri Lanka toa (Bhogahawatte 1986). The three vilages surveyed by
Bhogawatte, received from 22 to 40 per cent of their income from local cornon pool
resources. The forest is controlled by the government, and felling of trees restricted.
Despite such restrictions, vilagers fell trees for domestie use as well for sale at urban
timber markets. On average, income from timber accounts for 11 per cent of household
eammgs.
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(Chanadrakanth et aL. 1990) and Pakstan (Dove and Rao 1990) one should
aim to incorporate the religious sanctions inherent in Hinduism and Islam
respectively to protect trees. Chandrakanth et aL. suggest afforesting land
owned by temples and religious institutions where religious sanctions would
ensure their protection. An example of this is Gadgil and Varak (1976)
study of sacred groves. Based on field research on India' s southwest coast,
they concluded that sacred groves in many cases had been the only
successful example of protection of forest. Previously, neither timber,
fuelwood nor dead leaves could be removed from the groves, but these
sanctions had been lifted in many places during the period following India's
independence. The groves were believed to be inhabited by guardian
deities,and removing forest products would cause the wrath of the spirits.
By contrast, groves which were not protected by deities but whose purpose
were to secure income for the priests have been destroyed. Still, sacred
groves are under attack too and Gadgil and Varak argue that in order to
protect them there is a need for government intervention (ibid.: 159).
Effects of nationalizing forests
Many blame the present problems of forest management in Nepal on the
devastating impact nationalization of forest in the 1950s had for the local
fore stry traditions (Messerschmidt 1986; Bromley and Chapagain 1984).
Among the Sherpas in highland Nepal there used to be elected vill age
officials who were in charge of protecting local forests. After nationali-
zation, when all forests (except trees on private land) were declared to be
state property, they were no longer needed and forest management quickly
decayed. It seems, however, that the consequences of nationalization of
forest in Nepal is more complex that is of ten acknowledged.
An example of this is Acharya's (1989) discussion of the effects of the
nationalization of forest with reference to the Jirel,a Tibeto-Burman
spe aking people in highland Nepal (Dolaka district). Acharya traces the
historical foundations of the Jire!' s present system of rights to forest and
rangelands. The historical rights to their lands extend back to the 18th
century, when the Jirel were incorporated into the kingdom of NepaL. They
were, however, allowed to keep their system of customary land tenure
(kipat). Whereas commercial forestry was encouraged in the lowland plains
(terai), strict rules were imposed to prevent felling of hill forests. In the
distant hill areas, much of the local control of forest was left to vill age
headmen. To strengthen state controlover forest, the new civil government
passed the Private Forest NationalIzation Act in 1957. Acharya argues that
contrary to many researchers who believe this led to full government
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control, remote hill dwellers such as the Jirel, were unaware of the Act.
Neither did they know about the Forest Act of 1969, which authorized
vill age councils (panchayats) to control vill age forests.
Among the Jirel ownership to forest and pasture are complex.' Forest is
perceived as consisting of three different resources; the landjtself, fodder
trees and non-fodder trees. Though the land itself is owned jointly by
members of a lineage, fodder-trees are privately owned and sub-divided into
species, age and size categories (ibid.:18). Due to the tight communal
control of forest, illegal felling of timber is rare, and if it happens, strongly
sanctioned. The Jirel communities are plural and inc1ude immgrant groups
such as Sherpas and Kamms, who unlike the Jirel, were not included in the
royal privilege of ownership to forest and rangelands. To accommodate
them, the Jirel has granted Sherpas and Kamms various usufruct rights,
allowing them for instance, to collect twigs and leaves.
A system of sanctions protects the trees; there is a general ban on cutting
green trees, collection of firewood is controlled and areas can be
symbolically closed for some activities but open to others. Whereas theft
and illegal felling is discouraged it does sometimes occur. Settlement of
conflict is preferably made in the vill age rather than reporting it to the local
range office. Adding to the complexity of forest management, the Jirel
share complementary usufruct rights with a neighbouring community of
ethnic Sherpas. The complex property regimes found among the Jire!, says
Acharya, "cannot well be comprehended by lumping them grosslyas
'forests' and 'pastures,' or as 'communal,' 'private' or 'state property'"
(ibid.:23). As such - and the reason for including it here - the description
offered by Acharya shows that the analytical "private" versus "communal"
dichotomy fails to account for the complex, interwoven property rights
characterizing management of forest and land among the Jire!. More
generally, the example underlines the importance of not to treat private,
communal and state property regimes in absolute terms, but as analytical
approximations which, depending on the context, may need to be further
sub-divided.
Localperceptions of forest
Approaching the problem of local forest management from another angle,
Bromley and Chapagain (1984) analyze the problems of fore st management
and collective action in Nepali villages. Bromley and Chapagain
interviewed about 140 household heads, presenting them with different
scenarios for forest management. Villagers were asked how they would
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allocate 100 Nepali rupees in a situation where they could chose to a) keep
it to themselves, or b) give it away for the benefit of the communal forest
or irrigation. In alternative b), they were told that the government would
match their investment rupee by rupee. The answers showed that the
average villager would keep circa 51 rupees to himself, and donate 49
rupees to the village for the benefit of the common good. Only 48
respondents (34 per cent) declined to give money to the village. Asking
more questions in similar fashion, Bromley and Chapagain conc1uded that
"free riding" was not a dominant strategy among Nepali villagers, and that
the current over-exploitation of resources was caused by the centralization
of . decision makng in relation to resource management. Is, however,
Bromley and Chapagain's "vill age against the centre" metaphor supported
by adequate data? It is plausible that the nationalization of forests made
things worse rather than better, but the hypotheticalquestions villagers were
asked to con sider do not give reliable information of whether they were as
committed to collective action and supportive of communal forestry as the
authors claim.
Opposed to Bromley and Chapagain's claim that Nepalese farers are
interested in vill age forestry, the conventional wisdom is that Nepalese
farmers are reluctant, even uninterested in tree-planting. This point is
discussed by Müller-Böker (1991) who has compared the knowledge and
evaluation of the environment in two Nepalese locations (Gorkha and
Chitwan, Middle Hills). She found that the ethnic Tauru inhabitants in
Chitwan had a very strong affinity with their forest, whereas the Gorkha
(consisting of many related ethnic groups ) did not state any particular
affinity with the forest, despite the fact that it was economically important
to both groups. Another study by Carer (1992), describes the widespread
practice of planting trees on private land in the Middle Hills of Nepal
(Dolakha District). Carer interprets this as a response to the overall decline
of communal forests. He concedes, however, that the practice of planting
trees varies from one household to the next, and is more common among
well-to-do households than among poor ones. Similarly Metz (1990) argues
that there is a community initiative to protect the remaining forest, and to
plant new trees in Western Nepal (Chimkola). Despite recent attempts to
con serve forests including, among other things, a ban on firewood and
fodder collecting around the village, these measures will not be effective,
says Metz, as long as the browsing livestock is not moved out of the
remaining forest.
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Political links and vested interests
The rapid depletion of forest is not unique to South Asia, but also
commonly found in Africa. Freudenberger (1991) describes how the
Mbegué forest, one of the few remaining wooded areas in Senegal, was cut
in one concerted effort in 1991. The forest. which was very important to the
ca. 6000 FulBe pastoralists and their livestock was felled to make room fot.
commercial peanut production. The rapid felling of the forest was made
. possible by. elose ties between the Mouride brotherhood - an enterprising
Islamic movement - and the government. As one of the major Sufi sects
in Senegal, the Mouride brotherhood was able to wield its political
influence to get the government' s approval for turning forested land into
arable fields for intensive peanut production. Senegalese authorities were
criticized by the World Bank for their role in the felling of the Mbegué
forest, but neither took steps to prevent felling of the scattered trees which
remained, nor was any action take n to aid the destitute FulBe pastoralists.
The case of the Mbegué forest is not a unique example. The Gishwati
Preserve in Rwanda, one of the two largest remaining forests in the
country, was cut down as par of a World Bank sponsored project meant to
support the development of a commercial dairyproduction among Tutsi
pastoralists (Ford 1990:54). These examples show that state management
of forest does not necessarily contribute to conservation: on the contrary,
state management may serve to increase the political elout of vested
interests and stakeholders, and reduce the capability to protect fores t.
In Asia as well as Africa, forests are not only threatened by
nationalization, but also imperiled by new rural-urban linkages and the
demand for firewood in the cities. In a case study from the Bay Region of
Somalia, Shepherd (1989; see also, FAO 1993:168) discusses how acacia
trees have come under acute pressure from the demand for charcoal in the
nearby capital Mogadishu. Due to the demand for charcoal, the government
does not want to stop the fellìng of trees needed for charcoal production
(Shepherd 1989:56). The agro-pastoral residents of the Bay region were
dependent on trees for housing materials, browse for animals, and used
trees to make different agricultural equipment. Prior to 1960 the right to
land was defined according to elan membership. With the nationalization
of land, elan rights were abolished, and there was no longer any legitimate
justification for exeluding outsiders such as charcoal producers.
Shepherd' s point about nationalization and erosion of traditional
management of forest is supported by Dei's (1992) study of the gradual
weakening of communal fore stry and the deeline of tropical rainforest in
Ghana. Traditionally, rights of usufruct were secured through the
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matrilineage (abusa), and all land was initially communalland. Land could
not be sold, neither could rightful users be alienated. Wage labour has
served to change traditional arangements and there is a gradual decrease
in c ommun al land, and a concomitant increase in private land holdings. At
present land rights can also be acquired through tenancy contracts of
various types. Trees were considered to be village property ,and some
species were considered sacred, or were protected through restrictions on
felling. With the growth of commercial agriculture in the 1970s,
government land-reforms promoted a gradual relaxation of the rules which
had governed the use of communalland. This resulted in an increase in the
purchase of private land, anda gradual, loss of kin-group control.
Traditionally, trees growing on communalland could not be felled without
user-group consent. The gradual shift to private landholdings, however, left
trees without such protection, and they could now be felled at the discretion
of the owner. Moreover, the policy of granting multinational companies as .
well as local firms concessions for commercIal logging on state owned
lands has contributed to deforestation. Summarizing the changes, Dei
(ibid.:84) argues that:
The transformation of traditional institutional mechanisms and
arrangements in property rights (e.g., privatization of communallands)
removed community safeguards protecting the forest and its trees. In some
cases, local institutions have been subverted or manipulated by the state,
external forces, or even forces from within the community itself for their
selfish interests.
Farmers ' perceptions of trees
. In an overview of communal fores t management in the semi-arid and sub-
humid areas of Africa, Shepherd (1991) argues that it would be mistaken
to treat forestry as separate from farmland management (ibid.: 151). This
point is supported by Thomson et aL.'s (1986) study from the West African
Sahel which shows how local forest management was intertwined with
farming, and how this delicate balance wasoffset by the imposition of
misguided forest policies. To understand the present problems of forest
management in Zinder (Niger), the authors argue, one needs to look at
changes occurring during three different stages: the period when trees
where relatively abundant (1884-1935), the equilibrium period (1935-1974)
and finally, when scarcity was becoming evident (1974-1984). During the
earliest period (1884-1935) the ethnic Hausa inhabitants planted and owned
privately two species which were valuable as food - baobab and date palms
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- as well as a nitrogen fixing tree (Acacia albida) which was protected by
decree of the Sultan. All other tree species could be used freely by anyone,
and since forest was plentiful, people of ten cut trees to make ro om for
fields.
During the equilibrium period (1935-1974), demand for forest and forest
. products could still be met, and though farmers were free to fence private'
plots to protect their trees, they lacked both the incentives as well as proper
material (barbed wire). In 1935 the French established their fores t service,
which took little notice of management traditions at the vill age level
(ibid.:399). The new legislation introduced the concept of state forests, and
went on to regulate the use of the most valuable tree species. The law did,
however, make provision for customary rights to non-protected species. The
contents of the new law was not known to many of the farmers, but
traditional tenure did not change much before the strictures of the new law
were enforced by appointed forest guards. Those who were fined for cutting
trees illegally quickly adopted the strategy of bribing the local fores t guards
and village informants. Even by the 1960s, however, trees were not
considered to be scarce, despite the fact that the new forest code had
removed the incentive for planting trees. In many instances farmers
destroyed seedlings in their fields. They feared that if they were allowed to
grow, the ban on lopping or cutting trees (ibid.:402), would cause the full
grown trees to cast a shadow on their fields and therefore reduce their
crops. During the third period (1974-1984), people began feel the effects
of the misguided forest policy and suffered from the scarcity of wood. The
protected Acacia species, however, was still fairly common. To remedy the
lack of trees, the government promoted the creation of fenced woodlots, but
they were not successful because villagers feared that the woodlots would
remain government property. Summarzing the development of forest in
Niger, Thomson et aL. (1986) conclude that the Hausa inhabitants neither
had a tradition for, nor the inclination to manage resources as a collective.
Given this lack of institutional backing, the costs of setting up and
organizing communal forest management became prohibitively large. In this
case, it was not local institutions which broke down, but the state' s forest
policies which did not take into account that it was the relative abundance
of trees, rather than careful management which characterized peoples'
attitudes towards forest resources.
Furthermore, peoples' attitudes to forest reflect whether fore st is
important to their adaptation or not. Pastoralists and agriculturalists usually
differ in their perceptionof forest and this becomes paricularly acutewhen
they compete for the same territories. In a case study of forests in Africa' s
montane regions, Ngoufo (1992) describes how the natural forest in the
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Bamboutos mountains, a vo1canic massif in western Cameroon, has been
"almost completely demolished..(through the)..assault of farmers"
(ibid.:356). The demise of local forest is, according to Ngoufo, caused by
severe conflicts between farmers andpastoralists. Twodecades ago the
Bamboutos mountains were used exc1usively by pastoralists, but the high
population density in the foothills, the meagre soilsand deficient
agricultural techniques, caused agriculturalists to expand into the
Bamboutos range from around 1970 and onwards. The result has been a
sharened conflict between the resident pastoralists and the encroaching
farmers. To stop the agricultural expansion, the local herdsmen "destroy the
enclosures around the farand and deliberately release their herds into
agricultural fields" (ibid.:356). To avenge such incursions the farmers
retaliate by "systematically slaughter the animals, poison them, or steal
them" (ibid. :356). Despite attempts by the government to mediate in the
conflict, the problems have not abated and erosion is high due to
overgrazing among pastoralists as well deliberate felling of vast tracts of
forest by farmers.
It should be evident from the examples in this chapter that forests in
Africa and South Asia are under pressure from diverse vested interests
which tend to undermine the sustainability of fore st management.
N ationalization of forest has not served to protect it, but replaced local
management systems with inefficient management plans. As a valuable
commodity, the forest can provide income to poor rural communities as
well as much needed state revenue. This has removed local and state
incentives to protect the forest. State intervention which Hardin (1968)
prescribed as the antidote to "the tragedy of the commons", is in this case
a par of the problem, not an element in its solution. Is, therefore, Hardin ' s
"hypothesis" refuted? It is to this question we will turn in the final chapter.
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5. Conclusions and directions for further
research
Introduction
In theprevious chapters there have be en attempts to give an .overview of
both various substantive (empirical) and theoretical contributions to the
study of property regimes. One problem with a report of this kind, is that
the conc1usions of such an exercIse largely reflect the case studies which
have been reviewed. This is, however, not a problem unique to this report,
but is a problem encountered by anthologies (Berkes 1989; Bromley 1992)
and monographs (Ostrom 1990) which constrct arguments and generate
hypothesis on the basis of case studies. The selection of case material is,
of course, neither totally haphazard, nor does it reflect a hidden agenda or
an axe to grind. The selection of aricles does, however, reflect some
unease with the penchant for reproducing arguments instead of questioning
them. Despite a hectic research activity, there is a considerable redundancy
in the study of common property regimes, and a tendency to repe at
arguments and launch criticisms which have already been absorbed by the
research community (Lees 1993). This is regrettable, because it has
obscured the need for a fresh look in the nooks and crannies of the field
itself to identify new research themes, which may pave the way for a novel
research agenda, and a need for restructuring the conventional framing of
the "tragedy of the commons" paradigm.
Models of what? Modelling agents and choice
The use of models is central to social science research and theory building.
However, one should not confuse "the reality of the mode!" with "the
model ofreality" (Jenkins 1992: 169). The differentgame theoretical models
which have been reviewed, represent approximations of the complex
empirical reality surrounding us (the model of reality), but even though
they may seem essentially realistic on their own terms (the reality of the
model), should not be confused with reality. Nevertheless, game theory
provides an important insight into the problems of collective action, which
lie at the hear of the problem of common property management. As such,
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the strength of a simple game theoretical model such as the "prisoner' s
dilemma", lies in its potential as an analytical model. That such a model
is not empirical, in the sense, can be falsified by empirical observations, do
not detract from its utility in research (Brox 1991:ch. 5). The same is true
for Gordon's (1954) "common property theory", which provides important
insights into the problems concerning harve st, effort and returns in
renewable natural resources, and distinguishes between returns of labour
and economic rent as well as the problem of rent dissipation (Brox
1990:230).
. The study of common property regimes is a field which attracts both
political scientists, economists and anthropologists. The field is multi-
disciplinary rather than inter-disciplinar, and a prerequisite for the
strengthening of the study of common property regimes is a tighter
integration between empirical and theoretical analyses. Theory, however,
is to a considerable degree the domain of economists, whereas empirical
studies - particularly in the field of renewable natural resources - is the
domain of the anthropologist. 1 It is symptomatic that "common property
theory" is regarded as providing a fundamental insight by economists, but,
is almost unanimously rejected by anthropologists (Berkes 1983, 1987). As
Brox (1990:228) has pointed out, this is grounded in a failure to distinguish
between analytical theories and empirical models. "Common property
theory" is neither a naturallaw nor a hypothesis but a theory. Likewise, the
"prisoner' s dilemma" is the foundation of a huge and sophisticated sub- field
of research among economists and mathematicians. Anthropologists by
contrast, have been content with questioning the logic of the prisoner' s
dilemma (which is inherent in Hardin's argument), and indifferent towards
exploring the ramifications of more complex game theoretical models and
arguments (Runge 1981, 1986).
What has anthropology's contribution to theory been? Apart from
empirically grounded analyses of local management systems (Ruddle et aL.
1992), the contribution of anthopology has first of all been the
documentation of in formal regulations and systems of local resource
management among fishermen (Acheson 1987, 1988) and pastoralists
(Dombrowski 1993; Stiles 1992). This is of course important in itself. It is
a problem, however, that the new empirical findings are generally used only
to debate substantive positions, but rarely to use these findings to build new
However, economic anthropology has long been an important subfield. For an excellent
overview of issues in econornc anthropology, see Gregory (1994). Other useful
introductions to econornc anthropology are Acheson (1989) and Halperin (1982).
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or alternative theory.2 To make any headway, there seems to be a need for
an integrated approach, which may inc1ude biologists, economists, political
scientists and anthropologists. The emerging new paradigm on the ecology
of African drylands (Scoones 1994) seems - even though it was initiated
by biologists - to be propell ed by an interdisciplinar research effort (Ellis
and Swift 1988). An obstacle to such an interdisciplinary exercise has been
the problem of finding a "language that niakes interdisciplinary discourse, .
possible" (Brox 1990:227). A first step in this direction is a willingness to
become familiar with modes of analysis and keyconcepts of related
disciplines.
The study of institutions is a field with interdisciplinary qualities, and has
a distinguished ancestry both in economics (Eggertsson 1990: 10), political
science (Shepsle 1989: 132) and anthropology (Polanyi 1944). The study of
"institutions" is also an attempt to model human behaviour and choice and
identify what it is that strctures human agency in society and, more
fundamentally, why human society is not a Hobbesian anarchy as the logic
of the "prisoner' s dilemma" would suggest. The concept of institutions is
used in order to grasp processes which contribute to change and continuity
in sociallife, and as such, institutions serve primarilyas heuristic devices.
However, one should be careful with reifying institutions: an institution is
not a "thing" or a tangible object (North 1990:107). Instead, institutions are
analytical constructs which we employ in order to analyze, and hopefully,
explain paricular aspects of sociallife and human behaviour. Institutions
are also analytically important in order to connect the micro-level of agents
and choice, with the macro-level outcome which broadly, wè may term
society.
It . seems that there is a need to integrate lessons from the field of
economics to explain institutional change in general, and the transition from
communal to private property rights in particular. The report has discussed
the contribution of one approach which offers a theoretical framework for
studying institutions, namely neoinstitutional economics (North 1990).
Neoinstitutional economIcs incorporates a theory of property rights (largely
borrowed from the "property rights school"), the concept of transaction
costs (hailing from Ronald Coase), and a theory of institutions (with the
2 In a forthcornng book, Baland and Platteau (1994) provide an unprecedented wide range
of case studies, but stil fall short of integrating these to build new theory. Typically,
they conc1ude that "our game theoretical analysis suggests that problems of the cornons
are not necessarily well depicted by the classic Prisoner's Dilerna" (ibid.:466). This
conc1usion is neither surprising, nor innovative, and is typical of the involution which
much "new". research on cornon property regimes suffer from.
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roots in the institutionalist approach of Karl Polanyi). Despite the critique
of neoinstitutional economics (Field 1981), it remains an approach which
offers analytical tools to the study of property regimes, and helps to explain
why private property replaces common property regimes or cases where
common property regimes persist. However, the problem of explaining
institutional change and innovation is still elusive, and there are
epistemological problems linked to the notion of "induced institutional
innovation" (Grabowski 1988).
Are "loe al institutions" an alternative?
At the outset of this report we proposed that local institutions for resource
management could be an alternative to the high transaction costs incurred
by state management and the exclusion of legitimate users that characterize
privatization. Based on the different case studies which have been reviewed,
it seems that local institutions - under certain conditions - do provide such
an alternative. The central problem is to predict under what conditions
people will choseto cooperate (Axelrod 1984; 1990:11-16). There may be
situations where it is rational to cooperate (Runge 1986), but as a rule
individual and group interests differ, a problem which increases with group
size (Olson 1965). Effective institutions are able to provide the assuranee
that other users will cooperate in the best interest of the collective, and this
can be achieved by finding the right balance between incentives, costs3 and
penalties (Kehoane and Ostrom 1995). Jf enough members ("the critical
mass") find that it is to their advantage to cooperate, this will spur the rest
to do the same (Runge 1992). However, a variety of factors may affect to
what degree institutions are able to provide compliance with informal rules
and regulations. During times of rapid social change, enforcement costs rise
and may exhaust the communal ethos which ensured group solidarity
(Greenberg 1989). In some cases, local institutions lack the legitimacy for
penalizing offenders, because they were rooted in an egalitarian ideology
which made coercIon impossible (Ensminger 1990).
Managing scarce resources mandates, as we have seen, rules of exc1usion
and inclusion (Ostrom 1990). In many cases, however, a further subdivision
of user-rights may be needed. This can be accomplished by a system of
graded access, ranging from full rights to limited rights. Instituting graded
access rights to a commons may take advantage of inherent systems of
3 The costs can be detailed as: "cost of intragroup enforcement, cost of extragroup
exclusion, cost of decision makng, and cost of coordination" (Feeny 1992:272).
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stratification in a society to create a hierarchy of user groups (Park 1992).
Some groups might enjoy more liberal access than others or have wider
rights of resource extraction (Gilles et aL. 1992). This suggests that we
should avoid the frequent mistake of making common property regimes
synonymous wIth equity when, instead, they of ten are premised on,
. hierarchy (Park 1992).
The term "institution" is analyticallyambiguous and plural, and is of ten
used in a haphazard manner. Hence, the report has emphasized the need for
a clearer analytical precision in the use of the terms "institution" and
"institutional". Institutions are frequently used to denote very different
empirical entities- a custom, a consensual assembly, a cooperative - and
it is therefore difficult to generalize on the basis of empirical studies which
institutions are durable and which are not. As the reviewed case material
shows, many of the durable common property regimes are premised on the
effective exc1usion of non-right holders (Netting 1981). To summarize the
lessons of the reviewed case material, the attributes of robust institutions
can be identified as:4
· organize a well defined user group which is identified by itself and
others by way of its locale, descent, custom etc. (circumscription)
· define who can (inclusion ) and who cannot use the resource (exclusion)
· if feasible, establish the extent of territories under group jurisdiction
(resource boundaries)
· users have long standing, historical claims to the resources
(legitimacy)
· users share similar traits or identities, or are an interest group
(homogeneity)
· provide confidence that legitimate user will comply with rules, hence
restrains individual maximizing behaviour (assurance)
· punish offenders through a graded system of penalties (sanetions )
· provide legitimate users with a fair share of the harvest (equity)
· are able to avert incursion from other potential user groups, and
supervise legitimate users (monitoring)
· provide long-term stability by reducing the risk of over-harvesting
(security )
Naturally, not every institution for natural resource management fulfils all
these requirements, but will include some of them. Which of these are most
important is difficult to know a priori and is a matter of empirical
4 For a sirnlar overview of design principles, see Ostrom (1990:90).
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investigation. It is also difficult to specify under what circumstances local
institutions should be rebuilt or not. The case material which has been
reviewed points to the need for thorough research before the rebuilding of
institutions shouldbe contemplated (Vedeld 1994). There is also a need to
wam against reconstructing institutions about which we know little,
especially if we do not know what their prime function is. The sympathetic
reading of local ecological practice may lead to the conclusion that
indigenous peoples everywhere manage resources (Freeman and Carbyn
1988). This is not altogether clear, and instead, we need to question not
onlywhether there is an environmental ethic (Johannes 1982), but if there
are local management systems at all (Polunin 1984). Whether people
intentionally manage resources also applies to East African pastoralism. It
seems that some East African pastoralist groups manage their water
resources, which are more critical to their survival than pastures (Helland
1978, 1980), whereas other pastoral groups neither have a tradition for
water nor rangelands management. Researchers agree, however, that East
African pastoralists have not institutionalized measures aimed at restraining
herd growth (Behnke 1994). In order to resolve the question of conservation
measures among East African pastoralists, more historically (Anderson
1988) and contemporar (Scoones 1994) grounded research is needed.
It is a problem that research among small-scale communities has often
been conducted as if history did not matter. To counter this bias, this report
has purposely included historical case studies as a form of "retrospective
data collection" (Feeny 1992:273). The adoption of a longer time frame
makes it possible to say something about the origins of institutions for
common property management, as well as identifying features of enduring
common property regimes (Ostrom 1990). The case studies which have
been reviewed show a considerable variation; common property regimes
could be instituted through the initiative of local right holders (Netting
1981), or could be the result of feudal policies and decrees (Kalland 1984).
Moreover, by disregarding historical material, one may distort the
interpretation of contemporary adaptations (Anderson 1988). Historical
studies have also uncovered the need for a critical reflection when using
concepts such as "traditional" and "customary" which may be used to
validate claims to resources among user groups (Johannes 1982). The
problem of authenticity is also reflected in the use of the term "communal",
whose meaning can be transformed and manipulated by colonial (Peters
1987) and post-colonial authorities (Cheater 1990). Recasting and
reformulating the past in a mythological hotchpotch of communalism can
also can be found among small-scale communities (Taylor 1987).
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The "success" or the "tragedy" of the commons?
The two extreme positions of the common property regimes may be termed
the "success" and the "tragedy" of the commons respectively (Sandersen
n.d.). The "tragedy of the commons" position (Hardin 1968) is theoretically
linked to the claim that private property regimes represent the apex of an
evolutionar process (Demsetz 1967). The "success of the commons"
perspective (McKean 1992), on the other hand, claims that common
property regimes are regulated through informal management systems
(Berkes et aL. 1989), are not free for everybody to use (Ciriacy- W antrup
and Bishop 1975) and are frequently underpinned by local systems of
ecological("traditional") knowledge (Freeman and Carbyn 1988). The
contrasting views on common property regimes reflect different analytical
vantage points. Anthropologists tend to focus on common property regimes
as a cultural adaption, a management regime which reflects a communal
ethos (Taylor 1987). This perspective is commonly used as an argument in
favour of communal property arangements as a means to achieve equity
and sustainability. Opposed to this perspective, economists tend to analyze
common property regimes as an economic system (Gordon 1954; Scott
1955) - judging common property regimes on the basis of their
effectiveness and distributional effects - or as "gares" where different
scenarios can be modelled mathematically (Runge 1992).
As we have seen, actors' economic behaviour are constrained by both
economic and cultural factors. The fishery can legitimately be analyzed as
an economic system (Gordon 1954), even though case studies show that
fishermen's effort level does not always conform to the simple neoclassical
supply and demand model (Acheson 1985). Moreover, standard economic
models do not normally account for the variety of informal regulations
which affect fishing effort such as territoriality (Acheson 1988), information
management and secrecy (Andersen 1979b), non-market exchange (Tvedten
1990), self-imposed catch limits (McCay 1980), the internal organization
of the fishery operations (Jul-Larsen 1994) and guest fishing (Kalland
1991) .
Similarly, pastoralism may be viewed either as a sociological (Helland
1978) or an economic enterprise (Hardin 1968; Sommerville and Kerr
1988). Whereas the focus used to be on a crude version of the former -
Herskovits (1926) "cattIe complex" parable implied that people had an
irrational cultural affinity for cows - more recent (Barth 1980 (1964);
Haaland 1977) and contemporary studies (Behnke 1994; Dombrowski 1993)
have tried to combine the cultural and economic aspects of pastoralism and
pastoralist economic behaviour. Pastoralists seem to combine a diversity of
economic strategies which promote long term viability through, for
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example, the building of networks through the strategic lending of animals
(Stiles 1992), as well as husbandry strategies which are characterized by
deliberate overstocking (Ellis and Swift 1993) and the maximization of herd
growth (Behnke 1994; Helland 1990).
The case studies which have been reviewed show thatgood analyses
should aim at incorporating both an economic and a cultural perspective,
and focus on why property rights institutions change and how certain traits
- biologic, economic or social - promote certain property rights regimes.
Factors such as low or sub-maximum productivity, huge exclusion and
maintenance costs or high environmental uncertainty (Ellis and Swift 1988),
seem, initially, to be elements which favour communal arrangements. This
would mean that, for example, African rangelands would be typical for a
situation which favours common property regimes. As we have seen, the
privatization of rangelands ("enclosures") occurs when the costs of
exclusion are lowered, either by the availability of cheap fencing material
(Behnke 1985; Anderson and Hill 1975) or the weakening of a pervasive
communal ethos (Helland 1993). This type of reasoning conforms to the
tenets of the "property rights paradigm" (Demsetz 1967). What is lacking
in this paricular approach, however, is the role of the state in defining
property rights.
The state, stratification and equity
As a number of scholars have pointed out, a theory of property rights is
incomplete without a theory of the state (North 1977; Furubotn and
Pejovich 1972). The emergence of the modern nation state has
fundamentally changed the system of creating and protecting property rights
(Eggertsson 1990:319). However, state control with resources is not a
modern phenomenon: imperial feudalism in Japan (Kalland 1984, 1991)
was instrumental in awarding villages access to coastal fisheries. In Africa,
the colonial powers took control of, and altered local systems of land tenure
and rangelands management (Anderson 1988; Peters 1984). Modern case
studies, however, also point to the possibility that the nation state leaves
matters of re source jurisdiction to local user groups (Acheson 1988).
Thequestion has been raised whether the term "property" is analytically
linked to the concept of the modern state (Durrenberger and Pálsson 1987a,
1987b). Jf this is right, it would imply that it is wrong to use the concept
"property rights" in situations where there is no state. This, however, does
not seem to be a common view: North and Thomas (1977:235) analyze the
"neolithic revolution" - the transition from hunting to agriculture - within
a framework of property rights theory. North and Thomas perceive this shift
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as the first tangible example of creating property rights through c10sing the
open commons.
It has been argued that states are typically unable to provide efficient
institutions and appropriate structures of property rights (Eggertsson
1990:320). Moreover, the state is often competing with Iocal communities
for the controlover resources (Shepherd 1989), and state intervention tends
to erode the foundations of local institutiuns and increase the enforcement .
costs (Ensminger 1990; Jentoft 1987; McCay 1978). State management of
forests seems, in particular, to lack legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of
local populations. In many South Asian countries this problem is pariculary
widespread and has long historical antecedents. Forest legislation reflects
the historical usuration of forest by the colonial powers (Tucker 1982,
1988) and local rajas (Guha 1989). The combination of a high market
demand, a slow biological growth rate and bureaucratic failure and
corrption means that the forest is paricularly susceptible to over-
exploitation. Whereas local institutions used to prescribe strict rules for the
extraction of timber, commercial interests exploit the need for cash among
the rural poor (Guggenheim and Spears 1991). Not only have local
institutions broken down in the process of dismantling forest commons
(Jodha 1991), but greed and envy have weakened village solidarity and
promoted the growth of enmity and revenge (Greenberg 1989; Keiser
1991).
The state and the local communities may, however, choose to cooperate,
for example by having state agencies taking over the task of monitoring
regulations (Berkes 1986), or by a more fundamental agreement where the
state and local institutions share the responsibility of defining and enforcing
regulations, a management regime referred to as co-management (Acheson
1989b; Jentoft 1989). Another possibility for the formalization of local
resource management, is the institution of cooperatives either through local
initiative (Berkes 1986; Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989; McCay 1980), or
government sponsorship (Jentoft 1986). Cooperatives in the form of
government sponsored group ranches have been a favoured strategy for
turning nomadic pastoralism into commercIal beef production (Anderson
1988; Galaty 1992).
This brings us to the consequences of the spread of market forces which
tend to promote new standards ofvalue - from use-value to exchange-value
- which increase the incentive for profit maximization (Dahl 1988). The
introduction of market forces can promote wasteful harve sting methods
(Johannes 1978) and ruin indigenous environmental ethics (Riewe and
Gamble, in Freeman and Carbyn 1988:35). The impact of market forces
may, however, be constrained by culturally constituted systems of non-
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market exchange (Tvedten 1990), firm control of exclusion and inc1usion
vested with corporate descent groups (Hviding and Baines 1994) or through
a system of where only citizenship confers legitimate access to local
resources (Netting 1981). Local institutions may also be harmed by
"predatory elites" (Nicholson 1993:26), which have vested interests in
controlling local resources or systematicallydisadvantage certain groups of
society, a problem which in paricular affects pastoralists (Freudenberger
1991; Galaty 1992). Misguided development interventions can also be
caused by "false design assumptions" (Cernea 1989:9), which may result
in resource scarcity due insufficient understanding of local fores t
management practices (Thomson et aL. 1986). Finally, local entrepreneurs
may play a crucial role as intermediares between state agencies and local
custodians, thereby facilitating commercial exploitation of fores t which
erodes traditional conservation measures (Knudsen, forthcoming).
Another problem concerns different responses to the introduction of new
technology (Goodlad 1972). This problem is especially relevant to fisheries,
where the introduction of more efficient fishing gear may lead to friction
between those who invest in modern gear, and those who prefer simpler
technology which is more labour intensive (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989).
The question of adoption of new technology (Moberg and Dyer 1994) is
connected to the problem of innovation. Durable management systems may
reflect a robust institutional setting (Hviding and Baines 1994), but may
alternatively be viewed as an inability to adapt to commercialization
(Johannes 1981). This contradietion is so important that it is worth
repeating Lees' (1993: 109) observation that "disincentives, while protecting
the pool of common property resources, also curb individual
entrepreneurship, investment, experimentation, and innovation". Lees' point
should not be taken lightly: if she is right, there is a need for "rethinking
the commons", both as an analytical construct and as an object of study.
Rethinking the commons?
In the beginning of this report it was claimed that research on common
property regimes has been stifled by the tendency to refine and re-use
familiar and well-wom arguments instead of questioning them (Lees 1993).
Instead of a further refinement along existing lines of scholarship, we first
need to ask: what is the object of study?
More than a conceptual confusion (Bromley and Cernea 1989), "common
property" as an object of study is blurred: Is "common property" a)
primarilya behavioural relation between men (Demsetz 1967; Furubotn and
Pejovich 1972); b) a question of agents and choice which can be solved
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through balancing incentives (e.g., penalties) (Runge 1992); c) foremost a
problem of markets (Bromley 1989b) and a question of "getting the prices
right" (Nicholson 1993:7); or finally, d) a question of institutions and how
institutions structure human action (North 1990)?
Theanswer is, it seems, that the study of common property regimes
needs to integrate all these modes of analysis. Naturally, different
theoretical approaches prescribe different solutions to the "tragedy of the
co.mmons" problem; state intervention and coercion, privatization, markets
and price mechanisms, and institutional design. In this report the emphasis
has been on the latter (institutional design) and the question has been raised
whether institutions contribute to conservation. In retrospect, it can be
argued that this question cannot be answered because it is toa general: to
answer it, we need to ask a) what is an "institution" (analytically), and b)
which social phenomena qualify as an institution (empirically) (North
1991).
The blunt statement of a fisherman: "Boats don' t fish, people do" (Miller
and van Maanen 1979), may seem a self-evident empirical fact. In the study
of institutions, however, the distinction between objects and agents is of ten
missing. Institutions in themselves do not conserve, but do - according to
the voluntaristic (Askvik 1993) view of institutions - reflect processes of
human agency. The study of institutions, therefore, cannot progress without
a theory of action. Rational choice is a theory of human agency which
underpins both neoclassical and neoinstitutional economics (Eggertsson
1993:ch. 1). However, rational choice is not a theoretical panacea for
understanding human behaviour. Rationality differs from the vantage point
of the individual and that of the collective (Olson 1965). Actors' choices
also reflect the time horizon (Angelsen 1991), and, in general, actors seem
to be psychologically inc1ined to prefer short term benefits over
sustainability in the long term (Moxnes 1993). Moreover, as game theory
has demonstrated, unconstrained actors tend to "free ride" (Runge 1984).
Does this mean that Hardin's "heuristic fable" (McEvoy 1988:213) - the
tragedy of the commons - was correct after all? As several authors have
taken pains to demonstrate, actors are implicated in dense socIal networks
and webs of social relationships, which serve to constrain their individual
freedom of action. This is true not only of complex societies in the
developing world (Hviding and Baines 1994; Tvedten 1990), but also a
feature of modern societies in the West (Acheson 1988; Netting 1981).
Besides, cultural proscriptions may hinder commercialization (Johannes
1981), which, generally speakng, is a prerequisite for privatization to
occur.
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The prospect of integrating the two contesting paradigms of human
behaviour - Homo economicus and Homo sociologicus - are slim and this
duality will continue to provoke debate in the social sciences (Heap et aL.
1992:71). That Hardin preferred the former over the latter does not imply
that he was "wrong" . Instead Hardinshould be credited for bringing our
attention to questions of gre at importance, simply rebutting or rephrasing
his argument brings us nowhere. To advance the study of common property .
regimes it is necessar to recast old questions, reformulate research designs
and refine our analytical tools.
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